ASAD ATTACKS MARCH 14 GROUP, ARABS, UNSCR 1701 IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004000

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD ATTACKS MARCH 14 GROUP, ARABS, UNSCR 1701 IN
COMBATIVE SPEECH


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: In a defiant August 15 speech delivered in
Damascus, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad adopted a
confrontational tone and criticized different aspects of
UNSCR 1701 and the negotiations that led to its passage. He
underlined at several points the importance that facts on the
ground had played in shaping the resolution, despite defects
caused by what he termed American and Israeli influence at
the UN. He hailed the heroic resistance of Hizballah and
criticized Arab regimes for not standing with it (unlike the
SARG and the Arab street, he noted.) Asad also attacked
the March 14 group in Lebanon, indicating at one point that
some in it had encouraged Israel to attack Lebanon and bore
responsibility for the war and the destruction in Lebanon.
One Egyptian diplomat predicted that the speech could provoke
diplomatic tensions with Egypt and Saudi Arabia because of
its veiled but obvious attacks on those regimes. End
Summary.


2. (U) In a combative August 15 speech to a Syrian
journalists association, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
reacted to UNSCR 1701, saying that it reflected "the use of
the Security Council against the Arabs. While the resolution
had some positive points, especially since it stopped the
killing of innocent people, it unfairly "blames the
resistance," instead of blaming Israel and its defenders,
said Asad. While he did not express outright opposition to
the resolution, Asad insisted that calculations of national
interest trump international resolutions, "even if this leads
to fighting or war."


3. (U) Asad noted that the diplomatic efforts that preceded
the passage of 1701 indicated that "the Arabs have no weight
in international forums." He also stated that 1701 is part
of a cluster of Lebanon-related UNSCR's, including 1559 and
1680 that legitimized Israeli and U.S. interests at the
expense of Arab interests. In Asad's view, Israel sought the
help of the UNSC, which the U.S. has turned into a body that
meets the demands of Israel, in order to achieve a political
victory and compensate for its military defeat. Asad claimed
that it was Hizballah's military strength and the facts on
the ground that helped improve some of what he termed the
worst aspects in the initial draft resolution. He drew from
this claim the larger point that Arabs cannot rely on "the
international situation" but must find ways to obtain
positions of strength.


4. (U) Asad expressed concern for the implementation phase
and urged Arabs support Lebanon and "turn the military
victory into a political gain, at least in the peace
process." He added that "the battle starts now in Lebanon
and noted that "not only we in Syria are standing with the
resistance (Hizballah),but all of the Arab street as well."


5. (C) Asad attacked unnamed Arab leaders (clearly
understood to be those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt) for
initially describing Hizballah's abduction of the two Israeli
soldiers as adventurous. He made several broader points that
cannot have been well-received in those capitals:

-- Arabs have failed in the peace process because they did
not maintain other options besides peace, including the
option of war, to liberate Arab lands;

-- We ask the Arabs to stand with us, according to our
vision, and those who do not should step aside and let us do
what is appropriate;

-- Arab officials should side with their people and with the
resistance; and,

-- The steadfastness of the resistance compelled Arab foreign
ministers to change their divergent positions and adopt a
unified position in Beirut.


6. (SBU) Asad also attacked the March 14 group in Lebanon,
indicating at one point that some in it had encouraged Israel
to attack Lebanon and bore responsibility for the war and the
destruction in Lebanon. Mentioning the March 14 group in the
same context as the short-lived May 17, 1983 peace agreement
between Lebanon and Israel, Asad (in a rhetorical flourish he
has used in many of his speeches over the past year) seemed
to hint -- according to some analysts -- that the current

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government of Lebanon is an agent of Israel.


7. (SBU) Asad called the American role in the peace process
essential but added that peace could not be achieved under
the current American Administration. He attacked Israel in
unprecedentedly strong language for him, saying that time is
not in favor of Israel and that future Arab generations will
find a way to overcome and "get rid of" Israel.


8. (C) COMMENT: Regional Arab commentators commenting on
Arab satellite TV described the speech as defiant and in
essence suggesting Bashar's readiness to accept serious
friction with several key neighboring regimes and long-time
allies, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt (as well as with Jordan).
Some described him as looking tired and nervous at the
beginning of the speech, although the overall tenor of the
speech seems to point to Bashar's renewed self-confidence.
Most of Asad's speeches since the issuance of the first
UNIIIC report last fall have been combative and defiant and
this one was no exception. An Egyptian diplomat commented
that the speech, if it is understood in Cairo the way it was
received here, could provoke diplomatic repercussions.


CORBIN