RIYAD SEIF: WHAT IS HIS POTENTIAL?

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000288

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: RIYAD SEIF: WHAT IS HIS POTENTIAL?

REF: A) DAMASCUS 0254 B) DAMASCUS 0207

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: The SARG's January 18 release of former MP
Riad Seif (with four other Damascus Spring detainees) has
provoked a surge of assessments and predictions about his
potential and his plans. Contacts are divided about Seif's
political prospects, with admirers noting that Seif, a
Damascene Sunni, is a charismatic figure with broad political
appeal. Skeptics dispute this level of actual or potential
support and point to what they describe as his lack of
political skills and vision for the future. We assess that
Seif has substantial potential as an opposition political
figure but anticipate vigorous SARG's attempts to divide the
opposition and intimidate Seif supporters, in order to
prevent him from building a democratic movement and
establishing a political party. If those SARG maneuvers are
unsuccessful, re-arrest of Seif would likely represent the
regime's default option. End Summary.


2. (C) A DAMASCENE SUNNI: Since former MP Riad Seif's
mid-January release, a range of contacts have offered
estimates of his potential political support and assessments
of his capabilities. Many contacts note that Seif, a
Damascene Sunni, is a charismatic figure with broad political
appeal, the only such figure among a Syrian opposition that
is which is dominated by feuding personalities, parochial
interests, and negligible grass roots appeal.


3. (C) AN ENTREPRENEUR: Unlike many in the opposition who
have emerged from aggressively secular leftist movements of
the 1960's and 70's, or from the Islamist Muslim Brothers,
Seif is a self-made businessman (and a supporter of a free
market economy),with a background as a mainstream
politician. He is from the Midan neighborhood of Damascus, a
religiously conservative, middle-class area defined by the
twin influences of Sunni merchants and religious clerics,
according to historian and political analyst Sami Moubayed,
who knows Seif well. That background makes him an appealing
figure in Damascus. His reputation as an enlightened
entrepreneur, who treated his factory workers quite well (far
better than the Syrian norm) has also engendered some working
class support for Seif.


4. (C) SECULAR BUT NOT ANTI-RELIGIOUS: Seif himself is
secular in orientation, describing himself to the Charge
recently as "a non-practicing believer" (ref A). That
secular orientation gives him appeal among religious
minorities in Syria fearful of being swamped by the Sunni
Muslim majority in any post-Ba'athist scenario. It also
appeals to Sunni secular elites. However, Seif is not
aggressively secular, presenting himself as one who respects
religion and can represent the interests of the Muslim
faithful, by far the largest bloc of voters in Syria. Seif
made a point of mentioning to the Charge that in the
mid-1960's he had belonged to the Muslim Brothers for a year
or so, and that during his imprisonment, he had received
feelers from exiled MB leader Sadr al-Din Bayanouni,
expressing interest in cooperating to form a political party
when Seif was released.


5. (C) UNCORRUPTED, UNLIKE KHADDAM: Seif's almost five
years' imprisonment, in tandem with his refusal to accept any
SARG deal for early release, have reinforced his image as an
uncorrupted politician and burnished his reputation in ways
that the Asad regime is likely to find discomfiting,
particularly if, as expected, he uses the corruption issue as
a political tool. The fact that the regime bankrupted him
before sending him to prison, with selective, confiscatory
tax rulings and other trumped up charges of malfeasance is
also likely to make Seif a more appealing figure. Unlike
former VP Khaddam (ref B),widely viewed here as discredited
by his corruption, Seif is seen by many as a potential
alternative to Asad. Film director and opposition figure
Nabil Maleh told Polchief he viewed Seif as a potential prime
minister in a post-Ba'ath government and has started quietly
mentioning that possibility to others. Dozens of opposition
figures (and other more mainstream political figures, such as
MP's) have been visiting Seif since since his relief, giving
some indication that he is a uniting figure among the
opposition.


6. (C) ALLIES AMONG OTHER DAMASCUS SPRING DETAINEES: Seif
has other allies among the Damascus Spring detainees with
whom he plans to cooperate in forming a political party,
which should also strengthen his appeal. The most
influential among them are the recently released pan-Arabist
lawyer, Habib Issa, and the still-detained economist and
intellectual Arif Delilla. Both are impressive Alawite
opposition figures, according to our contacts. (Note:
According to fellow Alawite intellectual Hassan Abbas, Issa
and Seif, while friends and political allies, have very
different views on some key issues. Seif has left prison
proclaiming openly his pro-American tendencies, says Abbas,
while Issa's pan-Arab nationalism and anti-American
tendencies became more pronounced during his years of
detention. Fawaz Tello and Walid Bunni are unimpressive
figures unlikely to offer Seif much value, said Abbas. Seif
himself acknowledged to Charge that fellow MP Ma'amoun Homsi
had been a corrupt smuggler with little education and would
not be welcomed as a political partner.)


7. (C) SKEPTICS QUESTION SEIF'S APPEAL: Not everyone here
shares the view that Seif has tremendous political potential.
His detractors question whether he has any broad political
appeal, insisting that he is not that well known and that
those who know him tend to dismiss him as "a merchant" not
qualified to be viewed as an alternative political leader of
Syria. Civil society figure Amr al-Azm noted that Seif has
been out of circulation for five years and is isolated
politically. Al-Hayat correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi, who
offered a nuanced assessment of Seif, noted that the regime
has released him at a time when he will find it difficult to
develop any political opening. The regime has wrapped itself
in the Syrian flag and whipped up nationalist (and pan-Arab
and anti-American) sentiment in ways that will make it more
difficult for Seif to attack it, and will make him vulnerable
to charges of being an agent of the Americans.


8. (C) CAPABILITIES ALSO QUESTIONED: Several contacts also
question Seif's political skills and depth of experience in
politics. Moderate Islamist MP Mohammed Habash, who
expressed satisfaction with Seif's release, nonetheless noted
that when he visited him afterwards, Seif sounded more like a
"an angry demonstration leader" than a politician capable of
using savvy and political cunning to build coalitions and put
pressure on the regime. Habash also questioned Seif's claim
to appeal to the religious faithful, sniffing that "he is a
secular man who does not share our program." Long-imprisoned
Communist dissident Fattah Jammous, an Alawite, dismissed the
release of Seif as "not a very important step" and discounted
his political prospects. Jammous assessed that opposition
efforts to have the Emergency Law canceled, all political
prisoners released, and basic rights granted for free
expression and association would continue and would not be
appreciably bolstered by the release of Seif. Some of this
naysaying about Seif represents legitimate questioning and
some of it seems characterized by the typical ax-grinding and
jealousy one confronts regularly among the opposition and
political elite. Habash for example likely views Seif as a
future political competitor (and unlike Habash, one who is
untainted by years of collaborating with the regime).


9. (C) SARG REACTION A CRITICAL LIMITING FACTOR: Beyond any
political limitations Seif suffers from, the critical factor
limiting Seif will be the SARG's reaction to his attempts to
build a democratic movement and establish a political party.
Many observers expect the SARG to re-arrest Seif -- as it did
with fellow Damascus Spring detainess Kamal Labwani and Habib
Saleh -- if he creates any problems or overly embarrasses the
government. Abbas, for example, dismissed any notion that
the regime would be reluctant to create a poltical headache
for itself by re-arresting Seif. Others thought that the
SARG would hesitate to re-jail Seif, but would put tremendous
pressure on his associates and potential followers, with
intimidation, surveillance, and possible trumped-up charges
and imprisonment. They also doubt whether the SARG will let
Seif proceed very far in organizing any new political party,
using the Emergency Law and the SARG's monopoly on the media
to prevent him from spreading his message. The SARG is
likely to try to persuade the Saudis to limit Seif's access
to satellite TV networks like al-Arabiyya, as it did with
Khaddam, if Seif's appeal seems to be getting out of hand.
With the security services' penetration of the opposition,
the regime is also likely to try to divide opposition forces,
opening talks (likely to go nowhere) with one wing, for
example Hassan Abdul-Azim's Democratic Gathering, as a way to
block Seif from building coalitions or gathering any
political head of steam.


10. (C) OVERALL ASSESSMENT; DANGERS SEIF FACES: Seif's
supporters and his detractors make valid points but probably
overstate their cases to a degree, although the detractors
seem to be a bit more enthusiastic in their efforts. Seif
strikes us -- by far -- as the most appealing figure in the
opposition, with the potential for drawing a substantial
political following from a broad base of groups in Syria. He
is charismatic and exudes some populist appeal. With his
reputation as an uncorrupted political figure enhanced by the
courage and sacrifice evident with his prison years, he can
potentially cast a large shadow on the Syrian political
landscape. He also seems to have a definite political vision
for the future, which emphasizes democratic development in
Syria. Nonetheless, Seif will have to demonstrate in the
coming weeks that he has a plan and specific ideas for
surmounting existing obstacles, such as the SARG's monopoly
on the media, the fear-inspiring reputation of the security
services, as well as existing divisions in the opposition in
order to achieve his political objectives. Otherwise, the
government may not need to do much to actively repress his
efforts. If Seif does devise effective tactics, the
government is likely to weigh in at every possible juncture
in an attempt to limit his political future. If those SARG
maneuvers are unsuccessful, re-arrest would likely represent
the regime's default option. Seif also mentioned the
possibility the regime might at some point try to assassinate
him.


SECHE