SYRIAN POLICY POST ASAD SPEECH: NO FUNDAMENTAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 004186

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SYRIAN POLICY POST ASAD SPEECH: NO FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE IN COURSE EVIDENT


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Despite Syrian President Asad's
confrontational rhetoric in his August 15 speech, there is
unlikely to be any fundamental change in the overall
orientation of Syrian policies, either foreign or domestic,
although periodic damage control will be evident as a
tactical adjustment, as it has been in the wake of Asad's
speech. Regarding Lebanon, the policy (and the rhetoric) was
-- and will continue to be -- confrontational, as Syria seeks
to maintain controlled instability and pressure on the
Siniora government and the March 14 group. The SARG will
also act and speak aggressively on any moves to deploy UNIFIL
forces -- or any augmented Lebanese force -- on its border
with Lebanon. Such a posture is not new, nor is the
burgeoning alliance with Iran, the friction with Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, and the heightened internal repression. Likewise
Syria,s longstanding interest in negotiations on the return
of the Golan may see more activity, especially if recent
Israeli expressions of interest continue. Visits by the
Amir of Qatar and the Turkish FM -- and FM Mu'allim's visit
to Helsinki may allow the SARG to argue that it is slowly
breaking out of its diplomatic isolation. The SARG seems to
be using its confrontational rhetoric, including formulations
pointing to the war option if the peace option is rejected,
to enhance current policy tendencies rather than to make any
fundamental change in course. End Summary.


2. (C) BITTER RHETORIC IN THE SPEECH: The bold rhetorical
flourishes in Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's August 15
speech provided some indications that Syrian policy was
possibly becoming more hard-line and confrontational,
especially in the wake of what is overwhelmingly perceived in
the Arab world as Hizballah "victory" over Israel. The
speech obviously was meant to remind Syrians and the wider
Arab world that Syrian support for Hizballah had contributed
mightily to that victory. Asad's lashing out at those Arabs
who failed to support the resistance in Lebanon was his
clumsy way of expressing resentment that Syria had stood
nearly alone in its support for Hizballah, especially in the
uncertain first days of the hostilities. The speech also
seemed to express some frustration and bitterness about the
isolation that Syria has endured over the past two years,
facilitated significantly by Arab regimes, for SARG support
for "resistance" elements such as Hamas and Hizballah, and
even for the way Arab leaders have condescended to Asad as
the recalcitrant, inexperienced leader who refused to give up
on the "futile" notion of resistance. It is clear from the
tone of the speech and from subsequent discussions with
contacts that hard-liners in inner circle of advisors
exercised a heavy hand in shaping the speech.


3. (C) BUT LITTLE SIGN OF BOLD POLICY DEPARTURE: Despite
the hard-line speech, the preponderance of evidence indicates
that Syria is not embarking on a bold new confrontational
policy or closing itself off in another layer of self-imposed
isolation. The SARG's aggressive damage control after the
speech, both behind the scenes and publicly, including
Bashar's August 23 interview on Dubai TV, clearly indicates
that the regime feels the speech went too far. Replaying a
dynamic that is a a constant of Syrian regime politics,
moderates led by FM Mu'allim and Minister of Information
Bilal have been empowered, at least temporarily, to correct
what is viewed as the tactical excesses of the hard-liners.


4. (C) The overall lines of Syrian policy are not likely
change, however. Regarding Lebanon, the SARG will continue
to speak aggressively and "stir things up" with the help of
its allies there. The aggressive language was evident August
23 even in the midst of Asad's charm offensive on Dubai TV.
While politely backpedaling and denying any intention to
insult Arab leaders, Asad noted that any attempt to deploy
UNIFIL forces on the border between Syria and Lebanon would
"signal a hostile act against Syria and will create problems"
between the two countries. FM Mu'allim spelled out the
threat more explicitly during his visit to Helsinki when he
told the Finns, according to public statements attributed to
the Finnish FM, that Syria would close the border with
Lebanon if these UNIFIL forces were deployed on the border.
Pro-Syria press assets in Lebanon are also viciously
attacking the Lebanese government in response to reports that
the LAF is being deployed along the border. (Comment: The
regime knows from its brief closure of the border in 2005 --
and similar moves in the past -- that this is a potent weapon

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that can inflict tremendous economic damage on Lebanon.)


5. (C) HARSH VIEW ON LEBANON A CONSTANT: In tandem with the
strident rhetoric, analysts here such as al-Hayat
correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi and a-Safir correspondent Ziad
Haidar, who follow SARG policy closely and are in regular
contact senior members of the regime, tell us that it is
clear Syria will continue to meddle in Lebanese affairs,
hoping to bring about the collapse of the Siniora government.
They and other contacts hint that the meddling will go
further and will continue to provoke instability in Lebanon,
while avoiding all-out chaos. According to Hamidi, it is
"clearly in Syria,s interest, and Iran,s" to continue with
such a role, since there are "no incentives" being offered to
it for not doing so.


6. (C) GOLAN &PEACE8 OPTION MAY SEE MOVEMENT: Syria,s
longstanding willingness to enter into negotiations with
Israel on a return of the Golan (without making any
concessions on terrorist groups) remains very much alive.
The Turkish DCM told the Charge that this was one of the
messages in Bashar,s (and FM Mu,allim,s) presentation to
visiting Turkish FM Gul August 22, going as far as to suggest
that Mu,allim had been authorized to carry a &new
initiative8 on the Golan to Helsinki to present to the EU
President. The Turk said that Bashar was very keen to hear
from Gul Gul,s impressions of Olmert,s real views on the
prospect of peace negotiations from Gul,s visit to Israel.
The French have also received signals that the Syrians have
an interest in pressing their agenda on the Golan directly
with Israel. Any possibility for progress on Golan
negotiations will reinforce the view here that the current
policy is working.

7. (C) REAL POLICY SHIFT NEARLY YEAR OLD: Syria,s current
policy, despite its tactical zigs and zags, began to take
shape in the early fall of 2005, under intense international
pressure in the run-up to the issuance of the first report of
then-UNIIIC head Detlev Mehlis. Asad,s University of
Damascus speech last November provided the public outlines
and rationales for this more confrontational posture they
have not changed that much since then. Even then, Asad
highlighted the option of "resistance," noting that "the
region has two choices, either resistance or chaos." Both
explicitly and with his references to Syrian dignity,
national identity, and refusal to submit, Asad made clear
that Syria would pursue a policy of resistance and modulated
confrontation. Since Hizballah's "victory," these references
to resistance and confrontation have become a bit more
insistent, and have been yoked more explicitly to getting
back the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, Asad is usually very
careful, as he was in the Dubai TV interview, to qualify
support for the notion of resistance, calling it not a
government prerogative but a people's option (a meaningless
notion in a police state like Syria).


8. (C) IRAN ALLIANCE, INTERNAL REPRESSION TO CONTINUE: On
other fronts, SARG policy remains relatively constant. The
alliance with Iran will continue and Syrian leaders are
likely to continue to use it -- especially in the wake of
Hizballah's growing power in Lebanon -- to prod regional
powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia into sullen acquiescence
to , if not real support for, SARG policies. Internally,
repression of the opposition will continue, as his language
in the Dubai interview made clear, although no major
high-signature crackdowns will be necessary. The arrests and
harassment over the past year, in tandem with the war climate
that developed during the fighting in Lebanon, have
completely silenced and paralyzed the internal opposition,
and much of the external opposition, who are fearful of being
branded by the SARG as "agents of the Israelis and the
Americans. "


9. (C) IS THERE SOMETHING MORE? There remain some observers
who insist that SARG policy has gone further, and with its
complete embrace of Hizballah and Iran, and may even be
approaching a point of no return as its policy hardens into
one of rigid confrontation. We do not see much persuasive
evidence for that view. Instead, we observe the messy blend
of confrontational posturing and hasty backtracking that
combines to endow Syrian policies with generally cold
calculations that can be alternately predatory and hostile,
as when facing Lebanon, or pay lip service to accommodation,
as on Iraq, while waiting to see what types of incentives
might be forthcoming that could persuade the regime to change

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its policies in ways that might facilitate U.S. interests.


10. (C) SARG WILL USE VISITS TO CLAIM ISOLATION IS ENDING:
The Mu'allim visit to Helsinki, the Turkish FM's and Qatari
Amir,s' visits here (although the latter may have had more
to do with the Qataris seeing an opportunity to take
advantage of Syrian-Saudi tensions to poke a stick in the eye
of the Saudis),and the upcoming visit scheduled by the UN
SYG also will be used by the regime to claim that it,s
diplomatic isolation may be drawing to a close, even if we
oppose it. While the cancellation of the German FM's visit
immediately in the wake of the speech caused some
consternation, there seems to be confidence that developments
in Lebanon are so congruent with Syrian interests that
eventually Syrian views and desires will have to be solicited
in a way the SARG can use to break its isolation more
fundamentally. Renewed Israeli interest in negotiations
would reinforce any such trend. Given these factors, the
SARG is likely to continue to opt for its current policy
course, straight ahead, with some tacking but no fundamental
shift in direction.
CORBIN