SYRIAN REGIME REBUILDING WALLS OF FEAR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 002593 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY SUBJECT: SYRIAN REGIME REBUILDING WALLS OF FEAR AND ISOLATION REF: DAMASCUS 2517 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: The crackdown on Syrian civil society and the opposition has gotten so intense that some observers argue that the regime of Bashar al-Asad is "rebuilding the walls of fear" that his father once erected. Even if the ten Damascus-Beirut Declaration activists are released, which is doubtful, the internal environment is likely to remain extremely repressive. Contacts note that the repression is having a broader impact on journalists and other marginally independent figures who fear getting caught up in it. Many observers believe that the regime is also embracing confrontation and willfully isolating itself from the West, although there appear to be internal divisions about how aggressively the SARG should pursue such policies. The June 2 gunbattle at the headquarters of Syrian Radio and Television, as well as the impending release of UNIIIC June 15 report, are likely to embolden voices in the regime calling for greater repression, isolation, and confrontation. End Summary. ¶2. (C) A CRACKDOWN THAT WOULD MAKE HIS FATHER PROUD: The crackdown on civil society and the opposition has reached such proportions in Syria that people are comparing it to the repression in the 1980's during the rule of Hafez al-Asad. Previously, comparisons with the father nearly always pointed to Bashar al-Asad's weaknesses: his indecisiveness, his inability to assert his authority, his lack of experience, and his poor decision-making. ¶3. (C) UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW BAD THE REPRESSION WILL GET: There remains some uncertainty about how far the regime plans to take the current wave of repression. Some of the most optimistic argue that the SARG has halted the arrests over the Damascus-Beirut Declaration (DBD) and is instead using threats and other forms of intimidation to avoid further arrests (reftel). These people speculate that if the threats and other tactics bear sufficient fruit, undermining support for the DBD and its legitimacy, the regime may walk things back a bit and release the ten imprisoned activists, instead of following through on threats to detain them for five years. Even if the DBD activists are released (which is viewed as extremely doubtful, according to some of our 
contacts who know the regime well),the overall internal environment is likely to remain extremely repressive. ¶4. (C) USING PRETEXTS TO SUSTAIN BROAD-BASED CRACKDOWN: Some activists insist that the regime is merely using the DBD as a convenient weapon to throttle the opposition and civil-society movement, which angered and embarrassed a less assertive regime last fall with the release of the Damascus Declaration (as distinct from the DBD),calling for an end to emergency law and respect for human rights and democracy. Now emboldened, the regime is intent on erasing the memory of that embarrassment. Activists note that the DBD-related arrests of Michel Kilo, Anwar al-Bunni, and others represent only the latest wave of arrests, but that many other prominent dissidents, like Kamal Labwani, Fatteh Jammous, and Ali Abdullah, all of whom remain imprisoned, have been caught up in previous cycles of arrests over the past year. ¶5. (C) WALLS OF FEAR GOING BACK UP: These previous waves of arrests already had some observers quietly declaring that the level of repression in Syria was as bad or worse than during the days of Hafez al-Asad. Yassin Haj Saleh, one of Syria's most prominent dissidents, told Polchief in mid-April, before the latest crackdown over the DBD, that the regime of Bashar al-Asad is "rebuilding the walls of fear" that his father once erected. He described the current situation as the middle range of a cumulative process and predicted that the arrests would continue. ¶6. (C) Saleh insisted that the regime was "re-inserting" the Syrian security services much more aggressively into the Syrian domestic political scene. He called it a recurring aspect of modern Syrian history: "You can invite these security services in, giving them greater control, but you can't get them to leave so easily after the crisis has passed." He noted that the regime is like a patient that has "survived a critical illness" and is now stronger than at any time since UNSCR 1559 was passed in the fall of 2004. For the first time since he was released from prison seven years DAMASCUS 00002593 002 OF 003 ago, Saleh is considering leaving the country, sneaking out since he has no passport, because of the increasingly repressive environment. (Note: Saleh signed both the Damascus Declaration and DBD but has not yet been arrested.) ¶7. (C) ONLY REGIME CHEERLEADERS NEED APPLY: Other contacts note that the repressive environment is not merely silencing the opposition or civil society. Even the relatively meek independents in Parliament, some of whom, like independent MP Basil Dahdouh, have tried to inject a limited degree of skepticism about regime policies over the past decade, say that the regime is not accepting any questioning of its policies. Now the regime will only tolerate "cheerleaders," he said. "No real political players outside the regime are allowed." In the current environment, people are afraid to travel abroad to attend conferences or meetings, or to make any contacts (either abroad or at home),"unless they get regime blessing first," said Dahdouh. Many, like himself, who are reluctant to seek such a blessing, have opted not to travel and to keep a low profile. Even in the 1990's, under the father, the situation was much more open, he added. In the current environment, any political reforms that might emerge, such as a new political parties law, are likely to be worse than the status quo, said Dahdouh. ¶8. (C) JOURNALISTS ALSO BEING INTIMIDATED: Journalists have also noted the increasingly repressive environment. Damascus-based Al-Hayat bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi told Polchief in late May that in the days prior to the most recent wave of arrests, he had been warned by a figure "very close to the security services" that he should be extremely careful about what he writes. "When you write, assume you're writing during the period of Hafez al-Asad," he was warned. "There is no room for mistakes." Taking the warning seriously, Hamidi noted that he had avoided writing about the DBD-related crackdown. ¶9. (C) REGIME OPTING FOR ISOLATION AND CONFRONTATION: Many observers of the Syrian political scene believe that as the regime rebuilds these walls of fear, it is also willfully isolating itself from a West that it believes will not engage with it and wants to see it fall from power. Emboldened by its alliance with Iran, its re-assertion of influence in Lebanon, the ongoing carnage in Iraq (a trend that it believes signals the waning of American pressure),the election of Hamas, and the re-establishment of close ties with Russia, the Syrian regime believes it has the political assets it needs to withstand the costs of a sustained rupture with the West. ¶10. (C) Given that assessment, and regime sentiment that it remains under pressure and threat, many here believe that the walls of isolation that cut Syria off from the West are likely to grow more impenetrable. In addition to the current crackdown (which prompted unprecedented EU criticism),a series of other events, including SARG complicity in the destruction of several European embassies in February, the closing of the EU-sponsored human rights center, pressure on the U.S. Embassy through restrictive visa issuance and travel policies, and efforts to wrest control of the Embassy-sponsored Damascus Community School, indicate that the SARG has opted for a more confrontational policy and cares little about the isolating effect such policies could have. The Egyptian Ambassador told the Charge recently that Syria even seems to be distancing itself from Egypt, a key regional ally, by indicating that it has no interest in taking any steps that might address Egyptian concerns about SARG policies. Concurring, analyst Samir al-Taki told Polchief that Syria's relations with Saudi Arabia are also shaky. "Syria has no Arab dimension to its foreign policy right now," because it is overplaying its Iran card, he noted. ¶11. (C) INTERNAL DIVISIONS ABOUT HOW FAR TO PUSH THINGS: Some argue that the regime is divided about how far it wants to proceed with such isolation and escalation. According to Hamidi, there are hard-liners, including key figures in the security services and VP Farouk Shara'a, who argue that Syria is benefiting from an across-the-board policy of escalation and confrontation with the West and that any costs in terms of isolation are negligible, given the threat that the regime faces. Others, led by FM Mu'allim are pressing for a more nuanced policy, one that seeks limited confrontation with the U.S. and Europe, even as it "continues to escalate," to DAMASCUS 00002593 003 OF 003 remind these parties of the costs of their Syria policy, and to pressure them to re-engage with Damascus, assessed Hamidi. These forces urging "limited escalation" eventually prevailed in the internal battle over control of the American school (septel),forcing the more radical elements in the Syrian regime to relinquish this issue when it became clear that the diplomatic costs of continuing to escalate would be high, he noted. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Despite any divisions at the margins over how far it wants to press its policy of escalation and isolation, the overall policy is likely to continue. The regime feels strong internally and regionally and seems to care very little about its image in the West right now, or about any international damage the recent crackdown may have caused. In addition, its current allies like Russia, China, and Iran care little or nothing about human rights and protecting a strong civil society. The impact of the June 2 gunbattle at the headquarters of Syrian Radio and Television on these regime calculations is not completely clear (septel). It may cause some momentary nervousness and sense of vulnerability, but will also likely be used to shore up support for the regime and to persuade ordinary Syrians that the country and its security and stability are under real threat. Uncertainty and jitters over Brammertz's June 15 UNIIIC report are likely to exacerbate these sentiments. In the end, however, both events are expected to embolden the voices in the Syrian regime calling for greater repression and for discounting the costs of a policy of isolation and confrontation, especially if the UNIIIC report fails to indict the regime (or at least senior officials) for the Hariri assassination. It should be noted that although these policies are helping the regime survive in the short term, some Syrian observers believe they are misguided and offer no way forward for Syria to address the political and economic challenges the country will face in the intermediate and longer term. End Comment. SECHE