ASAD MEETS BRAMMERTZ IN DAMASCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 001909 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCR SY IZ LE SUBJECT: ASAD MEETS BRAMMERTZ IN DAMASCUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Syrian President Bashar al-Asad met with UNIIIC chief Serge Brammertz in Damascus April 25. The official Syria News Agency SANA issued a terse statement confirming the visit after Brammertz departed Damascus with his team. Media contacts acknowledged that very few details about the visit were known. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) President Bashar al-Asad met yesterday morning (April 25) with the head of UNIIIC, Serge Brammertz, and his accompanying team of investigators. Brammertz met separately with FM Farouk al-Shara'a, according to the brief statement released by the official Syrian Press Association, SANA. Present at the meetings on the Syrian side were the Foreign Ministry's legal advisor and point man for the UNIIIC investigation Riad Daoudi, and Assistant Foreign Minister Ahmad Arnous, according to SANA. Reuters quoted Syrian law professor Ibrahim al-Daraji, a spokesman for the Syrian team investigating the Hariri assassination, saying "the fact that Brammertz is here shows that Syria has no problem in seeking the truth about the Hariri killing and cooperating with the inquiry." Human rights contact Anwar al-Bunni expressed satisfaction with the visit, telling Poloff that it was an accomplishment just to force Asad and Shara'a to accept being questioned. ¶3. (C) According to foreign affairs expert Dr. Imad Shueibi, who confers regularly with senior regime officials, Brammertz met with Asad at the President's office and not, as some press accounts reported, at the Monterosa Hotel complex on the outskirts of Damascus. The Syrian government announced that the interviews had taken place only after Brammertz returned to his base in Beirut in a convoy of armored vehicles, according to AP. Shueibi reported that in fact Shara'a had not met with Brammertz himself but with members of Brammertz's team, although press accounts and the SANA statement contradicted this assertion. ¶4. (C) Shueibi told Polchief that Brammertz's interview with Asad on April 25 was not the first such meeting, but followed a secret meeting in Damascus held April 24. The second meeting was designed to allow the two sides to read and sign the transcripts of the questioning that had occurred. (Comment: We have not been able to confirm from other sources if Shueibi's information about two meetings is accurate.) There will be no further meetings with Asad or Shara'a, he noted, but added that Brammertz and his team are likely to return to Syria for meetings with others. ¶5. (C) Shueibi insisted that Asad "was happy" with the way the interview went. Asad had "answered all Brammertz's questions" and had repeated his previous denials that he had threatened Lebanese PM Hariri, in the period before the PM's assassination. Shueibi predicted that there would be no evidence found that would implicate Asad or the most senior regime officials beneath him in the assassination of Hariri, although some Syrians below that level would likely be accused and tried (but not convicted) at the international tribunal that will hear the case. In his overall assessment, "the sword of the UNIIIC investigation" will continue to hang over Syria, but "nothing will be done," he maintained, that will shake the foundations of the regime. ¶6. (C) Assessing Syria's situation in the wake of the Brammertz visit, Shueibi insisted that Syria is stronger now -- despite its acknowledged military weakness -- than at any time since the release of the first Mehlis report last October, with valuable regional cards to play in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine. Shueibi said he was puzzled about why the U.S. had not reached out to Syria for help, especially to address the situation in Iraq, where in his view a civil war was breaking out. He noted that Syria is the only regional party whose intervention Iraq's Sunnis would accept. He expressed hope that in the wake of the Brammertz visit, the U.S. would re-evaluate its hard-line stance towards Syria. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Apparently very nervous about the optics of this visit, the regime succeeded in keeping the precise date for the Asad-Brammertz meeting a secret until it was completed, and released no details beyond acknowledging that the meeting had taken place. The positive spin that Shueibi puts on the meeting is already evident in the regional press coverage of the visit and will likely continue in the coming DAMASCUS 00001909 002.2 OF 002 days. SECHE