REACTIONS TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 004614 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU; E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER SY SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY IN DAMASCUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Syrian contacts have expressed relief that no Americans were killed or injured in the September 12 attack on the Embassy. Partly due to the almost complete lack of official information from the SARG on the attack, many contacts, echoing widespread street views, are speculating that the attack was somehow "staged" by the Syrian security services to send the message that the SARG also faces a terrorist threat and can cooperate with the U.S. on this challenge. A second view dismissed these conspiracy theories as unpersuasive, given the enormous risks such a staged attack posed to the SARG if it went badly and given the dangerous signs of loss of control by security services such an attack would send. Most contacts are convinced that the attack will not be repeated. The SARG refusal to release any information about the results of its investigation into the incident has left people with nothing but speculation and conspiracy theories by way of explanation. Syrians' understandable, if unreliable, conviction that their police-state security services are all-powerful and all-knowing, also contributes to this insistence that no such security trespass could occur without those services' knowledge and blessing. Syrians' fears about instability and potential chaos also make it comforting to rely on the assumption that any major security breaches here are merely illusory. End Summary. ¶2. (C) EXPRESSIONS OF RELIEF MINGLED WITH SCHADENFREUDE: Syrians have reacted with a range of emotions and theories to the September 12 attack on the Embassy in Damascus. On the emotional level, many expressed relief that no Americans were killed or injured. Some of course followed up such expressions with criticisms of U.S. policies in the region, which were meant to communicate the view that the anger that provoked the attack is real and understandable. While careful about expressing it openly, some Syrians -- still angry and embittered about the destructive war in Lebanon that they believe the U.S. "green-lighted" and allowed to continue -- are convinced that the U.S. "got what it deserved." ¶3. (C) CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND: Most Syrians who responded to the event are consumed with the issue of whether or not the attack was "staged" in some way by Syrian authorities. As is predictable in the hothouse world of Middle East conspiracy politics, a situation where the SARG tightly control all information and has refused almost to release any official information about the attack, the majority are speculating that the attack was "pre-fabricated" by Syrian security services. The purpose of "faking" such an attack on the U.S. Embassy was to persuade the Americans -- and Syrians -- that Syria faces a real Islamic terrorist threat and that if the U.S. pressures the regime until it collapses, the Islamists would "take over." As one proponent put it to A/DCM, the regime felt that the "message of the terrorist attacks on the U.N. building in Mezzeh in the spring of 2004 and on the Radio and TV HQ's in June of 2006 had been insufficiently "understood by the Americans," so the SARG delivered a more blunt message. ¶4. (C) Some more thoughtful contacts, like al-Hayat correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi and former Deputy Minister of Planning Riad Abrash, spun out such theories to A/DCM while admitting it was impossible to know if they were true. They pointed to the reactions of the security services at the scene to support the claim that the event was known about in advance and "under control." Hamidi, for example, said he understood that after the event, which took place in an area where many senior government officials lived and worked -- including the President -- there was no additional security presence visible afterwards. For him, this was a sign that the SARG was not concerned at all about what -- if it was real -- would normally be viewed as an extremely serious, threatening security incident. These contacts speculated that the SARG did not have to actually hatch this plot but merely could have allowed it to develop on its own and monitored it with informants to ensure it was contained in advance. ¶5. (C) Others like Sunni religious leader Salah Kuftaro argued that the quick, heavily armed reaction of the Syrian security forces also demonstrated that the security services had advanced knowledge of the attack. Opposition figures also espoused this conspiracy view, with Walid al-Bunni for example, claiming that unlike with previous terrorist DAMASCUS 00004614 002 OF 003 attacks, SARG security forces have not made mass arrests of family members and associates in the hometown of attackers. (Note: A Canadian diplomat told Poloff on September 20 that such arrests had since begun.) ¶6. (C) REALISTS SEE A SERIOUS SECURITY LAPSE: The minority view among the limited sounding we took with contacts was that the attack was real and indicated a serious security lapse. One contact described the attack as designed to embarrass the regime and demonstrate that it could not provide security or even protect foreign diplomats. Proponents of this view argue that the regime would never have allowed a violent incident of this nature to unfold in such a sensitive area, so close to the President. Security chiefs would fear the signal of instability and lack of control that such an incident would send. ¶7. (C) Dr. Samir al-Taqi, an advisor to the MFA with close ties to GID chief Ali Mamluk, told A/DCM that staging such an attack would pose enormous risks for the SARG, in the event something went wrong or if its involvement was discovered. In al-Taqi's view, the cell that staged the attack likely had shadowy connections to far-flung al-Qaida branches, so any revelation of SARG involvement would expose the SARG to damaging accusations of consorting with al-Qaida. If there was any SARG staging, it was handled by a very restricted group in a single security force, with other services "kept in the dark," since most of the security forces are sincerely and obviously troubled and galvanized into action by the attack, judging by their reactions, claimed al-Taqi. Al-Taqi hinted at several points about the Saudi connections of the attackers but did not state explicitly that there could have been external influence shaping the attack. ¶8. (C) FOCUS ON "AMATEURISHNESS" OF ATTACK: Many contacts focused on the "amateurish" nature of the attack, including both conspiracy proponents and those who thought the attack was real. Both sides insisted that the amateurishness supported the view that this attack was a one-off and would not be repeated. For conspiracy proponents, one amateurish attack is all that was needed to send the message. For the realists, such as Reuters bureau chief Khalid Oweis, the amateurish nature of the attack showed that the really serious terrorists, such as those aligned with al-Qaida in Iraq, had been co-opted by the security services and channeled by Syrian policy for "terrorism export only." They would not mount such an attack for fear of jeopardizing their "base" in Syria. Taking the opposite view, al-Taqi predicted that there would be subsequent attacks. ¶9. (C) DIPLOMATIC REACTION: Diplomatic contacts have expressed sympathy as well as concern about the attack and have followed closely Embassy decisions about personnel in the wake of the attack. The British seem to have been the most concerned, closing their Embassy immediately after the attack, as we did, for the rest of the week. The British military attache told DATT that embassy personnel have been meeting regularly since the attack to determine short- and longer-term options for responding to ensure the safety of their personnel. The Italians, with an embassy located across the street from the back of our embassy, have also expressed concern and have met with the MFA and senior Damascus police officials to request that the shared side street be closed to traffic. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: The tendency in the Middle East to fall back almost immediately on conspiracy theories is certainly evident in Syrians' reactions to the attack on the Embassy. The complete lack of official information or any transparency by the SARG regarding its investigation into the incident has left people with nothing but speculation and conspiracy theories by way of explanation. Syrians' understandable, if unreliable, conviction -- after more than 40 years of Ba'athist police state rule -- that their security services are all-powerful and all-knowing, also contributes to this insistence that no such security trespass could occur without those services' knowledge and blessing. Given Syrians' fears about instability and potential chaos, in view of the war next door in Iraq, they likely find it comforting to assume that everything is under control here in Syria and that any major security breaches are merely illusory. It is still a bit early to tell what effect this attack will have on the political landscape here and how it might impact on Syrians' perceptions about stability and order. DAMASCUS 00004614 003 OF 003 CORBIN