ASAD SPEECH, ON-THE-GROUND REALITIES, FORESHADOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 003998

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY LE
SUBJECT: ASAD SPEECH, ON-THE-GROUND REALITIES, FORESHADOW
UNHELPFUL SYRIAN ROLE ON UNSCR 1701

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: Until the August 15 speech of President
Bashar al-Asad, the SARG adopted a tone of cautious, critical
tone in its reaction to UNSCR 1701, expressing little
enthusiasm but avoiding statements that could be read as
outright rejection. Asad's combative speech was much more
critical of the resolution (see septel for details). While
the SARG has professed happiness that the destruction of
southern Lebanon has stopped, the regime is profoundly
unhappy that the conflict did not provide a bigger role for
Syria, a situation it still has hopes of redressing in the
implementation phase. European contacts here assert that the
conflict underscores the necessity of engagement with the
SARG; it is clear that Italy, Spain and Greece have already
taken steps to engage and that Germany and possibly other
countries are following suit. Some Syrian contacts say the
SARG is content to let Hizballah defy UNSCR 1701 for now, but
hint that if that defiance falters or does not sufficiently
address Syrian concerns, the SARG could stir up trouble in
Lebanon and even in Iraq. The U.S. should press our European
allies who are engaging the SARG to link any engagement with
specific steps, for example, easing repression on the
internal opposition and civil society. End Summary.


2. (C) SARG OFFICIAL VIEW OF UNSCR 1701: Until the August
15 speech of President Bashar al-Asad, the SARG expressed
little enthusiasm for UNSCR 1701 but avoided statements that
could be read as outright rejection. Asad's combative speech
was much more outspoken in its criticisms. (See septel for
details). The SARG expressed satisfaction that the UNSC
finally stepped in to stop the fighting, confirmed the
importance of a just and comprehensive peace based on
resolutions 242 and 338, and avoided adoption of a Chapter
VII resolution. However, the SARG, in a statement issued by
the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) expressed regret that the
resolution did not take into account "many of the Lebanese
demands," and "avoided holding Israel responsible for its
brutal aggression." The SARG has generally couched its
disagreements with 1701 in support for Lebanon's "national
consensus" and the Lebanese government's "reservations" with

1701. The SANA statement issued August 13 also noted that
UNSCR 1701 contained several items that impinged on "internal
Lebanese affairs," and stated that the April Understanding of
1996 is the framework for judging any "field confrontations
that could emerge" in the coming days. The Asad speech
repeated many of these reservations and points but wrapped
them in a conspiratorial view of 1701 and the cluster of
Lebanon-related resolutions that began with UNSCR 1559,
describing them as favoring American-Israeli interests and
directed "against the Arabs."


3. (C) DIPLOMATS WORRY ABOUT SARG TROUBLE-MAKING: Contacts
we have spoken with are pessimistic about the prospects of
any positive SARG role that could contribute to
implementation of 1701. The French DCM Nicolas Suran told
the Charge August 12 that he did not expect Syria to be very
helpful in the coming weeks, especially given that "its
interests were being ignored." Suran noted SARG
disappointment that had set in during the diplomatic
negotiations over the UNSCR, assessing that Syrian officials
had held out the hope that there would be more consensus for
reaching out to Syria and ending its isolation.


4. (C) Other diplomats here expressed similarly pessimistic
assessments. Austrian DCM Doris Danler, voicing a common
European viewpoint heard in Damascus, asked why the U.S. did
not re-engage with Syria and take into account its interests.
She too noted that the SARG is capable of playing a very
subversive role in Lebanon and speculated that although it is
likely to stand aside or express a degree of support for
initial UN efforts, in the coming months it was capable of
fomenting violence against any international stabilization
force. Danler saw less SARG disappointment than Suran with
the diplomatic maneuvers that led up to 1701, noting that
there was growing support from a part of the EU, led by
Spain, Italy, and Greece -- and followed tentatively by
Germany -- for ending Syria's isolation and reaching out to
it. (Note: The German FM is scheduled to visit Syria within
days, as part of a regional tour, according to press
accounts.)


5. (C) SARG CONTENT TO LET HIZBALLAH DEFY UNSCR: Syrian
contacts insisted that although the SARG had been caught a

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bit off-balance by the diplomatic negotiations on 1701 that
had seemingly ignored its interests, as well as Hizballah's
"military successes," the current implementation phase would
return the spotlight to the situation on the ground.
Independent MP Basil Dahdouh told A/DCM the situation was "a
stand off." Dahdouh did not expect the Hizballah to actually
attack any international troops, saying that it would not be
necessary since they would likely be sufficiently intimidated
by Hizballah's presence on the ground. Dahdouh added that in
his view it is unlikely that Hizballah forces will leave
southern Lebanon or give up their weapons there. He pointed
to the rapid return of Lebanese civilians to the south as an
obviously Hizballah-orchestrated effort to create conditions
where its forces could blend into the civilian population.
Israel would "control the heights" to stop missiles from
being fired across the border and would not likely withdraw
soon, despite any commitments it is currently making to do
so, said Dahdouh.


6. (C) SARG PLAN B CALLS FOR "TREATING CRISIS WITH A
CRISIS": Foreign affairs analyst Imad Shueibi, who has close
ties to Syrian intelligence and other senior figures in the
regime, told A/DCM the SARG was disappointed with UNSCR 1701
but that in its official position it would "stay within the
international consensus on the resolution." Shueibi added,
however, that the resolution "does not reflect the realities
on the ground, so Hizballah will modulate it" during the
implementation phase. Concurring with Dahdouh, he argued
that Hizballah would not leave the area and added that the
Lebanese armed forces, with its heavy Shia representation,
would not be able to disarm the militia. Any effort to put
UN troops on the Syria-Lebanon border "would not be accepted"
and would precipitate "a coup d'etat in Lebanon," he added
ominously. He described the current situation in Lebanon as
"an open crisis," noting that "sometimes it is good to treat
a crisis with a another crisis." While acknowledging the
dangers of such an approach, he retorted that it is also
dangerous "to put a country in the corner and ignore its
interests." He called the current U.S. approach a mistake
that would cause it problems in Lebanon as well as in Iraq,
where "Muqtader a-Sadr is so close to Nasrallah." Thus far,
a-Sadr "has not moved in Iraq", but that could change very
easily, said Shueibi, intimating without stating explicitly
that Syria had influence it could use there if its interests
in Lebanon were ignored. Shueibi pointed to the "incredible
popularity" of Nasrallah in the Arab world as a brake on any
regional support for U.S. efforts in Lebanon.


7. (C) COMMENT: The SARG seems persuaded that, in the short
term, its proxy in Lebanon has survived intact and is fully
capable of standing its ground in the implementation phase.
If Hizballah, because of a conjunction of internal Lebanese
developments and external pressure, indicates that
circumstances are driving it towards a weaker position that
might involve withdrawing from territory in the south or
giving up its weapons, the SARG is likely to take a more
active position, one that could involve behind-the-scenes use
of violence in the south by its proxies against any
peace-keeping efforts and fomenting of instability in
Lebanon. Meanwhile, domestically, the regime has taken
advantage of the crisis to silence any opposition, as the
internal atmosphere has made clear the Syrian population is
focused on Lebanon's suffering and Hizballah's "victory,"
rather than on criticizing the regime's repressiveness and
corruption. The regime clearly hopes that the crisis will
sideline the Brammertz investigation into the Hariri
assassination. As countries within the EU move towards
re-engaging with the SARG, we should encourage them to
condition that engagement on specific positive steps by the
SARG, including easing repression the opposition and civil
society, for example.



CORBIN