TEHRAN'S INFLUENCE SAID TO BE SPREADING IN SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002687 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY IR SUBJECT: TEHRAN'S INFLUENCE SAID TO BE SPREADING IN SYRIA REF: A. DAM 1361 ¶B. DAM 710 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: Syria and Iran have exchanged a number of visits in the past several days: longtime SARG regime insider and VP assistant Muhammad Nassif Kheirbek was in Tehran on June 7, and the commander of the Iranian Army's Air Forces was in Damascus on June 6. One of our contacts mentioned the possibility of an imminent trip to Tehran by Syrian VP Farouk al-Shara'a, which would be his second to the Iranian capital in less than three months. The frequency of high-level Iran-Syria exchanges has contributed to a buzz in Damascus about the deliberate and successful spread of Tehran's influence on a number of fronts here. Some of our contacts have expressed growing concern about this spreading Iranian influence in Syria and have noted a division in the SARG about whether it is a wise policy course. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Syria and Iran have exchanged a number of visits in the past several days. On June 7, there was a visit to Tehran by Muhammad Nassif Kheirbek, a senior intelligence official and assistant to VP Farouk Al-Shara'a. An article in Iran's official Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) characterized Nassif as Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's special envoy. Nassif met with Iranian FM Manouchehr Mottaki on bilateral and regional issues including Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian conflict, according to IRNA. Nassif called for strengthening ties between countries in the region to promote stability and security, and he underlined Syria's support for Iran's right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, according to IRNA. The two officials characterized Tehran-Damascus relations as strategic and sustainable. Syria's official media did not report on Nassif's trip, but one of our contacts recently mentioned in passing that a Shara'a aide was set to travel to Iran as part of the preparations for a Shara'a trip to Tehran, which would be the VP's second visit to the Iranian capital in less than three months (reftel A). ¶3. (U) Earlier this week, Syrian PM Naji al-Otri visited Tehran, meeting with Iranian VP Mohammad Reza Aref, according to a June 5 BBC report. Aref was quoted by the BBC as saying, "We are ready to help Syria on all grounds to confront threats," while Otri was quoted as saying his meeting was taking place at a "very important and delicate time, with Syria and Iran facing numerous challenges." On May 28, Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade Amer Hosni Lutfi met in Tehran with Iran's First Vice President Parviz Davoudi and called for the speedy execution of economic projects between the two countries and for the boosting of economic and trade ties, according to the official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). (Comment: Lutfi's comments may reflect the frustration of some Syrian public and private sector entities, as reported reftel B, that very little has materialized economically as a result of Syria-Iran exchanges.) ¶4. (C) On June 6 in Damascus, visiting Commander of the Iranian Army's Air Forces Gen. Karim Qawami met with Syrian Defense Minister Gen. Hassan Turkmani to discuss "current developments in the region and cooperative relations between the two friendly Syrian and Iranian armies and ways of developing them," according to SANA. Syria's Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ali Habib also met Qawami and his delegation, SANA reported without elaboration. Post does not know if there is a connection, but an Egyptian diplomat told us this week that his embassy has received unconfirmed information from a reliable Syrian source that Iran recently requested Syrian permission to station Iranian missile batteries and their crews on Syrian territory (presumably as part of increased air defense protection for Iran). The SARG responded that Iran could either station unmanned surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile batteries here and train Syrians to operate them or that Iran could send them through Syria to Hizballah, said the diplomat who emphasized he was still seeking separate confirmation of the report that he had forwarded to Cairo. ¶5. (C) The frequency of high-level Iran-Syria exchanges has contributed to a buzz in Damascus about the deliberate and successful spread of Tehran's influence on a number of fronts here. A Canadian diplomat told us this week about Iran's educational recruitment efforts at a university in the eastern Syrian city of Deir-ez-Zor where the Canadians are also trying to set up an educational advising center. The DAMASCUS 00002687 002 OF 002 diplomat also noted that this week was "Iranian Cultural Week" in Deir-ez-Zor. Separately, a Jordanian diplomat and Syrian contacts have mentioned repeatedly over the past year Iranian Shiite proselytizing in the northeast of the country, particularly around Raqqa, where there is a large Shiite shrine reportedly paid for by Iran. On June 7, the Syrian Champress website carried an article entitled "Growing Shiite Presence a Dilemma for Syrians," which characterized Damascus' Saida Zeinab mosque as a thriving hub of Shiite activity dominated by Iranians, Iraqis and Afghans. The article quoted a Sunni preacher from Aleppo, Mahmoud Alhosainy, as praising Syrian authorities for respecting freedom of religion, while also noting that Iranian support of Shiites beyond Iran's borders could spark an explosion of violence. "Iran is capable of doing any kind of activity it wants here, without anyone from the government stopping them," Alhosainy said. On the economic front, our Egyptian colleague noted that he had recently encountered Syrian businessmen serving as fronts for Iranian investors seeking to do business in Cairo. ¶6. (C) Comment: All of this Iranian activity has disturbed some of our Syrian contacts, who report a division in the SARG between those who want to proceed "full speed ahead" (based primarily on the assessment that Syria is isolated and under threat),and those who fear that Syrian interests will eventually be jeopardized by such a bold approach. Hard-liners like Ba'ath Party Regional Command National Security Bureau Chief Hisham Ikhtiyar and VP Shara'a, apparently with the support of the President, have pressed for this full embrace of Tehran. Nassif, although he has carefully nurtured a discreet reputation over the years for wanting dialogue with the USG, especially via back channels or through intelligence channels, is considered to be one of the long-time architects of Syria's Iran policy. He plays a complex role in foreign-policy making circles on Iran policy and has traditionally exercised heavy influence over Syrian policy toward both Iraq and Hizballah. Because those "files" are considered among the SARG's most active, Nassif's influence is thought to be on the rise yet again (despite conflicting reports earlier in the year that his influence had been eclipsed). Long-time contacts like Shiite businessman Saeb Nahas have insisted to us repeatedly, however, that Nasif is an ally of his and Foreign Minister Mu'allim's in their insider efforts to curb the influence of hard-liners like Shara'a and to seek avenues for re-engagement with the U.S. 7, (C) Comment Continued: The group led by Mu'allim arguing for more caution in Syria's approach toward Iran has not had much success in braking Syria's overt embrace of Tehran over the past six months. Samir al-Taki, a Mu'allim protg, told Polchief recently that the SARG's tilt toward Iran was complicating and souring Syria's relations with traditional regional allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia, destroying any possibility that Syria's regional foreign policy could have any "Arab dimension," a fatal defect, in al-Taki's view. These key allies perceive Iranian regional interests as inimical to their own. Egypt in particular is questioning why Syria is "isolating itself" and allowing Iran in effect to marginalize Damascus' regional influence. Contacts such as al-Taki insist that, in the end, "at five past midnight," Iran -- because it has so many cards to play -- will be able to strike a deal with the U.S., leaving Syria out on a limb, caught in an awkward and dangerously confrontational position toward the U.S. SECHE