LABWANI INDICTED ON CAPITAL CHARGES; DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002166 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU, DRL FOR ELISE CARLSON, DEPARTMENT FOR ECA/PE/V/M E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2016 TAGS: PHUM PGOV SY SUBJECT: LABWANI INDICTED ON CAPITAL CHARGES; DEFENSE LAWYERS SEEK INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE REF: A) DAMASCUS 1158 B) DAMASCUS 1815 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a member of opposition activist Kamal Labwani's legal team, the criminal court has handed down an indictment charging him with having contact with a foreign power and encouraging the foreign power to invade Syria, a charge that could carry the death sentence. The defense team is now hopeful that international organizations like Amnesty International will be willing to offer legal support, in part to raise the international profile of the case and pressure the SARG to conduct a fair trial. Lawyers expect the Labwani trial to begin sometime in June. ¶2. (C) LABWANI INDICTED ON CAPITAL CHARGES: A Syrian criminal court judge on April 29 formally indicted opposition activist Kamal Labwani, charging him with having contact with a foreign power and encouraging the foreign power to invade Syria, a charge that could carry the death sentence. Labwani and his defense team have been anticipating these charges since mid-March (ref A). According to defense lawyer Mohanned al-Hasani, Labwani's defense team was only notified of the indictment after the three-day period lawyers are normally given to file appeals against charges. Hasani expects the trial to begin sometime in June. According to Hasani, from a purely legal perspective, Labwani's case is strong; however, the political nature of the case will make a fair trial highly unlikely without increased international coverage of the case. Particularly because Labwani could face execution, said Hasani, the case is likely to attract the attention of international legal and human rights experts, possibly forcing the SARG to at least formally comply with basic legal standards for such a trial. Noncompliance with these international standards would also make clear that the SARG is using its courts for political purposes. "The regime must come to the realization that it will suffer public humiliation internationally when it is made clear that the court system is in fact a tool of the regime," he added. ¶3. (C) DEFENSE TEAM TO SEEK INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: Hasani noted that the defense team is seeking support from Amnesty International (AI) to bring in other Arab lawyers to work on the case. He noted that AI had declined the defense team's November request that a team of Egyptian and Jordanian lawyers be sent to Syria for that purpose. Hasani asked that the USG persuade AI to send a legal team now that the court had formally indicted Labwani. Hasani also asked that the USG consider releasing the names of SARG officials who had participated in past International Visitor (IV) programs to show both the court and the Syrian people that Labwani's participation was not unique and that even Syrian government officials had taken part in the program. ¶4. (C) SARG VIEWS LABWANI AS BARGAINING CHIP, EU SENDING WRONG MESSAGE: Hasani echoed earlier comments by fellow defense team lawyer Anwar al-Bunni and the Labwani family (ref B) that the SARG wants to make an example of Labwani and that the SARG perceives Labwani's fate as a potential bargaining chip in its dealings with the USG. Hasani also noted that European embassies seem to have taken little interest in the case, in stark contrast to their support of Riad Seif during his incarceration. According to Hasani, the EU's lack of action communicates to the SARG that human rights is not a principle but instead a question of individual contacts. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Six months after Labwani's arrest, his defense team's hopes for a quiet resolution to the case have dimmed substantially. Hasani's comments indicate that the defense team views intense international NGO and media pressure as the best way to influence the SARG's decision about Labwani's fate, a strategy that succeeded in the June 2005 acquittal of human rights activist Aktham Naisse. However, the defense team's ability to mobilize such pressure for Labwani, whose international stature is far less than Naisse's was at the time, is questionable. Hasani's curious assessment of the USG's level of influence with AI may reflect the defense team's desperation to involve anyone in lobbying AI to assist in the case, particularly since European embassies do not appear willing to do so. We strongly recommend against releasing the names of the IV participants, as the crux of the case is not Labwani's participation in the program, but rather the public DAMASCUS 00002166 002 OF 002 statements made outside of the program and the publicity surrounding his visits with high-level USG officials. ¶6. (C) COMMENT (CONTINUED): The SARG seems intent on prosecuting Labwani on trumped-up security charges, similar in wording to those being pursued against former Vice President Abdulhalim Khaddam and his family, showing that the regime can choose to deal with its critics forcefully. The likelihood of a capital sentence is unclear as SARG judges have recently commuted most death sentences for other political activists, specifically Muslim Brotherhood members, to long prison terms. Labwani's case may serve as a test to demonstrate to the opposition how severely the SARG will deal with democratic activists who overstep the regime's red lines, especially the one banning any contact between the internal opposition and Washington officials. SECHE