Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS4798
2006-10-06 08:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
how-toVZCZCXRO1838 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK DE RUEHDM #4798 2790806 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 060806Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1890 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1328 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0176
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 004798
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MORCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD DEMANDS RE-ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 004798
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MORCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD DEMANDS RE-ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
1. (C) Summary. In back-to-back interviews with European
media, (Der Spiegel and El Pais),President Asad made points
in public that we have heard in private: the SARG will not
allow the status quo to endure; the only way to avoid further
conflict is if there is a policy-level USG re-engagement of
the SARG; if the USG decides it wants re-engagement, it will
first have to offer the SARG something Syria wants on either
the peace process, Lebanon, or Iraq. The SARG,s newfound
assertiveness, which dates most immediately from Asad,s
confrontational August 15 speech but has been building since
last December, is generally viewed as a clear sign of the
self-confidence it feels as a result of Hizballah,s
perceived victory in Lebanon, its strengthened ties with
Iran, Hamas' election victory, and the regime having survived
the intense international pressure it felt last fall as a
result of the Mehlis investigation and the resulting UN
security council resolutions. Contacts opine that Asad,s
choice of European media reflects his sense that the mood has
shifted in Europe and the time is now ripe for pressing the
Europeans to change policy -- hopefully leading to a US
change. End summary.
2. (U) President Bashar Asad made similar points in his
October 1 interview with the Spanish El Pais to those he had
made with Der Spiegel, on September 24. In both interviews
Asad attacked at length US foreign policy in the region,
while at the same time emphasized the necessity of the USG
re-engaging Syria. In both interviews, Asad was
transparently playing to his European audience when asserting
that peace was not possible without the Europeans pushing the
Americans to change policy. In the Der Spiegel interview,
which followed on the heels of the attack on the U.S.
Embassy, Asad repeatedly commented that the Embassy attack
was a consequence of US foreign policy in the region. As he
has in all of his speeches since the Hariri assassination,
Asad also took a hard line against the anti-Syrian forces in
Lebanon, labeling them &enemies.8 He further asserted that
Israel was an enemy of Syria. Though he did not specifically
name the U.S. as an enemy, the implication was clearly there.
3. (U) At the same time, Asad,s interviews communicated an
intention to force America,s hand. Asad commented in both
interviews that many within Syria believe war is the only
solution to the current impasse. Though he asserted in his
most recent interview that relations with the U.S. were
&nearly severed,8 he returned repeatedly to the need for
U.S. reengagement. His refrain in both interviews was that
the U.S. must &listen8 to Syria and that the Europeans
&must8 talk to the Americans to make them understand that
necessity. To reengage, however, the Syrians would want
their own interests to be advanced, asserted Asad. It is up
to America to take the initiative and offer something on
&Lebanon, Iraq, or the Middle East peace process,8
commented Asad.
4. (C) Asad,s interviews coincided with the SARG leaking to
regional media that FM Walid Mouallem had met with high
ranking officials from both US political parties on the
margins of the UNGA. Though editorials in the state-owned
papers remain rabidly critical of US policy, Syrians who
follow the news closely report the SARG is signaling the
continued importance it attaches to a relationship with the
US.
5. (C) Comment. Asad,s two recent interviews point to a
SARG that continues to desire reengagement with the USG,
though increasingly on its own terms. The Iranian card is
certainly part of the SARG,s calculation as the regime
listens carefully to the rising European chorus demanding
reengagement of Syria as a way to split the regime from Iran.
Interestingly, there has been no obvious similar effort
towards the French, which may reflect the SARG calculation
that ultimately it must come to some understanding with the
US if it is to achieve its objectives in the region.
CORBIN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MORCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD DEMANDS RE-ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
1. (C) Summary. In back-to-back interviews with European
media, (Der Spiegel and El Pais),President Asad made points
in public that we have heard in private: the SARG will not
allow the status quo to endure; the only way to avoid further
conflict is if there is a policy-level USG re-engagement of
the SARG; if the USG decides it wants re-engagement, it will
first have to offer the SARG something Syria wants on either
the peace process, Lebanon, or Iraq. The SARG,s newfound
assertiveness, which dates most immediately from Asad,s
confrontational August 15 speech but has been building since
last December, is generally viewed as a clear sign of the
self-confidence it feels as a result of Hizballah,s
perceived victory in Lebanon, its strengthened ties with
Iran, Hamas' election victory, and the regime having survived
the intense international pressure it felt last fall as a
result of the Mehlis investigation and the resulting UN
security council resolutions. Contacts opine that Asad,s
choice of European media reflects his sense that the mood has
shifted in Europe and the time is now ripe for pressing the
Europeans to change policy -- hopefully leading to a US
change. End summary.
2. (U) President Bashar Asad made similar points in his
October 1 interview with the Spanish El Pais to those he had
made with Der Spiegel, on September 24. In both interviews
Asad attacked at length US foreign policy in the region,
while at the same time emphasized the necessity of the USG
re-engaging Syria. In both interviews, Asad was
transparently playing to his European audience when asserting
that peace was not possible without the Europeans pushing the
Americans to change policy. In the Der Spiegel interview,
which followed on the heels of the attack on the U.S.
Embassy, Asad repeatedly commented that the Embassy attack
was a consequence of US foreign policy in the region. As he
has in all of his speeches since the Hariri assassination,
Asad also took a hard line against the anti-Syrian forces in
Lebanon, labeling them &enemies.8 He further asserted that
Israel was an enemy of Syria. Though he did not specifically
name the U.S. as an enemy, the implication was clearly there.
3. (U) At the same time, Asad,s interviews communicated an
intention to force America,s hand. Asad commented in both
interviews that many within Syria believe war is the only
solution to the current impasse. Though he asserted in his
most recent interview that relations with the U.S. were
&nearly severed,8 he returned repeatedly to the need for
U.S. reengagement. His refrain in both interviews was that
the U.S. must &listen8 to Syria and that the Europeans
&must8 talk to the Americans to make them understand that
necessity. To reengage, however, the Syrians would want
their own interests to be advanced, asserted Asad. It is up
to America to take the initiative and offer something on
&Lebanon, Iraq, or the Middle East peace process,8
commented Asad.
4. (C) Asad,s interviews coincided with the SARG leaking to
regional media that FM Walid Mouallem had met with high
ranking officials from both US political parties on the
margins of the UNGA. Though editorials in the state-owned
papers remain rabidly critical of US policy, Syrians who
follow the news closely report the SARG is signaling the
continued importance it attaches to a relationship with the
US.
5. (C) Comment. Asad,s two recent interviews point to a
SARG that continues to desire reengagement with the USG,
though increasingly on its own terms. The Iranian card is
certainly part of the SARG,s calculation as the regime
listens carefully to the rising European chorus demanding
reengagement of Syria as a way to split the regime from Iran.
Interestingly, there has been no obvious similar effort
towards the French, which may reflect the SARG calculation
that ultimately it must come to some understanding with the
US if it is to achieve its objectives in the region.
CORBIN