CHARGE PUSHES ASSISTANT FM HARD ON SECURITY IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE PUSHES ASSISTANT FM HARD ON SECURITY IN
WAKE OF EMBASSY ATTACK


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Following the armed attack on the embassy
September 12, Charge met with Assistant FM Ahmad Arnous, to
press the SARG on his concerns about security for the
embassy. Charge urged the SARG to be transparent and to
offer full cooperation on the investigation including
through better intelligence sharing on threat information.
He asked for a senior security service contact point for RSO.
He also pressed the SARG to close the streets around the
Embassy, especially the street by which the attackers were
able to drive an explosives-laden vehicle up to the back
entrance of the embassy. Arnous expressed relief that there
was no loss of life and satisfaction that the security
services had responded quickly and effectively, but he
provided no assurances on the specific requests made by the
Charge. In a follow-up telecon, the MFA Director of Protocol
provided the Charge with a POC on security issues. RSO is
determining how useful this contact is. End Summary.


2. (C) In the wake of the September 12 armed attack oQthe
Embassy, Charge met with SARG Assistant FM Ahmad Arnous at
his office to press hQd on the need for the SARG to provide
better security for the Embassy. Charge underlined to Arnous
his extreme concern at the attack, noting that if the
explosive device in the van at the back embassy gate had
detonated, there would likely have been significant loss of
life. Charge expressed appreciation for the Qick response
from Syrian security forces and for the real-time
consultation on the scene provided to him by Minister of
Interior Bassam Abdul Majeed but noted that the attack
underscored the vulnerability of the embassy. In addition,
the Charge urged the SARG to cooperate with Embassy security
personnel and other USG personnel who will be focused on
investigating this attack and to provide a senior POC for
RSO. Finally, the Charge pressed Arnous hard to close
streets around the embassy, particularly the side street by
which the attackers had been able to approach the back gate
of the Embassy, noting that the Embassy had requested
repeatedly in the past that this and other streets adjacent
to the Embassy be closed for security reasons.


3. (C) Arnous responded to the Charge's points by expressing
regret for the attack as well as his government's relief that
there was no loss of life and reiterated that the SARG was
committed to protecting the U.S. Embassy and all diplomatic
missions in Damascus, viewing the commitment as part of its
obligations under the Vienna Convention and in Syria's
self-interest as well. Arnous expressed his relief that the
Syrian security forces responded quickly, hinting that they
had to some extent even prevented the completion of the
attack, a point that prompted Charge to interrupt and
reiterate that the only thing that prevented the attackers
from causing serious casualties was the failure to detonate
of the explosive device in the van that stopped in front of
the back gate.


4. (C) Arnous noted that the attack was under investigation
and speculated that the people involved could have been part
of "sleeper cells" or terrorist cells, while expressing his
conviction that Syrian security services would address the
threat such groups posed. Arnous asked Charge for any
Embassy security photos or film footage of the attackers,
prompting the Charge to press Arnous for full cooperation, a
higher-level liaison between the SARG Ministry of Interior
and Embassy's RSO, which could possibly include sharing any
requested film, as well as for intelligence sharing on the
incident and on other threat information. Arnous' response
to this and similar urgings was to note that the Charge
should stay in close contact with the MFA Director of
Protocol, the Embassy's designated POC at the Q. Charge
pushed back, noting that neither he nor the Director of
Protocol were security or intelligence experts and neitherQhould be expected to investigate terrorist incidents or
evaluate threat information.


5. (C) Arnous subsequently added that the security services
would be re-evaluating the security of the Embassy in light
of this attack. Elaborating, he noted that a security
commQee had been formed that would recommend additional
security measures as warranted. Arnous made that point
several times that the SARG is focused on the security of all
diplomatic missions in Damascus. The Charge took the point
but reminded Arnous that this attack had specifically

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targeted Americans at the Embassy. Arnous did not provide
much reassurance on the street closure issue, insisting that
the SARG would not close the street but would beef up
security to control access to the street. (Note: The small
side street Atta al-Ayoubi branches off of the main street,
al-Mansour, that passes in front of the street. Past the
Embassy, al-Ayoubi passes in front of the office of senior VP
advisor Mohammed Nassif Khairbek.)


6. (C) Charge closed the meeting by reiterating his extreme
concern about the security of the embassy and our personnel
and that we expected full cooperation on all details of the
attack. In a follow-up telecon, the MFA Director of Protocol
provided the Charge with a POC and phone number for the RSO.
RSO is determining how useful this contact is.




CORBIN