Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS4446
2006-09-13 13:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:
SARG COMPLAINT RE PERSONAL BANKING PROBLEMS IN
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHDM #4446 2561356 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131356Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1500 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 004446
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCLONE
EB/TSC
OFM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: EFIN PREL SY
SUBJECT: SARG COMPLAINT RE PERSONAL BANKING PROBLEMS IN
WASHINGTON
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 004446
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCLONE
EB/TSC
OFM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: EFIN PREL SY
SUBJECT: SARG COMPLAINT RE PERSONAL BANKING PROBLEMS IN
WASHINGTON
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
1. (C) On the margins of a late August meeting with the
director of protocol at the MFA, another MFA official, Bassam
Sabbagh, raised with the Charge a complaint from the Syrian
Embassy in Washington that it was being cut off from
necessary banking services in the U.S. Sabbagh had no
specifics on what accounts, in which banks, were affected,
but suggested the SARG could take reciprocal action against
the U.S. mission in Damascus.
2. (C) Sabbagh promised to provide more information to allow
the embassy to follow up. Sabbagh did not, however, provide
any further information, but the embassy in Washington did
provide specifics to the desk on issues with personal
accounts of Syrian embassy officials in Washington.
3. (C) On September 7, Charge drew on information provided by
NEA, EB, and L and informed Sabbagh that the official
accounts of both the Syrian Embassy in Washington and the UN
mission in New York were operating unimpeded. Charge further
commented that the only banking disruptions we were able to
identify had to do with the personal accounts of seven staff
members at the Syrian Embassy in Washington. Charge pointed
out to Sabbagh that it is incumbent on the individuals
involved to obtain their own private banking services and the
USG has no obligation to intervene on their behalf. Charge
asserted that there was no basis for SARG reciprocal action
against the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.
4. (C) Sabbagh made no substantive reply and seemed to
understand the difference between personal and private
accounts. He made no reference to his earlier suggestion
that the SARG had a basis for reciprocal action against our
official accounts in Syria.
5. (C) Comment. We have taken seriously the SARG,s threat
as it has an established track record of responding to any
slight, real or imagined, suffered by the Syrian embassy in
the U.S. by trying to act against our mission in Damascus.
We hope this will be the last we hear of this issue. But
given this is Syria, and the fact that SARG doesn't view
facts as necessary to support punitive action, we are
documenting this latest diplomatic focus on Embassy
operations.
CORBIN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCLONE
EB/TSC
OFM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: EFIN PREL SY
SUBJECT: SARG COMPLAINT RE PERSONAL BANKING PROBLEMS IN
WASHINGTON
Classified By: CDA Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.5 b/d
1. (C) On the margins of a late August meeting with the
director of protocol at the MFA, another MFA official, Bassam
Sabbagh, raised with the Charge a complaint from the Syrian
Embassy in Washington that it was being cut off from
necessary banking services in the U.S. Sabbagh had no
specifics on what accounts, in which banks, were affected,
but suggested the SARG could take reciprocal action against
the U.S. mission in Damascus.
2. (C) Sabbagh promised to provide more information to allow
the embassy to follow up. Sabbagh did not, however, provide
any further information, but the embassy in Washington did
provide specifics to the desk on issues with personal
accounts of Syrian embassy officials in Washington.
3. (C) On September 7, Charge drew on information provided by
NEA, EB, and L and informed Sabbagh that the official
accounts of both the Syrian Embassy in Washington and the UN
mission in New York were operating unimpeded. Charge further
commented that the only banking disruptions we were able to
identify had to do with the personal accounts of seven staff
members at the Syrian Embassy in Washington. Charge pointed
out to Sabbagh that it is incumbent on the individuals
involved to obtain their own private banking services and the
USG has no obligation to intervene on their behalf. Charge
asserted that there was no basis for SARG reciprocal action
against the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.
4. (C) Sabbagh made no substantive reply and seemed to
understand the difference between personal and private
accounts. He made no reference to his earlier suggestion
that the SARG had a basis for reciprocal action against our
official accounts in Syria.
5. (C) Comment. We have taken seriously the SARG,s threat
as it has an established track record of responding to any
slight, real or imagined, suffered by the Syrian embassy in
the U.S. by trying to act against our mission in Damascus.
We hope this will be the last we hear of this issue. But
given this is Syria, and the fact that SARG doesn't view
facts as necessary to support punitive action, we are
documenting this latest diplomatic focus on Embassy
operations.
CORBIN