FORMER COMMANDER LOOKS BACK ON RAB'S ORIGINS AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002078 SIPDIS SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016 TAGS: PTER KISL KCRM PHUM BG SUBJECT: FORMER COMMANDER LOOKS BACK ON RAB'S ORIGINS AND MISSION REF: 05 DHAKA 02603 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS FOR REASONS(s): 1.4 (c) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The former deputy commander of RAB recounted the origins of the controversial anti-crime unit, disparaged the skills and integrity of police, and cited the interrogations of JMB suspects to suggest that the BDG's zeal in arresting the August 17 bombers ironically triggered as retaliation JMB's deadly campaign of terror in late 2005. End summary. ¶2. (S/NF) On April 5, Brigadier General Chowdhury Fazlul Bari, now Counter Intelligence Director of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) but previously the deputy commander of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), discussed on the margins of the 2006 PASOC conference in Hawaii, attended by poloff, his RAB experiences and his observation of Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) interrogations. Raising RAB -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) "I was there at the initial planning," Bari recalled. The original personnel plan had been to have 44 percent military, 44 percent police, and 12 percent from the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR),but the police were reluctant to fill their slots because they "earned more money on the outside" from bribes and other illicit activities. Senior police officers, he claimed, preferred to sit in their offices. The police, he agreed, operate like a giant pyramid scheme, where street personnel pass payoffs up to their bosses. Corruption, he added, was one reason police failed to capture JMB commander Sheikh Abdur Rahman. ¶4. (S/NF) Bari noted that RAB now comprises 10 battalions of 600 men each and will soon grow to 12 battalions. He complained that the police remain unwilling to second able personnel, often providing instead the old and physically unfit. Police personnel lack basic skills, such as shooting, and have no training in special operations. He pleaded for more training for RAB to enhance its capabilities in CT and other areas. ¶5. (S/NF) When RAB was first established, Bari said, they only had old police weapons and vehicles, but now they have new weapons from the military, new vehicles, and three Chinese-made armored personnel vehicles. Asked if there was one political sponsor of RAB, Bari said no, there were several. Bari added that the PM herself selected the black RAB uniforms from six alternate designs, including the distinctive black RAB "doo-rag." JMB --- ¶6. (S/NF) Bari described JMB as a "home grown" military organization. Abdur Rahman, he said, studied Arabic in South Asia, visited India and Pakistan twice, and in 1996 started learning from ISI in Pakistan how to make improvised explosive devices and use AK-47s. ISI, Bari stated, wanted to use Rahman in Kashmir, but Rahman chose to return to Bangladesh instead and form JMB. ¶7. (S/NF) In 2002, an accidental explosion at a JMB safe house alerted the BDG to JMB's bomb-making activities, Bari continued. He described JMB operatives as poor people who flunked out of madrassahs. Being poor, they could easily blend in "as rickshaw pullers and hawkers" and go anywhere to recruit for JMB. ¶8. (S/NF) In his current capacity at DGFI, Bari was present at many of Rahman's interrogations. Rahman reportedly stated that he ordered the August 17 bombings to spread JMB's demand for sharia Law, that there was no intent to kill anyone, and that there was "no law against setting off firecrackers." Furthermore, since there were "no splinters in the bombs, how can you charge me?" Bari expressed sympathy with that point, stating that the two fatalities that day stemmed from "shock" and not the explosions themselves. ¶9. (S/NF) Taking the August 17 explosions seriously, law DHAKA 00002078 002 OF 002 enforcement personnel, Bari said, quickly arrested 70 persons involved with the blasts, which angered the JMB rank-and-file and generated internal pressure on Rahman to retaliate and demonstrate that JMB remained a viable entity. The result, Bari claimed, was the onset in October of the deadly attacks on the judicial system. Comment -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Bari is a forceful advocate for RAB. In a June 2005 conversation with us, he described "cross-fire" killings as a necessary, short-term expedient, and stated that "due process is (RAB's) objective." Military disdain for the police is not new, and police failings are often cited to justify the military's continuing dominance of RAB--about 80 percent of its total force structure and virtually all of its senior officers except for the director general himself. ¶11. (S/NF) It is an interesting twist to suggest, as Bari did, that the deadly JMB attacks in late 2005 were an unplanned action triggered by BDG zeal in rounding up August 17 bombers. However, along with downplaying JMB's religious credentials as failed madrassah students and describing JMB as home-grown, Bari is toeing the BDG line that JMB operatives were basically local yokels with little or no interest in "true" Islam. BUTENIS