POST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATEMENT ON SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 005290 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: POST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATEMENT ON SYRIA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: In response to USG queries, Syrian civil society and human rights activists favor a U.S. statement in support of political reform and greater respect for human rights in Syria. There is also agreement that such a statement should call upon the SARG to ensure the well-being of a wide range of political prisoners. Our contacts believe that the Syrian public would be receptive to a statement that addresses its desire for good governance, the establishment of the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, and economic reforms. Timing is a critical element that will impact the effectiveness of a statement. Possible repercussions include retaliation against the prisoners or their families and renewed SARG efforts to limit Post's official and unofficial contacts in Syria. Post has discussed the inclusion of prisoners' names with family members and lawyers, or, in cases where access to the family and lawyers is difficult, to their political associates. Suggested points for a statement are included below. End Summary. ¶2. (C) IN SUPPORT OF A STATEMENT: In response to queries from DRL and NEA/ELA on the need for a new USG statement on human rights in Syria, poloffs have examined with human rights and civil society activists possible language, as well as the usefulness and timing of the statement. There is consensus in favor of a statement reaffirming our commitment to greater respect for human rights and gradual democratic reform. There is also agreement that such a statement should also call upon the SARG to ensure the well-being of political prisoners, particularly in light of reports of the failing health of Damascus Spring detainee Arif Dalila, who suffers from a heart condition, and reports that government critic Kamal Labwani was beaten by a fellow cellmate. Timing is critical both for how the Syrian public receives the statement and how the SARG factors it into its internal calculations. Graphic images from the Beit Hanoun incident, which have flooded the airwaves, provide the wrong backdrop for the issuance of a statement in the next few days. Separately, the inner circle of the SARG, which always ascribes other motives to our actions, will likely link it to other considerations such as Lebanon or U.S. election results, and Washington may wish to time the statement to have the maximum impact with the SARG. ¶3. (C) ADDRESSING THE SYRIAN PEOPLE: Our contacts believe that the Syrian public would be receptive to a statement that addresses its desire for good governance, the establishment of the rule of law and anti-corruption measures, and economic reforms. A USG statement would underscore with the public our belief that long-term regional stability is intrinsically linked to respect for human rights and gradual democratic reforms. ¶4. (C) POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS: Mention of political prisoners, names could prompt SARG actions that threaten their well-being or that of their families, so we think that any statement should be carefully crafted to limit the idea that they are somehow betraying their country or the Syrian people. The families of Damascus-Beirut Declaration signatories Michel Kilo and Anwar Bunni, as well as Labwani, support the inclusion of their names in a White House statement, along the lines of the suggested points below. Damascus Declaration group leader Riad Seif who personally knows Dalila and Damascus-Beirut Declaration signatory Mahmoud Issa strongly urged inclusion of their names in a statement, stating that they deserve mention and would welcome such a move. He also noted the importance of including an Alawite such as Dalila. (Post went to see Seif in the hopes that he might know when family members of Issa and Dalila would be in the capital, but he did not.) It should be noted that Seif has not always been constant on this topic. In several previous meetings, he cautioned against any USG statement, arguing that post Iraeli-Hizballah fighting that the U.S. had no credibility to back up a statement. ¶5. (C) Separately, as the SARG has sought to limit our official and unofficial contacts, we need to be prepared for the possibility that a statement could prompt renewed SARG efforts to restrict Embassy activities involving contact with political, economic and civil society interlocutors. ¶6. (C) Points for a possible statement could include: -- The U.S. supports the Syrian people's desires for greater respect by the Syrian government for human rights and freedom of expression, a government that develops an open and free economy and stems rising corruption, and supports the establishment of the rule of law. -- When President Asad came to power in June 2000, he promised meaningful internal political reform. More than six years later, his administration has delivered only crackdowns on a wide range of civil society groups; increased harassment by security services; deportations of legitimate refugees to face persecution; political trials, arbitrary detentions, and imprisonment even of the very ill. -- The SARG is fundamentally responsible for the safety and well-being of its citizens, including political prisoners such as Aref Dalila, Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, Mahmoud Issa, Kamal Labwani, and others. We are deeply troubled by reports that ailing political prisoners are denied private emergency health care and that others are held in cells with common criminals who have committed violent crimes. -- Steps that address the Syrian people's legitimate concerns--including respect for human rights, greater freedom of expression, and a more open and democratic system--are fundamental to Syria being included in regional efforts to foster stability and prosperity. CORBIN