RIAD SEIF, OTHERS, VIEW LEBANON STRUGGLE AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 005381

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: RIAD SEIF, OTHERS, VIEW LEBANON STRUGGLE AS
CRITICAL FOR U.S. REGIONAL INTERESTS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Opposition figure Riad Seif and other
Syrian contacts insist that the current political struggle in
Lebanon is "the critical battle" for the U.S. and Europe.
For Seif, that battle "must not be lost," if the U.S. wants
to retain influence in the Middle East. He recommended U.S.
support for a Sheba'a Farms solution and more active,
even-handed peace process diplomacy as indirect ways to shore
up the Siniora government. The consensus view is that Syria
has contributed mightily to provoking the crisis in Lebanon
to try to block formation of the Hariri tribunal, fearing
that such a body will be used to embarrass it politically and
possibly undermine the regime. There is division about
whether the Syrians killed Pierre Gemeyal, with Seif and a
few others representing a minority view, insisting it should
be viewed as a "mafia hit" by the regime on a charismatic
future leader. Many contacts viewed the release of the
Baker-Hamilton report through the prism of the struggle in
Lebanon. End Summary.


2. (C) Opposition figure Riad Seif told A/DCM December 6 the
current political struggle in Lebanon is a critical battle
that the U.S. and its Lebanese allies cannot afford to lose.
"Lebanon is the important battle. The winner there will be
the winner of the whole issue." He recommended U.S. support
for a Sheba'a Farms solution and more active, even-handed
peace process diplomacy as indirect ways to shore up the
Siniora government and weaken the SARG's ability to
destabilize it. Other contacts, who are not in the
opposition but are privately critical of the regime to
different degrees, made similar points in recent discussions.
Maverick internet journalist Ayman Abdul Noor, resorting a
bit to hyperbole, called Lebanon "the last castle," insisting
to A/DCM that if the Siniora government collapses under the
pressure from Syria and its allies in Lebanon's March 8
group, "U.S. influence in the entire region is finished."


3. (C) WHY THE STAKES ARE SO HIGH: When asked why the
stakes are so high, Seif argued that if the March 8 forces
prevail, Syria is likely to hold sway over Lebanon for
decades to come and the U.S. will lose "a critical platform"
for maintaining influence -- and communicating its message on
democracy -- in the region. Seif predicted that such a
victory will exacerbate sectarian tensions in the region and
cause problems for governments with significant Shiite
populations, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Most of these
contacts expected the Siniora government to survive, with
some insisting Hizballah was less strong as political force
than the current situation might indicate. Some, such as
Riad Abrash, economist and former deputy minister, expected a
compromise that would be viewed as a victory of sorts for the
March 8 forces. Even Seif voiced a note of caution, pointing
out that Syria, after three decades of occupation and a long
history of dominance in Lebanon, "still has real power
there."

4. (C) BLOCKING THE TRIBUNAL: The consensus is that Syria
has helped provoke this crisis as a way of blocking formation
of the Hariri tribunal. The SARG is fearful that the
tribunal, if constituted in Lebanon, could put the regime
under tremendous pressure with summons against accused family
members or even against lower-level figures. Most people
here believe that the regime will not deliver anyone for
trial or questioning, for fear they would betray the regime.
The regime is so fearful, in the view of Seif, "because there
is no doubt that they killed Hariri." Even questioning
lower-echelon figures would "reveal the mafia character of
the regime" and embarrass it fatally in the court of world
opinion. "Even simple people here in Syria will make the
connection," Seif added. Hizballah also fears the tribunal
because of worries about what might happen to Syria, its key
supporter, said Seif.


5. (C) A MAFIA HIT ON PIERRE GEMEYAL?: There is a division
among contacts about whether the SARG killed Lebanese
Minister Pierre Gemeyal. Seif and independent MP Basil
Dahdouh are part of a minority who are convinced Syria had
Gemeyal killed. According to Dahdouh, the Syrians have a
long history of killing charismatic, potential future leaders
of Lebanon like Gemeyal, who in Dahdouh's view had been very
active in re-building the Phalangist party. Seif also
cautioned that one should not focus too intently on the
calculus of immediate benefit in trying to decide who killed
Gemeyal. For the SARG, he was "a future leader of the entire

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Maronite community," and not just of the Phalangists.
Resorting to his mafia analogy, Seif made the obvious point
that "this way of thinking, of facing a political challenge"
reflects a mafia mentality. Other contacts, citing the
dominant view among Syrians that the regime has helped to
propagate, argued that there is no way the Syrian regime was
involved because the timing during the current crisis would
have pointed the finger directly at the Syrians and cut
against their immediate interests. Al-Hayat journalist
Ibrahim Hamidi also made the point to A/DCM that the Syrians
did not kill Gemeyal because the SARG had sent FM Mu'allim to
Iraq to restore diplomatic relations and was trying to send
signals of willingness to re-engage with the U.S., in the
run-up to release of the Baker-Hamilton report.

6. (C) BAKER REPORT VIEWED THRU PRISM OF LEBANON: Many of
these contacts viewed the release of the Baker-Hamilton
report through the prism of Lebanon, maintaining the
conventional view here that the regime is willing to offer
the U.S. help on Iraq, but will not be helpful at all on
Lebanon. According to Abdul Noor, the SARG is "actively
marketing the idea that Baker-Hamilton means Lebanon will be
sacrificed for Iraq." The regime is "is so happy with its
conclusions and recommendations," added Abrash. Several
contacts cautioned that even on Iraq, the regime would likely
drive a hard bargain and insist on knowing "what will be done
on the Golan issue" before offering much help. (Note: Abdul
Noor noted in an aside that the security services in recent
months had a survey done on Syrians' attitudes about the
Golan and discovered, much to the regime's dismay that it
rated a relatively distant third in peoples's priorities,
behind a better economic situation and better government.
That helped explain why the SARG is re-injecting the Golan
issue so actively into media and other official discourse, he
argued. Abdul Noor passed an Arabic version of the survey to
A/DCM.) Seif echoed others in pointing out that Syria's
influence in Iraq has for decades been much more limited than
in Lebanon. Syria is likely to find it difficult to
intervene very actively in Iraq, where it has allies in many
different groups, without alienating one or more key groups.



7. (C) COMMENT: Seif's stern warnings about the importance
of the struggle in Lebanon should probably be viewed as a
caution from the Syrian opposition about any U.S. or European
rush to re-engage with the SARG, in the hope that the regime
will offer help in Iraq. In his view, the help that the
Syrians have to offer in Iraq is limited, and the demands
they are likely to make -- including signals of resolution on
the Golan issue, a commitment that the regime is secure, and
a freer hand in Lebanon -- are extensive, as other contacts
point out. There is no doubt, however, that Baker-Hamilton
has stirred up tremendous debate about where U.S. policy in
the region is headed.
CORBIN