WITH TALK OF "RESISTANCE" ON THE GOLAN, ACCENT IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: WITH TALK OF "RESISTANCE" ON THE GOLAN, ACCENT IS
ON TALK


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Recently contacts have reported that there
is a still developing shift in regime thinking about the
supposed benefits of continuing to keep the Golan front
quiet. Press accounts have reported the nascent formation of
"Syrian popular resistance" groups, modeling themselves on
Hizballah. In recent public appearances, President Bashar
al-Asad has offered carefully formulated support for notions
of resistance aimed at obtaining the return of the Golan.
Observers maintain that this change in language about the
Golan reflects Syrian frustration about its isolation and its
desire to remind the international community that Syria
remains a key player. Skeptics dismiss the threatening
language as a ploy and note that the corrupt, autocratic
Syrian regime could not motivate -- and would not want -- any
popular resistance groups to form. It remains a remote
possibility that the "shift" in regime thinking could lead to
dangerous miscalculation by Syria. End Summary.


2. (C) TOUGH TALK ON THE GOLAN ISSUE: Since the war in
Lebanon ended, we have heard a range of contacts with
assorted ties to the regime say that there is a shift in
regime thinking about the benefits (and costs) of keeping the
Golan Heights quiet. These contacts note that there is
disagreement, and some indecision, but a relatively clear
push by a hard-line faction in support of provoking Israel on
the Golan. One contact described the new view to A/DCM as "a
simmering notion." According to these voices, it is not
clear how such thinking could be implemented, but one view is
that a "a popular movement" would in fact be composed of
Syrian special forces. These contacts predicted that the
Golan is unlikely to remain completely quiet in the coming
months.


3. (C) DESIGNED TO RE-OPEN SYRIA PRISONER ISSUE?: Regional
press accounts in the past month (and even before the
fighting stopped) reported the nascent formation of groups
such as The Men of the National Syrian Resistance in the
Occupied Golan. As recently as August 31, it was reported
that this group was threatening to follow the example of
Hizballah, for example, by capturing Israeli soldiers and
forcing a prisoner exchange. According to Damascus-based
ICRC representative Jean-Jacques Fresard, the Israelis are
holding 19 Syrian Druze, convicted over the past three
decades of various acts of violent resistance against the
Israeli occupation, and three other Syrians, one of
Palestinian origins. (Comment: Jesse Jackson told Charge
when he was here last week that Asad had raised the issue of
some 20 Syrian "Golan" prisoners held by the Israelis, which
Asad suggested should be linked to the return of the two
Israeli soldiers taken by Hizballah.)


4. (C) OPENING A "SECOND FRONT"?: Sunni religious leader
Salah Kuftaro, in a sermon he delivered in the early stages
of the war, raised the idea of opening a second front on the
Golan while the war still raged in Lebanon. He told A/DCM
subsequently that he had done so to stay ahead of the Islamic
street in Syria and to embarrass a regime that had remained
completely quiet on the conflict to that point. He also
noted that he was uncomfortable with a Shia-led group having
a complete monopoly over any "Islamic resistance." Kuftaro
also reported that officials in the SARG security services
told him not to repeat his remarks.)


5. (SBU) AND PUT NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON AGENDA: President
Bashar al-Asad in his August 15 speech, as in his subsequent
Dubai TV interview, also alluded to notions of Syrian
resistance on the Golan, claiming that they had become more
prevalent since the spring. Asad noted carefully in the
Dubai interview that the move to resistance is one for the
people to opt for, and not the state, adding that is armed
resistance is the fallback option if the first option, the
path of peace and negotiations, fails. But despite all the
caveats and careful formulations about "popular action" and
"only as a last resort," Asad made clear that he was
unsheathing a quasi-veiled threat, adding that "I said (in
the speech) that we will liberate the Golan with our own
hands and determination. This determination, (is) for us as
a state, as a political direction and a military one."


6. (C) WHY THE BELLICOSITY: The new thinking reflects
frustration on three counts: a long-frozen peace process, a
sustained, U.S-led isolation campaign that Syrians insist is

DAMASCUS 00004340 002 OF 002


aimed at stripping Syria of any regional role, and a
diplomatic aftermath in Lebanon that could "rob" Syria of the
victory that Hizballah could not have obtained without years
of Syrian support. The new Golan thinking also reflects SARG
fears that the current status quo, if allowed to continue
indefinitely, would eventually bequeath the Golan to Israel
as "a fait accompli" in the absence of any peace
negotiations. Contacts who have recounted this evolving
regime thinking also note that proponents understand that
such a move would involve a huge sacrifice for Syria, in the
form of military retaliation by Israel, but it is the price
that must be paid to get back the Golan, via post-hostilities
negotiation. One well-informed analyst, informal MFA advisor
Dr. Samir al-Taki maintained that the "Golan talk" made sense
in the post-Lebanon-war context, where "the Golan is the only
front left," given that implementation of UNSCR 1701 is
likely to push Hizballah away from the Lebanon-Syria border.
He noted that Syrian strategic thinking focuses on possible
post-war developments in Lebanon and views the Golan as the
critical element in most scenarios (see septel for fuller
report on al-Taki's comments)


7. (C) SKEPTICS DISMISS THREATS AS A PLOY: Skeptics here
discount the seriousness of these "threats" to mount armed
resistance, referring to them as a ploy designed to put a
little pressure on Israel, at a time when it is on the
defensive after the bruising stalemate in Lebanon, and to
remind the world that Syria remains a key player in the
regional strategic equation. These skeptics note that the
regime is fully aware that anything more than talk could lead
to devastating Israeli retaliation that Syrian military
forces are in no shape to resist. Opposition figures have
told Emboffs that the aggressive new Golan talk is completely
cynical because the regime of Hafiz al-Asad decades ago
struck an implicit bargain with the Israelis, effectively
ceding the Golan to them in exchange for a free hand in
Lebanon.


8. (C) POINT TO REGIME LIABILITIES: Others note that there
is no group in Syria -- apart from anti-regime Islamists
whom the regime could not safely use -- with the religious
zeal needed to take on a heavily armed occupier as Hizballah
had. There is also little history of resistance to the
occupation in the Golan, unlike in the Palestinian
territories or in Lebanon. In addition, it is also unlikely
that the Asad regime could motivate such forces to organize.
As former VP Khaddam put it in a recent Future TV interview,
"Nobody is prepared to fight and to kill and be killed for
the sake of this corrupt regime." Finally, skeptics note
that there is no credible proxy that would give the SARG any
deniability and allow a low-level, safe proxy war to develop
without the risk of massive Israeli retaliation.


9. (C) COMMENT: Thus far, all the Golan talk seems to be
for show and thus does not contradict decades-long SARG
policy of keeping the Golan quiet. It does seem designed to
reflect Syria's overwhelming fears that the Golan issue will
not be addressed. It is possible that there is a bit of a
"shift" in regime thinking on the issue, reflecting to some
extent the advice of hard-line advisors impressed with
Hizballah's "victory" and feeling emboldened by Syria's
burgeoning alliance with Iran. This, in an extreme case,
could lead Bashar to miscalculate on the Golan, but we view
this as unlikely.

CORBIN