1.
4(d).



1. (C) SUMMARY. Since 2002, the Government of Tanzania (GOT)
has been partnering with the U.S. to collect information and
screen travelers at major entry points using the Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES). Through the GOT's own initiative, Tanzania's
Immigration Department is also currently in the process of
rolling out a new computerized visa system to points of entry
and diplomatic missions abroad. The system will use the GOT
Immigration Department's Prohibited Immigrants List as its
primary watchlist to ensure unwanted foreigners do not enter
Tanzania. Although using a variety of international
watchlists, the GOT has not yet integrated these lists and
information sharing between key GOT agencies is limited.
Another challenge to the GOT's collection of biographic data
on suspected terrorists is that PISCES is neither
interconnected at different border points nor managed
centrally to ensure timely, accurate information exchange.
The USG and GOT have been working as partners and sharing
information in the global war on terror in the wake of the
1998 bombing. Potential for greater sharing and partnership
exists, especially to enhance existing systems, such as
PISCES, and to encourage better use and management of
existing watchlists. Completing PISCES is an imperative
under Post's MPP CT goal paper and we believe sharing of
watchlists and ultimately connection of PISCES networks
across boundaries should be components of the Secretary's
Regional Strategic Initiative for East Africa. END SUMMARY.

Immigration Database:


--------------------------




2. (SBU) Assistant Director of Immigration, Magnus Ulongi,
explained that the Government of Tanzania (GOT) was currently
piloting a new immigration visa system. In 2004, the GOT
began developing the visa system and by early 2006, the GOT
started to pilot the system at three major points of entry:
Dar es Salaam International Airport (DIA), Kilimanjaro
International Airport (KIA) and Zanzibar International
Airport (ZIA). The GOT's plan is to deploy the system at
over 50 points of entry and diplomatic missions abroad. He
said that the Immigration Department had a system of
"grading" entry points (large, medium and small) based on
their size and that the system would be rolled out to the
"large" entry points first over the next several years. A
Dutch contractor developed and implemented the system but the
GOT has provided full funding for the project, according to
Ulongi.



3. (C) Ulongi highlighted two challenges to the new visa
system's effectiveness. The first challenge, he explained,
was to ensure sufficient capacity to operate the system.
"The training takes place in the Netherlands and we need to
ensure over the long run that we have sufficient staff
trained to operate the system at entry points and diplomatic
missions around the world," Ulongi said. The second
challenge he stressed was that government systems namely, the
visa system and PISCES (Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System), were not integrated.
"Without these systems integrated, our control mechanisms are
weaker and our information remains stovepiped," he told
Poloff.



4. (C) According to Ulongi, the new visa system is based on
the Immigration Department's watchlist known as the
"Prohibited Immigrants List" - a list which dates back to the
1950s and comprises foreigners suspected of transnational
crimes. While noting that the list had hundred of names on
it, Ulongi said that he was not sure of any method or effort
to systematically update the list.

Watchlists and Information Sharing:


--------------------------




5. (C) Tanzania currently uses PISCES to screen travelers at
four major points of entry: KIA, DIA, ZIA and Namanga (a
border crossing with Kenya). In addition to the Prohibited
Immigrants List, the GOT has a variety of international
watchlists including lists provided by Interpol, United

DAR ES SAL 00001944 002 OF 002


Nations (UN), and the U.S. Although Ulongi noted that the
GOT had various watchlists, he explained that the GOT did not
have any "master list" and that information sharing between
Tanzania's police force, intelligence service and Immigration
Department was limited. "The police and the Tanzanian
Intelligence Service (TIS) are supposed to give us names for
the Prohibited Immigrants Lists, but they often don't," he
said, highlighting the relatively low level of information
sharing within the GOT. Ulongi also lamented that PISCES was
not interconnected: "To make PISCES work, we really need to
link points of entry and ensure the system is administered
centrally. Otherwise, it's effectiveness will be reduced."

(Comment: Post is currently conducting a National CT Center
Workshop which has drawn senior-level participation from
across the Tanzanian government, including the National
Police, military, immigration, and customs. We believe
creation of this center will help address coordination issues
like watchlist integration, and therefore we have made
creation and further development of this center a top MPP CT
objective.)



6. (C) Tanzania does not have any bilateral or multilateral
watchlist agreements with its neighbors, but Ulongi said that
the East African Community (EAC) was currently in the process
of developing common immigration practices. "In a joint
initiative, under the International Organization of Migration
(IOM), the EAC is currently working to streamline the visa
regime," Ulongi explained. He was not aware, however, of
any precise timeframe for implementation of this standardized
visa regime.

Biometrics:


--------------------------




7. (SBU) Tanzania does not have any biometrics systems in
place nor any plans to install such systems in the near
future. In March 2005, the GOT introduced a machine readable
passport, but the passports do not include biometric data.

Comment: Tanzania Already a Partner


--------------------------




8. (C) The GOT and USG already cooperate as data sharing
partners in a variety of areas ranging from law enforcement
and forensics, to narcotics and counterterrorist financing.
Although the GOT does not formally share its domestic
watchlist with the USG, there is potential for additional
data sharing on this front. There is little to no risk that
the GOT's watchlist ("Prohibited Immigrants List") would
include political dissidents since the list does not include
Tanzanian citizens. There is also little risk that the GOT
would use USG watchlists inappropriately. While additional
exchange of watchlists may be possible, Post views the most
pressing matter to be improving the GOT's management of
existing watchlists. As noted above, Tanzania has a variety
of watchlists, but the use and effectiveness of these
watchlists remains questionable. Linkage of PISCES and
encouraging greater interagency cooperation within the GOT,
would significantly improve Tanzania's pursuit of terrorist
information. END COMMENT.
RETZER