Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS701
2006-02-21 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:
ANNOUNCEMENT TO FUND OPPOSITION HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS, OTHERS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHDM #0701/01 0521449 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211449Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7237 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0656 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000701
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT TO FUND OPPOSITION HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS, OTHERS
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000701
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT TO FUND OPPOSITION HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS, OTHERS
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Post contacts have been quick to condemn
the USG’s public statement announcing the designation of five
million USD for support of the Syrian opposition, calling it
"nave" and "harmful." Contacts insist that the statement
has already hurt the opposition, and that the SARG will use
it in the coming months to further discredit its opponents as
agents of the Americans. We have also heard repeatedly that
no bona fide opposition member will be courageous enough to
accept funding. Contacts noted that the announcement could
benefit the SARG, since NGO’s with ties (often covert) to the
SARG or its security services could be encouraged to apply
for the funds. Several contacts insisted that the
initiative indicated the U.S. did not really care about the
opposition, but merely wanted to use it as "a chip in the
game." One contact praised the funding but said the amount
was paltry compared with what had been set aside for the
Iranian opposition. End Summary.
2. (C) Embassy contacts expressed frustration with the USG’s
February 17 public statement announcing the designation of
five million USD for support of the Syrian opposition.
Contacts agreed that the very public way in which the
initiative was launched would hurt the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that such funding initiatives are good but should be kept secret.
XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the opposition is poor and mechanisms should be created to fund their endeavors; however, "we must be very careful" and if such actions are done in the wrong way, it is very
harmful to the opposition’s efforts. XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the example
of Rafiq Hariri’s initial philanthropic work in Lebanon in
the early 1990s as an intelligent, strategic means of opening
the door for more political activism: "You have to find the
right channel to help people."
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX related that at a February 18 meeting of about
twenty Damascus Declaration participants, those assembled had
decided to publicly denounce the MEPI project because they
felt they had to, in order to avoid even more SARG scrutiny.
XXXXXXXXXXXX, said that the general consensus among XXXXXXXXXXXX civil society and opposition colleagues had been that the USG is "not serious about us" and that the public announcement was "just to put pressure on the regime with no regard for the opposition." "We are just a chip in the game," he asserted.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the announcement made it far too risky now for anyone with any credibility or a reputation to
protect to accept funding. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view, it is much more
difficult now for the U.S. to help strengthen the opposition
than it was before the announcement. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX,
either the USG is nave or it doesn’t care "and either conclusion is bad." When asked if XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that anyone would apply for funds, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that after the Damascus Declaration’s participants’ clear rejection of the funding initiative, it will be very hard. In addition, "who will dare to visit that website," with the SARG monitoring internet activity, he asked. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that it is against the law for Syrians to accept foreign funding, a
legal situation that makes it very easy for the SARG to
construe the acceptance of such funds as "treason, punishable
by death."
5. (C) WILL SARG HIJACK USG FUNDING? Contacts were also
quick to point out that the announcement could benefit the
SARG. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the SARG will be able to use the MEPI funding story as a propaganda tool against the opposition.
XXXXXXXXXXXX was concerned that the SARG would attempt to hijack USG funding by encouraging NGOs with strong government or
security ties to apply for MEPI funds, thus "draining" funds
from more worthy and independent NGOs.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX described the funding plan as a terrible
idea that will be used by the regime to discredit the opposition,
In XXXXXXXXXXX view, the announcement had already severely damaged the opposition, making all of them look, in the eyes of most Syrians, like agents for the U.S. And this is without any SARG exertions yet, added XXXXXXXXXXXX.
7. (C) Warming to XXXXXXXXXXXX subject, XXXXXXXXXXXX called the funding plan "poorly thought out," one that will weaken the opposition in Syria and also weaken any U.S. strategy for shaking the
regime. Echoing others, XXXXXXXXXXXX made the point that the U.S.
needed to be much more secretive, or at least discreet, if it wanted to fund the opposition and civil society in an effective way. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view the initiative would help the regime consolidate its position and would enhance, whether by design or not, "an Israeli agenda" that desired a weakened regime to stay in place.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, dismissed the funding plan as a stunt, saying
the amount of money was small and that the U.S. had already been funding the opposition secretly, without impact. The new initiative would make no real difference. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view, the announcement angered most Syrians, who viewed it as interference in the internal affairs of Syria, something that the U.S. always insisted that Syria should not do regarding Lebanon. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the U.S. should engage in dialogue with the Syrian regime and work for a stable, slowly democratizing country that could further U.S. interests in the region, instead of putting up obstacles to such dialogue.
9. (C) One embassy contact, XXXXXXXXXXXX, offered qualified
praise for the initiative, saying that XXXXXXXXXXXX was happy
about the funding, but critical of the public way that it was offered.
XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the USG’s pledge of $75 million to the Iranian opposition largely overshadowed the $5 million for Syrian efforts and raised questions about the US’s commitment to the Syrian opposition cause. XXXXXXXXXXXX was also quick to point out that most activists were afraid to say anything positive about the announcement. XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that activists may apply for funding but would prefer to do it in secret, especially after the MFA’s clear rejection of the USG initiative as international interference. People are afraid of being arrested,XXXXXXXXXXXX said. In addition, XXXXXXXXXXXX questioned why the focus was put on registered NGOs, referring to such groups as "GINGOS (government/NGOs),because of their close government ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX encouraged the USG to find a different way to fund opposition efforts by engaging regional, particularly Arab NGOs, to work indirectly in Syria.
SECHE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT TO FUND OPPOSITION HARSHLY CRITICIZED BY ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS, OTHERS
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Post contacts have been quick to condemn
the USG’s public statement announcing the designation of five
million USD for support of the Syrian opposition, calling it
"nave" and "harmful." Contacts insist that the statement
has already hurt the opposition, and that the SARG will use
it in the coming months to further discredit its opponents as
agents of the Americans. We have also heard repeatedly that
no bona fide opposition member will be courageous enough to
accept funding. Contacts noted that the announcement could
benefit the SARG, since NGO’s with ties (often covert) to the
SARG or its security services could be encouraged to apply
for the funds. Several contacts insisted that the
initiative indicated the U.S. did not really care about the
opposition, but merely wanted to use it as "a chip in the
game." One contact praised the funding but said the amount
was paltry compared with what had been set aside for the
Iranian opposition. End Summary.
2. (C) Embassy contacts expressed frustration with the USG’s
February 17 public statement announcing the designation of
five million USD for support of the Syrian opposition.
Contacts agreed that the very public way in which the
initiative was launched would hurt the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that such funding initiatives are good but should be kept secret.
XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the opposition is poor and mechanisms should be created to fund their endeavors; however, "we must be very careful" and if such actions are done in the wrong way, it is very
harmful to the opposition’s efforts. XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the example
of Rafiq Hariri’s initial philanthropic work in Lebanon in
the early 1990s as an intelligent, strategic means of opening
the door for more political activism: "You have to find the
right channel to help people."
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX related that at a February 18 meeting of about
twenty Damascus Declaration participants, those assembled had
decided to publicly denounce the MEPI project because they
felt they had to, in order to avoid even more SARG scrutiny.
XXXXXXXXXXXX, said that the general consensus among XXXXXXXXXXXX civil society and opposition colleagues had been that the USG is "not serious about us" and that the public announcement was "just to put pressure on the regime with no regard for the opposition." "We are just a chip in the game," he asserted.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the announcement made it far too risky now for anyone with any credibility or a reputation to
protect to accept funding. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view, it is much more
difficult now for the U.S. to help strengthen the opposition
than it was before the announcement. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX,
either the USG is nave or it doesn’t care "and either conclusion is bad." When asked if XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that anyone would apply for funds, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that after the Damascus Declaration’s participants’ clear rejection of the funding initiative, it will be very hard. In addition, "who will dare to visit that website," with the SARG monitoring internet activity, he asked. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that it is against the law for Syrians to accept foreign funding, a
legal situation that makes it very easy for the SARG to
construe the acceptance of such funds as "treason, punishable
by death."
5. (C) WILL SARG HIJACK USG FUNDING? Contacts were also
quick to point out that the announcement could benefit the
SARG. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the SARG will be able to use the MEPI funding story as a propaganda tool against the opposition.
XXXXXXXXXXXX was concerned that the SARG would attempt to hijack USG funding by encouraging NGOs with strong government or
security ties to apply for MEPI funds, thus "draining" funds
from more worthy and independent NGOs.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX described the funding plan as a terrible
idea that will be used by the regime to discredit the opposition,
In XXXXXXXXXXX view, the announcement had already severely damaged the opposition, making all of them look, in the eyes of most Syrians, like agents for the U.S. And this is without any SARG exertions yet, added XXXXXXXXXXXX.
7. (C) Warming to XXXXXXXXXXXX subject, XXXXXXXXXXXX called the funding plan "poorly thought out," one that will weaken the opposition in Syria and also weaken any U.S. strategy for shaking the
regime. Echoing others, XXXXXXXXXXXX made the point that the U.S.
needed to be much more secretive, or at least discreet, if it wanted to fund the opposition and civil society in an effective way. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view the initiative would help the regime consolidate its position and would enhance, whether by design or not, "an Israeli agenda" that desired a weakened regime to stay in place.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, dismissed the funding plan as a stunt, saying
the amount of money was small and that the U.S. had already been funding the opposition secretly, without impact. The new initiative would make no real difference. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view, the announcement angered most Syrians, who viewed it as interference in the internal affairs of Syria, something that the U.S. always insisted that Syria should not do regarding Lebanon. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the U.S. should engage in dialogue with the Syrian regime and work for a stable, slowly democratizing country that could further U.S. interests in the region, instead of putting up obstacles to such dialogue.
9. (C) One embassy contact, XXXXXXXXXXXX, offered qualified
praise for the initiative, saying that XXXXXXXXXXXX was happy
about the funding, but critical of the public way that it was offered.
XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the USG’s pledge of $75 million to the Iranian opposition largely overshadowed the $5 million for Syrian efforts and raised questions about the US’s commitment to the Syrian opposition cause. XXXXXXXXXXXX was also quick to point out that most activists were afraid to say anything positive about the announcement. XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that activists may apply for funding but would prefer to do it in secret, especially after the MFA’s clear rejection of the USG initiative as international interference. People are afraid of being arrested,XXXXXXXXXXXX said. In addition, XXXXXXXXXXXX questioned why the focus was put on registered NGOs, referring to such groups as "GINGOS (government/NGOs),because of their close government ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX encouraged the USG to find a different way to fund opposition efforts by engaging regional, particularly Arab NGOs, to work indirectly in Syria.
SECHE