WITH TALK OF "RESISTANCE" ON THE GOLAN, ACCENT IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004340 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: WITH TALK OF "RESISTANCE" ON THE GOLAN, ACCENT IS ON TALK Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Recently contacts have reported that there is a still developing shift in regime thinking about the supposed benefits of continuing to keep the Golan front quiet. Press accounts have reported the nascent formation of "Syrian popular resistance" groups, modeling themselves on Hizballah. In recent public appearances, President Bashar al-Asad has offered carefully formulated support for notions of resistance aimed at obtaining the return of the Golan. Observers maintain that this change in language about the Golan reflects Syrian frustration about its isolation and its desire to remind the international community that Syria remains a key player. Skeptics dismiss the threatening language as a ploy and note that the corrupt, autocratic Syrian regime could not motivate -- and would not want -- any popular resistance groups to form. It remains a remote possibility that the "shift" in regime thinking could lead to dangerous miscalculation by Syria. End Summary. ¶2. (C) TOUGH TALK ON THE GOLAN ISSUE: Since the war in Lebanon ended, we have heard a range of contacts with assorted ties to the regime say that there is a shift in regime thinking about the benefits (and costs) of keeping the Golan Heights quiet. These contacts note that there is disagreement, and some indecision, but a relatively clear push by a hard-line faction in support of provoking Israel on the Golan. One contact described the new view to A/DCM as "a simmering notion." According to these voices, it is not clear how such thinking could be implemented, but one view is that a "a popular movement" would in fact be composed of Syrian special forces. These contacts predicted that the Golan is unlikely to remain completely quiet in the coming months. ¶3. (C) DESIGNED TO RE-OPEN SYRIA PRISONER ISSUE?: Regional press accounts in the past month (and even before the fighting stopped) reported the nascent formation of groups such as The Men of the National Syrian Resistance in the Occupied Golan. As recently as August 31, it was reported that this group was threatening to follow the example of Hizballah, for example, by capturing Israeli soldiers and forcing a prisoner exchange. According to Damascus-based ICRC representative Jean-Jacques Fresard, the Israelis are holding 19 Syrian Druze, convicted over the past three decades of various acts of violent resistance against the Israeli occupation, and three other Syrians, one of Palestinian origins. (Comment: Jesse Jackson told Charge when he was here last week that Asad had raised the issue of some 20 Syrian "Golan" prisoners held by the Israelis, which Asad suggested should be linked to the return of the two Israeli soldiers taken by Hizballah.) ¶4. (C) OPENING A "SECOND FRONT"?: Sunni religious leader Salah Kuftaro, in a sermon he delivered in the early stages of the war, raised the idea of opening a second front on the Golan while the war still raged in Lebanon. He told A/DCM subsequently that he had done so to stay ahead of the Islamic street in Syria and to embarrass a regime that had remained completely quiet on the conflict to that point. He also noted that he was uncomfortable with a Shia-led group having a complete monopoly over any "Islamic resistance." Kuftaro also reported that officials in the SARG security services told him not to repeat his remarks.) ¶5. (SBU) AND PUT NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON AGENDA: President Bashar al-Asad in his August 15 speech, as in his subsequent Dubai TV interview, also alluded to notions of Syrian resistance on the Golan, claiming that they had become more prevalent since the spring. Asad noted carefully in the Dubai interview that the move to resistance is one for the people to opt for, and not the state, adding that is armed resistance is the fallback option if the first option, the path of peace and negotiations, fails. But despite all the caveats and careful formulations about "popular action" and "only as a last resort," Asad made clear that he was unsheathing a quasi-veiled threat, adding that "I said (in the speech) that we will liberate the Golan with our own hands and determination. This determination, (is) for us as a state, as a political direction and a military one." ¶6. (C) WHY THE BELLICOSITY: The new thinking reflects frustration on three counts: a long-frozen peace process, a sustained, U.S-led isolation campaign that Syrians insist is DAMASCUS 00004340 002 OF 002 aimed at stripping Syria of any regional role, and a diplomatic aftermath in Lebanon that could "rob" Syria of the victory that Hizballah could not have obtained without years of Syrian support. The new Golan thinking also reflects SARG fears that the current status quo, if allowed to continue indefinitely, would eventually bequeath the Golan to Israel as "a fait accompli" in the absence of any peace negotiations. Contacts who have recounted this evolving regime thinking also note that proponents understand that such a move would involve a huge sacrifice for Syria, in the form of military retaliation by Israel, but it is the price that must be paid to get back the Golan, via post-hostilities negotiation. One well-informed analyst, informal MFA advisor Dr. Samir al-Taki maintained that the "Golan talk" made sense in the post-Lebanon-war context, where "the Golan is the only front left," given that implementation of UNSCR 1701 is likely to push Hizballah away from the Lebanon-Syria border. He noted that Syrian strategic thinking focuses on possible post-war developments in Lebanon and views the Golan as the critical element in most scenarios (see septel for fuller report on al-Taki's comments) ¶7. (C) SKEPTICS DISMISS THREATS AS A PLOY: Skeptics here discount the seriousness of these "threats" to mount armed resistance, referring to them as a ploy designed to put a little pressure on Israel, at a time when it is on the defensive after the bruising stalemate in Lebanon, and to remind the world that Syria remains a key player in the regional strategic equation. These skeptics note that the regime is fully aware that anything more than talk could lead to devastating Israeli retaliation that Syrian military forces are in no shape to resist. Opposition figures have told Emboffs that the aggressive new Golan talk is completely cynical because the regime of Hafiz al-Asad decades ago struck an implicit bargain with the Israelis, effectively ceding the Golan to them in exchange for a free hand in Lebanon. ¶8. (C) POINT TO REGIME LIABILITIES: Others note that there is no group in Syria -- apart from anti-regime Islamists whom the regime could not safely use -- with the religious zeal needed to take on a heavily armed occupier as Hizballah had. There is also little history of resistance to the occupation in the Golan, unlike in the Palestinian territories or in Lebanon. In addition, it is also unlikely that the Asad regime could motivate such forces to organize. As former VP Khaddam put it in a recent Future TV interview, "Nobody is prepared to fight and to kill and be killed for the sake of this corrupt regime." Finally, skeptics note that there is no credible proxy that would give the SARG any deniability and allow a low-level, safe proxy war to develop without the risk of massive Israeli retaliation. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Thus far, all the Golan talk seems to be for show and thus does not contradict decades-long SARG policy of keeping the Golan quiet. It does seem designed to reflect Syria's overwhelming fears that the Golan issue will not be addressed. It is possible that there is a bit of a "shift" in regime thinking on the issue, reflecting to some extent the advice of hard-line advisors impressed with Hizballah's "victory" and feeling emboldened by Syria's burgeoning alliance with Iran. This, in an extreme case, could lead Bashar to miscalculate on the Golan, but we view this as unlikely. CORBIN