NEWLY RELEASED SYRIA DECLARATION ENCOUNTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002938 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016 TAGS: PHUM PGOV SY SUBJECT: NEWLY RELEASED SYRIA DECLARATION ENCOUNTERS SKEPTICISM, SUSPICION FROM CIVIL SOCIETY REF: (A) 05 DAMASCUS 005833 (B) DAMASCUS 02688 (C) DAMASCUS 02517 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: While the recently published "Syria Declaration" calling for improvements in human rights policy and the passage of laws guaranteeing a range of civil liberties has gained international attention following its release on June 14, many civil society members are either unaware of the document or have dismissed it, referring to its signatory organizations as "illusory." The majority of the Declaration's signatory organizations are, in fact, one-man shops with overlapping leaders, a number of whom have featured prominently in recent SARG-backed actions aimed at discrediting the opposition. Contacts are divided as to whether the Declaration is simply a publicity stunt by these small organizations, or if the SARG may have allowed or even encouraged the Declaration's release. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) SYRIA DECLARATION CALLS FOR IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, EXPANDED CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SECULAR APPROACH: A group of ten Syrian human rights and civil society organizations released the "Syria Declaration" on June 14, calling on the SARG to "follow peaceful and gradual democratic steps, taking it from a security state to a civil state." The Declaration calls for the SARG to implement eighteen measures, including freeing political prisoners; ending the Emergency Law; passing new laws allowing for freedom of expression, association, and party formation; ending the politicization of the armed services and the court system; committing itself to work on the return of the Golan Heights; working in harmony with the international community and its different organizations; and setting up a market-based economy. The signatories describe their project as using the secular approach of cultural liberalism, combining political action with "the slogan of democratic liberalism and human rights." According to post contacts, the document is in essence the same document that Aktham Naisse had been developing since November as an alternative to the Damascus Declaration (ref A). ¶3. (C) TEN SIGNATORY ORGANIZATIONS ACTUALLY ONLY A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE: While a joint public statement by ten Syrian 
civil society organizations may look good on paper, the document proves not to be especially representative of civil society upon closer inspection. Of the ten signatory organizations, five (CDF, the Cham Center, the Committee for Arrestees' Rights, the Program for Supporting Victims of Violence) are all run by human rights activist Aktham Naisse and have very few, if any, other members. (NOTE: A UPI article about the declaration incorrectly asserted that jailed human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni had signed the document, confusing Naisse,s Cham Center with another group, the Damascus Center for the Study of Human Rights, where Bunni is an advisor. Representatives of that center have confirmed to Post that they are not involved with this Declaration.) The signatory Syrian Human Rights Organization/SWASIAH is in fact a one-person splinter group run by Abdulkarim Rihawi, who split off from the larger SWASIAH in autumn 2005. Rihawi and Naisse (who have long been rumored to be active SARG collaborators) have been linked recently to SARG-backed actions aimed at discrediting or splitting the opposition in the post-Damascus-Beirut Declaration (DBD) environment, including the public denunciation of a human rights lawyer (ref B) and Rihawi's signature of a SARG-sponsored anti-DBD statement (ref C). ¶4. (C) The other signatories are equally small-scale. According to post contacts, two other groups, the Liberal Democratic Secular Gathering ('ADL) and the Oriental Center for Liberal Studies and Minority Rights, are run by political gadfly Nabil Fayyad and his "disciple" Elias Helyani and have few additional members. Another group, the Syriac-Syrian Movement, is a one-person splinter group from the much larger Assyrian Democratic Organization. Finally, the Third Alliance is a two-week old, U.S.-based group led by Marah Bukai, who post contacts say is the ex-wife of U.S.-based Syrian opposition politician Mohammed al-Jbaili. ¶5. (C) STATEMENT OFFERS ALTERNATIVE TO DAMASCUS DECLARATION, DOESN'T CROSS ANY REDLINES, SAYS SIGNATORY: Rihawi told Poloff on June 18 that the group decided to release the document now as an alternative to the Damascus Declaration (DD),as the DD has apparently failed and has not DAMASCUS 00002938 002 OF 002 gained broad support. In addition, the Syria Declaration is "more acceptable to the Syrian opposition" now, as Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni has, from the Syria Declaration group's perspective, left the DD for former Vice-President Abdulhalim Khaddam's National Salvation Front. Rihawi emphasized that the Syria Declaration is a work in progress and that other internal organizations and political parties are welcome to discuss its contents and join the group. ¶6. (C) When asked if the Syria Declaration signatories had faced any problems from the SARG since the document's release, given the current atmosphere of fear following the Damascus-Beirut Declaration, Rihawi answered that the SD does not cross any SARG redlines, adding that he had "recently learned" that the SARG has "no problem with us" as long as it does not cross the redline of contacting foreign governments or NGOs. "Any project created within Syria will be discussed, and potentially accepted, by the SARG," said Rihawi. When asked why the U.S.-based Third Alliance is acceptable to the SARG, Rihawi noted that its founding statement spoke out against external interference and invasion, and that a number of Syria-based activists (including Syria Declaration signatory Helyani) serve on Third Alliance's board. Rihawi claimed he had only been contacted twice by security service agents regarding the Syria Declaration, who took issue with a few minor phrases. ¶7. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY PLAYS DOWN DECLARATION'S SIGNIFICANCE: According to post contacts, the Syria Declaration has not been widely disseminated among Syrian civil society. Those who are aware of it have largely dismissed it based on the organizations which signed it, calling them "illusory organizations" and "merely names rather than real bodies." Post contacts note that a variety of secular alternatives to the Damascus Declaration had been floated since October and that the Syria Declaration is simply a latecomer publicity stunt by its organizers. Kurdish lawyer and Yekiti Party activist Faisal Badr told Poloff on June 14 that his party had worked with Naisse on an earlier draft and that he was surprised at the document's "sudden" release, as Naisse had told them that dialogue would continue about the declaration's contents. Badr dismissed the document as a personal project of Naisse's to gain attention. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: One explanation for the timing of the Syria Declaration would be that the leaders of these small organizations are using the document to promote themselves and gain press attention while more prominent activists are distracted by the aftermath of the May post-DBD crackdown. Other activists speculate that the SARG manipulated the Syria Declaration signatories. That Naisse and Rihawi have managed to release a document calling for democratic reform in the midst of the harsh crackdown has raised speculation that the SARG may have at least signed off on, if not directly encouraged, the statement's release, as a way to split the opposition further. SECHE