AN ALAWITE-SUNNI CHAT ON KHADDAM, FUTURE OF REGIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: AN ALAWITE-SUNNI CHAT ON KHADDAM, FUTURE OF REGIME

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) The criticisms and maneuvering of former VP Khaddam
continue to generate intense private discussion in Syria.
According to Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX on January 30, a
retired senior Alawite military officer pribvately endorsed
Khaddam's views and noted fears that he and other former
Alawite security officers might be arrested for sympathizing
or conspiring with Khaddam. This officer pressed XXXXXXXXXXXX to
find out if the U.S. wanted to get rid of Bashar al-Asad or
preferred to maintain his minority regime in Syria.
Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX touched briefly on the political strength
of recently released detainee Riad Seif and on the potential
political power of the Muslim Brotherhood. End Summary.


2. (C) A SUNNI-ALAWITE CHAT: Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX
recounted for Polchief January 30 a discussion he had earlier
in the day with XXXXXXXXXXXX, an Alawite who served as a former
senior Syrian army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX and still maintained close contact with former SMI
head XXXXXXXXXXXX, considered the most influential of retired
Alawite military officers in Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX he
had come on behalf of XXXXXXXXXXXX, whom he had seen at lunch the day
before. (Note: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was Ghazi
Kana'an's chief deputy in Lebanon for several years.)


3. (C) ALAWITE ENDORSEMENT OF KHADDAM: XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
discussed the implications of the press campaign launched by
former VP Khaddam in Paris. XXXXXXXXXXXX had described Khaddam as
"my friend" and noted somewhat cryptically that "he is
depending on us." XXXXXXXXXXXX had also noted that when he and
other former (Alawite) security officials like XXXXXXXXXXXX and
XXXXXXXXXXXX, and
XXXXXXXXXXXX
and others got together, they talked about "the same
problems, in the same tone," that Khaddam had used. These
included Bashar al-Asad's mistakes in Lebanon, his mistakes
in handling internal affairs in Syria, his misguided
rapprochement with Iran, as well as his ill-advised embrace
of Hamas leader Khalid Misha'al. XXXXXXXXXXXX described XXXXXXXXXXXX as
angry about Bashar's mistakes.


4. (C) KHADDAM'S LAST NIGHT IN SYRIA: XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX
that Khaddam had spent one of his last nights in Syria
playing cards and discussing the situation with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who now fears that the regime is lying in wait for
him. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he thought Khaddam had contacted XXXXXXXXXXXX by
phone in late January. XXXXXXXXXXXX had reached out to XXXXXXXXXXXX and
asked him, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX to stand behind him if the
regime tried to move against him, reported XXXXXXXXXXXX. In
XXXXXXXXXXXX view, Khaddam is planning more steps. XXXXXXXXXXXX described
Khaddam's actions as a conspiracy against the regime.


5. (C) BASHAR'S POPULARITY AMONG ALAWITES: XXXXXXXXXXXX told
XXXXXXXXXXXX that Asad was not popular at all among most Alawites,
most of whom remain mired in poverty. He had also probed
XXXXXXXXXXXX about whether the U.S. wanted to maintain the Alawites
in power as a minority regime and if it had objections to a
Sunni regime in Syria, which in his view would provide more
stability. He had also noted that the Israelis wanted a
minority regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he countered that in his view
the Americans did not favor continued rule by the Alawites,
given Washington's support for democratization. Both men had
agreed that it would be impossible for an Alawite to become
President of Syria after Bashar al-Asad, who had arrived to
power under unique circumstances.


6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX IMPRESSIONS OF XXXXXXXXXXXX: XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to
Polchief that XXXXXXXXXXXX had wanted to convey his fear that the
regime might try to imprison him because of his contacts with
Khaddam. Further, he had wanted to convey that "we are not
with the President," said XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX also wanted XXXXXXXXXXXX
to try to determine whether the Americans wanted Bashar to
continue in power or not. XXXXXXXXXXXX had expressed concern that
Khaddam was not accepted by the U.S. and at one point had
complained that it seemed that the U.S. wanted Bashar to
continue.


7. (C) RIAD SEIF; MUSLIM BROTHERS: On other subjects,
XXXXXXXXXXXX described recently released Damascus Spring detainee
Riad Seif as a good man and as someone XXXXXXXXXXXX could work
with, but noted that his political support beyond the elite
level was very thin. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, there is still a
strong perception that Seif is a leftist, which would hurt
him with conservative religious people in Syria, the vast
majority. On a separate issue, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that an Islamist
political movement in Syria led by the Muslim Brothers or
some like-minded group would not have more than 10-20 percent
support in Syria (see septel for a fuller discussion of his
and others views on this subject.)


8. (C) COMMENT: Although XXXXXXXXXXXX is one of our more
reliable political contacts, it is still a bit difficult to
know what to make of his conversation with XXXXXXXXXXXX. It does
seem to reveal some of the nervous fissures that Khaddam's
press antics and maneuvering have opened up, at least on the
outer fringes of the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to nurse
grander political ambitions, seeing himself as a conservative
but broad-minded Sunni (and prominent businessman) with
long-standing support in minority communities like the
Alawites, Christians, and Kurds. XXXXXXXXXXXX has created family ties and affiliations over
the years that have helped him nurture special relations with
senior Alawite regime figures, especially in the security
services, even when his opposition politics led him to
criticize the regime and call for change. These affiliations
also probably kept him out of prison over the years. He is a
harsh critic of Bashar and has refused repeated entreaties to
meet with him since the young Asad took power. XXXXXXXXXXXX
assessed that the internal situation in Syria remained stable
and the regime was weakened but still in control, with
"outside permission" to remain in power.


SECHE