SARG DIVIDED ON REACTION TO BRAMMERTZ; TILT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 002137 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY SUBJECT: SARG DIVIDED ON REACTION TO BRAMMERTZ; TILT TOWARDS IRAN SEEN AS HARDENING INTERNAL POLICIES Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: While noting that President Bashar al-Asad and others in the regime had emerged more confident after UNIIIC chief Serge Brammertz's April 25 questioning of the Syrian leader, MFA informal legal advisor Dr. Samir al-Taki termed such confidence misplaced. He voiced his suspicion that Brammertz is "hiding something." Al-Taki also claimed that SARG opposition to the formation of a tribunal is diminishing, with some in the regime accepting legal advisors' arguments that a tribunal will limit Brammertz's independence and buy the SARG time. On a separate issue, al-Taki said the regime is cracking down on the opposition to signal that the U.S. will not be able to pressure it through this medium. He described Syria's intensified relationship with Iran as both a reflection of the regime's more conservative policies and as a factor contributing to this growing inflexibility, which has increased the influence of VP Farouk Shara'a and senior security officer (and Shara'a advisor) Mohammed Nassif Khairbek. The tilt towards Iran has caused some unease at senior levels of the MFA, he noted. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Dr. Samir al-Taki, an informal MFA advisor on the UNIIIC inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri, told PolChief in early May that President Bashar al-Asad appeared to have emerged confident and optimistic from his April 25 interview with Serge Brammertz. The President was also satisfied that he had been able to show the SARG as fully cooperating with the Brammertz inquiry. According to al-Taki, many in the regime shared the President's upbeat view. ¶3. (C) Al-Taki called that view mistaken and said he is convinced that Brammertz is holding back, "hiding something" that will likely make the June 15 report damning for Syria. He also insisted that MFA legal advisor Riad Daoudi shares this view and thinks that the regime should not feel any special confidence or relief after the questioning of the President and VP Shara'a. Al-Taki predicted that pressure is likely to build again on the SARG in the run-up to the release of the report. ¶4. (C) According to al-Taki, the SARG is not opposed to the idea of an international tribunal. In fact, SARG officials are beginning to see it as a tool that can be used to put Brammertz and his inquiry team under more control, and "institutionalize" their investigation. Formation of a tribunal would also stretch out the legal proceedings into several time-consuming stages. Because of these factors, some SARG legal advisors are actually pushing for it to happen sooner rather than later. (Comment: We have received contradictory indications about how concerned senior regime figures are about the establishment of the tribunal and the dangers it might pose.) ¶5. (C) On a separate note, al-Taki assessed that the Syrian regime, even if under pressure, is tremendously resilient and able to adapt. Using a homespun analogy, he compared it to a donkey's ear that can be pushed "this way and that but is nearly impossible to pull off. It will do whatever it needs to stay in place." For the SARG, that includes manipulating the Islamic current, since that is what it perceives as necessary right now, he added. Al-Taki noted two reasons for the regime's crackdown on the opposition. First, "even if you're weak, you don't want to appear weak," he noted. Second, the regime wanted to send a signal directly to the U.S.: "Don't think you can get to us through the opposition and civil society here. It won't happen." ¶6. (C) Al-Taki said that the regime has become much more hard-line and conservative, and was hunkered down in survival mode. While expressing a certain degree of pessimism about the possibility of reform in any case, al-Taki insisted that at present there is zero chance of any reform occurring. He described Syria's intensified relationship with Iran as both a reflection of that hardened stance and as a factor contributing to it. He dismissed DPM Dardari's late April call for renewed emphasis on economic reform as a mistaken reading of current political circumstances, "and he will pay for that" (and for other "mistakes" that have eroded the President's confidence in him, added al-Taki.) While he gave Dardari high marks for his economic policy-planning skills and his ability to maneuver and create allies inside the DAMASCUS 00002137 002 OF 002 regime, al-Taki maintained that Dardari has fundamentally misunderstood the bigger policy shift that has occurred in his operating environment as Syria has tilted towards Iran. That shift has "hardened everything." ¶7. (C) Two political players who have profited from that shift are senior security officer Mohammed Nassif Khairbek and VP Farouk al-Shara'a, noted al-Taki. (Comment: We have received contradictory reports about how strongly Khairbek tried -- and apparently failed -- to undo Asad's appointiment of him as an advisor to Shara'a in his new capacity as Vice President.) Khairbek has benefited, said al-Taki, largely because two issues he has traditionally handled, Iran and Hizballah, are being given heightened prominence as a result of Syria's more confrontational posture. Khairbek has also buttressed Shara'a's influence. While initially the former FM was not viewed as someone who could maintain his influence as a vice president, Khairbek's security service "apparatus" and "his issues" are seen as enhancing Shara'a's influence, assessed al-Taki. He noted that Asad had recently asked current FM Mu'allim to "consult" with Shara'a on foreign policy issues. Mu'allim had replied that he "could not take orders from Shara'a" but did not explicitly refuse to consult, al-Taki intimated. ¶8. (C) In an aside, al-Taki noted that there is considerable unease at the MFA over Syria's Iran policy and the current lack of any "Arab dimension" to Syria's foreign policy, especially the lack of any special outreach to the Saudis, who had helped Syria re-assert its influence in Lebanon to an extent. Al-Taki described a May 2 evening meeting at the MFA with senior officials where there had been serious misgivings and "complaining" voiced about the policy. He hinted but did not confirm that Mu'allim was at the meeting. SECHE