ASAD SPEECH, ON-THE-GROUND REALITIES, FORESHADOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 003998 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY LE SUBJECT: ASAD SPEECH, ON-THE-GROUND REALITIES, FORESHADOW UNHELPFUL SYRIAN ROLE ON UNSCR 1701 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Until the August 15 speech of President Bashar al-Asad, the SARG adopted a tone of cautious, critical tone in its reaction to UNSCR 1701, expressing little enthusiasm but avoiding statements that could be read as outright rejection. Asad's combative speech was much more critical of the resolution (see septel for details). While the SARG has professed happiness that the destruction of southern Lebanon has stopped, the regime is profoundly unhappy that the conflict did not provide a bigger role for Syria, a situation it still has hopes of redressing in the implementation phase. European contacts here assert that the conflict underscores the necessity of engagement with the SARG; it is clear that Italy, Spain and Greece have already taken steps to engage and that Germany and possibly other countries are following suit. Some Syrian contacts say the SARG is content to let Hizballah defy UNSCR 1701 for now, but hint that if that defiance falters or does not sufficiently address Syrian concerns, the SARG could stir up trouble in Lebanon and even in Iraq. The U.S. should press our European allies who are engaging the SARG to link any engagement with specific steps, for example, easing repression on the internal opposition and civil society. End Summary. ¶2. (C) SARG OFFICIAL VIEW OF UNSCR 1701: Until the August 15 speech of President Bashar al-Asad, the SARG expressed little enthusiasm for UNSCR 1701 but avoided statements that could be read as outright rejection. Asad's combative speech was much more outspoken in its criticisms. (See septel for details). The SARG expressed satisfaction that the UNSC finally stepped in to stop the fighting, confirmed the importance of a just and comprehensive peace based on resolutions 242 and 338, and avoided adoption of a Chapter VII resolution. However, the SARG, in a statement issued by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) expressed regret that the resolution did not take into account "many of the Lebanese demands," and "avoided holding Israel responsible for its brutal aggression." The SARG has generally couched its disagreements with 1701 in support for Lebanon's "national consensus" and the Lebanese government's "reservations" with ¶1701. The SANA statement issued August 13 also noted that UNSCR 1701 contained several items that impinged on "internal Lebanese affairs," and stated that the April Understanding of 1996 is the framework for judging any "field confrontations that could emerge" in the coming days. The Asad speech repeated many of these reservations and points but wrapped them in a conspiratorial view of 1701 and the cluster of Lebanon-related resolutions that began with UNSCR 1559, describing them as favoring American-Israeli interests and directed "against the Arabs." ¶3. (C) DIPLOMATS WORRY ABOUT SARG TROUBLE-MAKING: Contacts we have spoken with are pessimistic about the prospects of any positive SARG role that could contribute to implementation of 1701. The French DCM Nicolas Suran told the Charge August 12 that he did not expect Syria to be very helpful in the coming weeks, especially given that "its interests were being ignored." Suran noted SARG disappointment that had set in during the diplomatic negotiations over the UNSCR, assessing that Syrian officials had held out the hope that there would be more consensus for reaching out to Syria and ending its isolation. ¶4. (C) Other diplomats here expressed similarly pessimistic assessments. Austrian DCM Doris Danler, voicing a common European viewpoint heard in Damascus, asked why the U.S. did not re-engage with Syria and take into account its interests. She too noted that the SARG is capable of playing a very subversive role in Lebanon and speculated that although it is likely to stand aside or express a degree of support for initial UN efforts, in the coming months it was capable of fomenting violence against any international stabilization force. Danler saw less SARG disappointment than Suran with the diplomatic maneuvers that led up to 1701, noting that there was growing support from a part of the EU, led by Spain, Italy, and Greece -- and followed tentatively by Germany -- for ending Syria's isolation and reaching out to it. (Note: The German FM is scheduled to visit Syria within days, as part of a regional tour, according to press accounts.) ¶5. (C) SARG CONTENT TO LET HIZBALLAH DEFY UNSCR: Syrian contacts insisted that although the SARG had been caught a DAMASCUS 00003998 002 OF 002 bit off-balance by the diplomatic negotiations on 1701 that had seemingly ignored its interests, as well as Hizballah's "military successes," the current implementation phase would return the spotlight to the situation on the ground. Independent MP Basil Dahdouh told A/DCM the situation was "a stand off." Dahdouh did not expect the Hizballah to actually attack any international troops, saying that it would not be necessary since they would likely be sufficiently intimidated by Hizballah's presence on the ground. Dahdouh added that in his view it is unlikely that Hizballah forces will leave southern Lebanon or give up their weapons there. He pointed to the rapid return of Lebanese civilians to the south as an obviously Hizballah-orchestrated effort to create conditions where its forces could blend into the civilian population. Israel would "control the heights" to stop missiles from being fired across the border and would not likely withdraw soon, despite any commitments it is currently making to do so, said Dahdouh. ¶6. (C) SARG PLAN B CALLS FOR "TREATING CRISIS WITH A CRISIS": Foreign affairs analyst Imad Shueibi, who has close ties to Syrian intelligence and other senior figures in the regime, told A/DCM the SARG was disappointed with UNSCR 1701 but that in its official position it would "stay within the international consensus on the resolution." Shueibi added, however, that the resolution "does not reflect the realities on the ground, so Hizballah will modulate it" during the implementation phase. Concurring with Dahdouh, he argued that Hizballah would not leave the area and added that the Lebanese armed forces, with its heavy Shia representation, would not be able to disarm the militia. Any effort to put UN troops on the Syria-Lebanon border "would not be accepted" and would precipitate "a coup d'etat in Lebanon," he added ominously. He described the current situation in Lebanon as "an open crisis," noting that "sometimes it is good to treat a crisis with a another crisis." While acknowledging the dangers of such an approach, he retorted that it is also dangerous "to put a country in the corner and ignore its interests." He called the current U.S. approach a mistake that would cause it problems in Lebanon as well as in Iraq, where "Muqtader a-Sadr is so close to Nasrallah." Thus far, a-Sadr "has not moved in Iraq", but that could change very easily, said Shueibi, intimating without stating explicitly that Syria had influence it could use there if its interests in Lebanon were ignored. Shueibi pointed to the "incredible popularity" of Nasrallah in the Arab world as a brake on any regional support for U.S. efforts in Lebanon. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The SARG seems persuaded that, in the short term, its proxy in Lebanon has survived intact and is fully capable of standing its ground in the implementation phase. If Hizballah, because of a conjunction of internal Lebanese developments and external pressure, indicates that circumstances are driving it towards a weaker position that might involve withdrawing from territory in the south or giving up its weapons, the SARG is likely to take a more active position, one that could involve behind-the-scenes use of violence in the south by its proxies against any peace-keeping efforts and fomenting of instability in Lebanon. Meanwhile, domestically, the regime has taken advantage of the crisis to silence any opposition, as the internal atmosphere has made clear the Syrian population is focused on Lebanon's suffering and Hizballah's "victory," rather than on criticizing the regime's repressiveness and corruption. The regime clearly hopes that the crisis will sideline the Brammertz investigation into the Hariri assassination. As countries within the EU move towards re-engaging with the SARG, we should encourage them to condition that engagement on specific positive steps by the SARG, including easing repression the opposition and civil society, for example. CORBIN