SARG SHEDS CROCODILE TEARS, AS IT ASSESSES COSTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 003487

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SARG SHEDS CROCODILE TEARS, AS IT ASSESSES COSTS
AND BENEFITS


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: The current conflict in Lebanon puts in
play significant Syrian interests, with the potential for
either windfall political profits or enormous costs.
Political analysts here believe at a minimum that the SARG
will benefit from the fatal weakening of Lebanese PM Fouad
Siniora and the March 14 group. The conflict could also end
Syria's political isolation, opening the way for the
reassertion of dominant Syrian influence in Lebanon, if
Hizballah survives. Analysts are divided about whether the
SARG was surprised by the Hizballah hostage-taking operation
and the rapid military escalation that ensued. While the
Europeans, the UN, and others are likely to come courting
Damascus with fevered intensity in the coming days, we assess
that the Syrian regime is likely to sit on the sidelines for
now, watching Lebanon burn as it sheds crocodile tears. End
Summary.


2. (C) THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS: JETTISONING 1559 . . .:
Syrian political analysts here believe that the SARG could
benefit tremendously from the current conflict in Lebanon or
it could end up paying enormous political costs, including
Bashar al-Asad's fall from power, depending on how the
hostilities are brought to a close. These analysts assert
if Hizballah survives the current Israeli onslaught, Syria's
position in Lebanon will be strengthened. According to Dr.
Imad Shueibi, who is considered very close to the regime and
has good contacts with the security services, the Hizballah
gambit "overturns the table," and changes the rules of the
game in Lebanon. It will prevent any further implementation
of UNSCR 1559, any disarmament of Hizballah, and any de facto
peace with Israel being imposed on Lebanon. It could also
diminish the importance currently given to the UNIIIC
investigation.


3. (C) DESTROYING SINIORA AND ENDING SYRIA'S ISOLATION:
Shueibi, Dr. Samir al-Taki, who is close to FM Walid
Mu'allim, and fellow analyst Sami Moubayed, all predicted
that the crisis will end the government of Fouad Siniora and
destroy any remaining effectiveness of the March 14 group.
The conflict will also end the American government's policy
of isolating and sanctioning Syria, since Damascus is likely
to become the address for envoys, diplomats and others
seeking to mediate an end to the conflict, insisted Shueibi.
In his view, the U.S. needs to approach Syria directly to
work together to end the conflict. Moubayed pointed to the
call that Asad took from Italy's PM Romano Prodi, the first
such call from a European head of state in 18 months, as an
indicator of how this end of isolation would play out.


4. (C) UNDERMINING ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC POSITIONS: Al-Taki
told PolChief that the Hizballah operation and aftermath also
undermines Israel's current convergence plan for unilateral
withdrawal from the occupied territories without any peace
agreement. In his view, the Hizballah shelling (as well as
the repeated Qassam rocket shelling from Gaza) has made it
highly unlikely that Israeli PM Olmert will be able to
implement the plan for the West Bank or persuade Israelis it
is safe. The analysts also noted separately that the
Hizballah-Israeli fighting undercuts Israel's strategy of
deterrence, since Israel is being shown as vulnerable to
ongoing missile attacks.


5. (C) RETURNING SITUATION TO "ARABS VERSUS ISRAEL: Syria
can also use the current conflict to return the regional
situation to the familiar lines of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
"a black and white terrain" where the Syrian regime feels
more comfortable and at an advantage, assessed al-Taki.
(Note: In addition to expressing anger over the destruction
Israel has wreaked on Lebanon, said al-Taki, Syrians are also
quietly expressing relief that the regional situation has
returned to the familiar "we Arabs against the Israelis," and
away from various iterations of inter-Arab conflict, such as
Sunni-Shia strife in Iraq.)


6. (C) AND TAKING ADVANTAGE INTERNALLY: On the internal
scene, the Syrian regime will also benefit from the conflict
provoked by Hizballah, according to al-Taki and dissident
lawyer Habib Issa. Al-Taki noted that despite the regime's
repressive moves and show of force domestically over the past
few months, it remained concerned about unfavorable trends,
both inside and outside Syria, for example those related to
civil society and the opposition. He mentioned as an example

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the "letter/declaration" that Sunni sheikhs had sent to Asad
few weeks ago, protesting in very strong terms SARG
education policies (see septel). Al-Taki described it as the
first significant protest against the regime by the Sunni
religious establishment in decades, a move that alarmed Asad
and his inner circle. Issa predicted that the regime would
exploit the current crisis in Lebanon to increase repression
in Syria, attack the opposition, and delegitimize any calls
for multi-party democracy and ending the state of emergency.
(Comment: Issa recently withdrew a lead attorney defending
activist Kamal Labwani, citing SARG interference with his
attempts to mount a defense. See septel.)


7. (C) BUT NO GUARANTEED BENEFITS: While concurring with
the list of potential regime benefits, al-Taki and Moubayed
noted that everything depends on how the current conflict
with Israel ends. Moubayed in particular cautioned that
Hizballah military capabilities are overrated and that the
Arab street had a bad habit of forgetting the power that the
IDF could bring to bear. In the view of these analysts, if
Israel succeeds in destroying Hizballah, none of these
benefits will accrue to Damascus. Instead, Syria will
confront its worst nightmares in Lebanon, with a disarmed
proxy, the completed implementation of UNSCR 1559, and the
definitive end of its influence in Lebanon. In addition,
conflict in Lebanon, if it ends badly, with an Israeli rout
of Hizballah, could put the Asad regime in jeopardy. The
regime would likely be blamed, whether justified or not, for
supporting reckless adventurism by Hizballah that had led to
untold destruction and humiliating defeat. Even if the Asad
regime survived the defeat of its Lebanese ally and proxy, it
would likely face increased diplomatic isolation and bleak
prospects for long-term political survival. However, all
three analysts expressed doubts about Israel's ability, in
the current circumstances, to inflict such a defeat on
Hizballah.


8. (C) WERE THE SYRIANS SURPRISED BY THE HIZBALLAH GAMBIT?:
There is disagreement among these analysts about whether the
Hizballah coordinated its moves in advance with elements in
the Syrian regime. Moubayed discounted the possibility,
pointing to Hizballah's relative strength and independence
from Syria. (Note: Moubayed did not rule out that Hizballah
"cooked this up" with Iran, however.) He also noted the
regime's sustained silence in the days just after the
conflict erupted, maintaining that it indicated surprise,
uncertainty and fear about being dragged into the conflict.
Moubayed pointed out that Syria was not facing serious
internal or external threats that would justify taking such
enormous risks. In his view, the Syrians may have expected a
hostage-taking operation at some point, but were not aware of
the timing and, like Hizballah, were surprised by the
overwhelming Israeli response. He termed the Hizballah
assessment that Israel would react with relative restraint to
the hostage-taking, as it had to a similar incident during
the second Intifada, as well as the group's decision to up
the ante by shelling Israel, as serious Hizballah
miscalculations.


9. (C) OR WERE THINGS COORDINATED IN ADVANCE?: Both al-Taki
and Shuebi took the opposite view. They told Polchief that
in their view the Syrian regime, or at least a close inner
circle including the President, was not taken by surprise at
the Hizballah hostage-taking operation or the militia's
escalating military response to expected Israeli retaliation.
In the view of al-Taki, a closed circle of people around the
President, which likely included senior security official and
VP advisor Mohammed Nassif Khairbek, head of Syrian Military
Intelligence Asif Shawkat, and VP Farouk a-Shara'a,
coordinated with Hizballah in advance and were well aware of
the consequences. Using an Arab proverb, al-Taki described
the gambit as "taking them (the Israelis) to lunch before
they take us to dinner." The plan was also likely
coordinated with the Iranians, in al-Taki's view. This
closed Syrian circle did not include the MFA or the PM's
office, where there are already indications of disquiet with
how the crisis has developed, al-Taki added.


10. (C) AND THERE IS NO SURPRISE OR MISCALCULATION: Shueibi
also indicated that the Syrian regime was not surprised,
either by the initial operation or the aftermath, noting that
Hizballah leader Sheikh Nasrallah and Asad meet regularly to
"coordinate their actions." Shueibi told Polchief that he
himself knew five months ago that Hizballah was planning such

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a hostage-taking operation, having been told so by Hizballah
officials. He described the initial Hizballah action as "a
trap" set for the Israelis and noted that "Israel has stepped
into it." When asked if Syria and Iran had helped "set this
trap," Shueibi did not deny it directly but merely laughed
and noted "God helped them." Shueibi also insisted that the
aggressive Hizballah response did not come as a surprise or
as the result of any Hizballah miscalculation that has left
the SARG feeling uncomfortable. Shueibi called Israel's
actions so far "predictable" and something Hizballah
welcomed, since the group stood to benefit significantly if
it prevailed. For Shueibi, Hizballah, Iran, and Syria are
clear "winners" so far. He expressed doubt that Israel would
try to drag Syria into the conflict, although it might strike
a symbolic blow to "send a message."


11. (C) POSSIBLE SARG INFLUENCE OVER EVENTS: Regarding
possible Syrian influence over events, the analysts expressed
ambivalence. They noted that Syria would likely be pleased
to find itself at the center of any diplomatic effort to
resolve the current crisis. Shueibi predicted that Syria
"would be a winner" regardless of how the situation played
out, since it would emerge a key player in resolving the
crisis. Al-Taki expressed doubt that the SARG would take any
immediate action to prevent the conflict from continuing,
noting that for Syria to obtain its benefits (he described
them as "objectives"),the conflict needed to continue for at
least a few months. Al-Shueibi dismissed out of hand any
notion that Syria would ask Hizballah to return the two
hostages, unless Israel agreed "to pay a price." Moubayed
expressed skepticism that the SARG had much ability to
influence events, although he agreed that Syria would enjoy
the diplomatic attention likely to come its way in the coming
weeks.


12. (C) COMMENT: It remains unclear to us how much advance
coordination, if any, took place between Syria and Hizballah,
and by extension, Iran. The enormous risks at stake and the
somewhat dazed Syrian reaction to events -- both public and
private -- would support the view that the Syrians were
surprised by the hostage-taking operation and the rapid
military escalation that ensued on both sides. On the other
hand, there are also indications that the regime is not
overly alarmed yet, that it is well aware of the political
benefits that will accrue to it in Lebanon, and beyond, if
Hizballah survives a fight that it deliberately provoked with
Israel. It should also be noted that there have been
indications for months Syria was looking to destabilize
Lebanon in ways that could not be laid at its doorstep. A
military confrontation with Israel in Lebanon, provoked by
Hizballah, represents one of the best scenarios for
destroying any semblance of a Lebanon independent of Syrian
influence. Given the limited window we have into the regime
at present, neither scenario can be completely discounted.
Internal developments and SARG statements and diplomatic
moves in the coming days may shed more light on the degree to
which the SARG has been caught unawares by the current
crisis. While the Europeans, the UN, and others are likely
to be courting Damascus with fevered intensity in the coming
days, we assess that the Syrian regime is likely to sit on
the sidelines for now, watching Lebanon burn as it sheds
crocodile tears.






SECHE