Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DAMASCUS4129
2006-08-22 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

DISPLACED LEBANESE DEPART SYRIA BY TENS OF

Tags:  PREF PGOV PREL SY LE IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO7691
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHDM #4129/01 2341520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221520Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1137
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0185
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004129 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU, AMMAN FOR
KANESHIRO/GREEN, CAIRO FOR CHEYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL SY LE IR IZ
SUBJECT: DISPLACED LEBANESE DEPART SYRIA BY TENS OF
THOUSANDS


Classified By: Charge Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004129 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU, AMMAN FOR KANESHIRO/GREEN, CAIRO FOR CHEYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016 TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL SY LE IR IZ SUBJECT: DISPLACED LEBANESE DEPART SYRIA BY TENS OF THOUSANDS Classified By: Charge Michael H. Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: As of August 21, an estimated 144,800 displaced Lebanese had departed Syria back to their country, with a relatively small number staying with Syrian host families, according to UN estimates. UN and international agency officials in Damascus expressed surprise and concern over the speed and scope of the massive return to Lebanon, particularly given unsafe and difficult conditions in southern Lebanon and the dearth of international agencies there. Officials cited several reasons that might explain the hasty return: the Hizballah leader's August 14 public promise of significant assistance to those who had lost their homes in the conflict, job opportunities, fear of squatters occupying or the looting of dwellings that are still standing, and financial incentives from Iran. The international response in Syria to the crisis had been hampered by its sometimes difficult working relationship with the SARG, which was at times unwilling or unable to respond in a comprehensive manner, according to UN and international officials. The Syrian private sector and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent responded generously and quickly to the crisis but were becoming overwhelmed by the extent of the continued needs, several officials noted. The UN Resident Representative and other international officials asserted as the crisis wound down that there was an immediate need to build SARG and non-governmental capacities in Syria in preparation for future turmoil, in addition to providing more focused assistance to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in Syria. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) RAPID RETURN OF DISPLACED LEBANESE: As of August 21, an estimated 144,790 displaced Lebanese had departed Syria back to their country, according to UNHCR reports and SARG officials. Original estimates placed the number of displaced Lebanese in Syria at up to 180,000 persons. This is a dramatic reduction in those present here, especially since many of those remaining are likely to be living with Syrian host families or with relatives. ¶3. (C) REASONS FOR THE RUSH HOME: UN and international agency officials in Damascus expressed qualified surprise and concern in August 16 and 17 me
etings with Poloff and Regional RefCoord over the speed and scope of the return to Lebanon, particularly since conditions in southern Lebanon were likely to be difficult and unsafe and since international agencies were not yet on the ground there. These same officials noted, however, that there were several compelling reasons for the Lebanese to return, including the public promise by Hizballah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah on August 14 to pay for rent, furniture, and the cost of rebuilding destroyed houses. Additionally, Lebanese were likely drawn back by the prospect of construction jobs, as well as the fear that squatters would occupy or loot residences that had not been destroyed, as has happened in the past in Lebanon, according to UN and international agency officials. Furthermore, Iran's government was coordinating with the SARG to provide financial assistance to displaced Lebanese as an incentive to return home, according to a UNHCR international, Arabic-speaking staffer who previously served in Damascus and had returned for a temporary assignment during the crisis. Politically, it was in Hizballah's interest to have as many people return home as quickly as possible to prevent Israel from blocking such a move, said ICRC representative Jean-Jacques Fresard. Given all of the above, the international community could not block the massive return, Fresard said, asserting, "We can't prevent people from returning home. They want to go and they want to go immediately. And Nasrallah wants and needs them there." ¶4. (C) SYRIAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: When assessing Syria's humanitarian response to the crisis, UN and international officials separately made several similar observations about their dealings with the SARG and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, a non-governmental organization led by its elected president and prominent Syrian Sunni businessman Abdul Rahman al-Attar. First, UN agencies such as UNICEF with previous operational relationships with the ministries of Health (MOH) and Social Affairs and Labor (MOSAL) had a much easier time organizing and getting permission to respond to the crisis, for example by rapidly providing vaccinations to displaced Lebanese children in collective, public housing, according to acting UNICEF DAMASCUS 00004129 002 OF 002 director Marc Lucet. In contrast, agencies such as UNHCR that had had previous difficulties with the SARG, such as the deportation back to Iran of recognized refugees (reftel), found it difficult to establish reliable working relationships with suspicious MOSAL officials who were never able or willing to provide reliable figures about the number of displaced Lebanese in collective shelters and private homes. ¶5. (C) Under pressure from the international community and Geneva to respond quickly and comprehensively to the crisis, UNHCR-Damascus struggled to improve its relationship with the SARG, according to the UNHCR international staffer. A visit to Syria by UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees Judy Cheng-Hopkins went a long way to improving the working relationship, but MOSAL never cooperated completely, according to the staffer. Second, the SARG was never able or willing to coordinate its own response to the crisis, designating the non-governmental Syrian Arab Red Crescent as one of its main points of contact for the relief effort, without fully clarifying the roles of MOSAL, the minister of Religious Trusts, and the State Minister for Red Crescent Affairs, according to a range of officials. ¶6. (C) A dearth of non-govermental organizations, which have difficulties registering in Syria, further hampered the response to the crisis, according to officials. The private sector and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, which is the local NGO most independent of the SARG, responded quickly and generously to the influx of displaced Lebanese, ensuring that most found generous accommodations throughout the month-long conflict. However, the Red Crescent's president and businessman Attar became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of UN and international agencies, finally telling them to "give me the money and I'll take care of it," according to the Damascus-based IOM representative. Even so, ICRC Representative Fresard praised the private sector and Attar's organization and its energetic corps of young volunteers, saying that the ICRC had provided the Syrian Arab Red Crescent with USD 130,000 to respond to the crisis and would seek to build its capacities, for example, by paying the salary of a motorpool fleet manager who would be indispensable in the event of likely, future emergencies. ¶7. (C) NOW THAT IT'S OVER: UN officials were still working as of August 22 to revise their agencies' needs in time for a scheduled donors' conference scheduled to take place August 31 in Stockholm. (Note: The UN's Resident Representative in Syria is planning to hold a donors' meeting next week in Damascus.) Many echoed Fresard's call for capacity building for Syrian ministry officials, the few non-governmental organizations, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in the event that another crisis erupts in Lebanon, or in the event that vulnerable Lebanese return to Syria to join a residual Lebanese population here. Separately, others noted that the time had come to address the needs of the hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis, some of whom had been living for years in Syria. As UNICEF's Lucet noted, "If 30 percent of Iraqi primary school-age children in Syria are not in school (despite that the SARG permits them to attend for free),there are definitely things that we can work on." The ICRC representative concurred, citing for example, the hundreds of Iraqi Palestinians who have been stranded since this spring on the Syria-Iraq border, hoping for entry into the country. ¶8. (C) Comment: The influx of up to 180,000 displaced Lebanese into Syria was met by a generous response from the private sector, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and private individuals. For the most part, the SARG stepped out of the way and let these entities and individuals take care of the largely Lebanese Shi'a population that spread itself throughout the predominately Sunni Syria. At the end of the monthlong crisis, however, business contacts, including the head of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, began to indicate an inability to sustain relief efforts to the Lebanese for much longer. Post believes that if the crisis had continued much longer, for example into the start of the Syrian school year, the Lebanese population would have faced greater hardship, much like that faced by the estimated 500,000 displaced Iraqis still in Syria. CORBIN

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