C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 001754

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PINR PREL PHUM SY
SUBJECT: C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN
PACT

REF: A. STATE 51913


B. DAMASCUS 1698

C. DAMASCUS 1692

D. DAMASCUS 1357

E. DAMASCUS 0392

F. DAMASCUS 0311

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's public
criticism of the regime and his move to ally himself -- via
the National Salvation Front -- with Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood leader Sadreddin al-Bayanouni continue to provoke
the regime and stir tremendous speculation among the public
and the opposition about potential impact in Syria. For now,
given the NSF's uncertain potential, most people are adopting
a "wait-and-see" attitude, a posture not likely to shift in
any fundamental way before the June release of the Brammertz
report. The answers provided below respond to the questions
posed in Ref A. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) QUESTION 3 (A): WHAT IS THE REACTION AMONG THE
OPPOSITION, THE PUBLIC AND THE SARG TO KHADDAM-BAYANOUNI
(SMB) COMMON VISION? As detailed in refs B, C, and D, the
reaction of the opposition to the Khaddam-Bayanouni formation
of the National Salvation Front in Brussels has been nuanced
and relatively pragmatic, with one significant disagreement.
The dominant opposition view on Khaddam's decision to join
forces with the MB is that this will increase his
effectiveness and strengthen his efforts to weaken the
regime, although there is uncertainty about how much Khaddam
has been strengthened. Many still feel that his potential as
an opposition figure is greatly weakened by his well-earned
reputation for corruption and his decades-long loyal service
to the Asad regimes. Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX point out that Khaddam has said nothing critical
about Hafez al-Asad and his brutal reign, limiting himself to
criticizing Bashar al-Asad, and that Khaddam has not
apologized for his long service to the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX also
believes that the NSF's program is too pro-Kurd and risks
creating an anti-Kurd backlash among Arabs in Syria.


3. (S/NF) Despite these reservations, the dominant
opposition view, certainly within the Damascus Declaration
(DD) group, is that Khaddam is a useful tool for weakening
the regime, all the more so after his joining forces with
Bayanouni. There is also a sense among the opposition that
the initial "shock" at having to consider Khaddam as an
opposition figure has worn off and people are more willing to
see what he can accomplish. The opposition group that has
coalesced around the DD met on April 6 and decided not to
publicly criticize Khaddam, despite intense SARG pressure to
do so (Ref B). Instead, the group decided to maintain a
relatively vague position that could not be used by the
regime to try to weaken Khaddam, issuing a statement merely
pointing out that the opposition inside Syria was not
connected to Khaddam. Some, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, blamed Khaddam's NSF
initiative on the failure of the internal opposition and DD
signatories to organize and follow up more rapidly after the
issuance of the original Damascus Declaration in October.


4. (S/NF) A minority view within the opposition, led by
XXXXXXXXXXXX, pressed for a more publicly critical opposition
attitude towards Khaddam in the run-up to the April 6
meeting. Some activists, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told
us the primary motivation of XXXXXXXXXXXX and his group was
fear of regime retaliation, rather than real opposition to
Khaddam on ideological grounds. Nonetheless, it is true that
opposition figures (and DD activists) such as XXXXXXXXXXXX
held very strong views, prior to the April 6 meeting, about
Khaddam's blemishes (ref D). These people were willing to
grant Khaddam and the NSF a limited role in the opposition
but were strongly opposed to granting Khaddam the leadership
of the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that Khaddam is unfit
for such a role and "we have ways to make him fail" if he
tries to usurp such a role. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also speculated that Khaddam may want to try to preserve much of the Ba'athist
regime, aiming to topple merely the Asad family and the
inner-most circle of the regime, but leaving the armed
forces, security services and Ba'ath party intact.) Others,
such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, thought that fears

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about Khaddam's ambitions were exaggerated, insisting that Khaddam understood the limits of his role.


5. (S/NF) THE PUBLIC'S VIEW: The Syrian public's view of
Khaddam and his NSF union with the SMB is harder to ascertain
, with his level of support remaining a matter of conjecture.
The majority view seems to be that his impact to date has
been limited, primarily because of the regime's success at painting him as a corrupt, embittered traitor with foolish,
impractical ambitions of overthrowing the Asad regime. Some
contacts insist, nonetheless, that Khaddam, with his
sustained criticism of the regime carried over various
satellite TV channels (and to a lesser degree via print
media) has made inroads, especially among the majority Sunni
population. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained recently (ref C) that Khaddam
is attaining quiet "majority support" among Sunnis in cities
other than Damascus, where the Sunni population is
maintaining a wait-and-see attitude towards the former VP.
XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Khaddam has substantial (also quiet)
support among Ba'athists and among a key group of Alawites,
including former (Hafez al-Asad) regime figures such as
XXXXXXXXXXXX and senior army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX
(ref E). Our best sense is that Khaddam's support so far is
relatively limited among the Syrian public.


6. (S/NF) THE SARG'S VIEW: The SARG's reaction to Khaddam
and the NSF has combined hostility and fear. The regime has
apparently complained to the Saudis about their initial
decision to allow Khaddam access to al-Arabiya to air his
regime criticism. Since late December, Khaddam has not had
access to any Saudi-owned media, either satellite or print.
The SARG, as noted, unsuccessfully put pressure on the DD
group to publicly attack Khaddam and the NSF. Despite the
SARG's repeated attempts to dismiss Khaddam as unimportant,
it is clear that his initial efforts, and his success in
joining forces with Bayanouni, rattled the regime and have
kept it on the defensive about his next moves and how much
support he is quietly building. Besides trying to portray
Khaddam as a traitor, the regime has initiated two sets of
legal proceedings against him, one relating to corruption
charges involving transactions and business deals done by
Khaddam or his family, and another charging him with inciting
a foreign attack against Syria and plotting to overthrow the
government. Both moves appear aimed at preventing any
increase in internal support for Khaddam. The government has
also apparently moved to prevent the travel -- and to freeze
the assets -- of at least one former senior official (XXXXXXXXXXXX) reportedly sympathetic to Khaddam. There were
unconfirmed reports of a SARG-compiled list of such officials
banned from foreign travel on suspicion they might constitute
"future Khaddams" or might try to coordinate with Khaddam
(Ref F).


7. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(B): ARE KHADDAM AND THE SMB DEDICATED
TO WORKING TOGETHER? IS IT A PARTNERSHIP OR IS THERE A
SINGLE LEADER?: Embassy Damascus's insight into the
relationship between Khaddam and Bayanouni's SMB is
relatively limited, but our best assessment is that it is a
partnership, with both sides contributing. Khaddam, despite
his reputation as an Asad regime henchman, also has a long
history of outreach to Sunni groups in Syria, including
Islamist groups sympathetic to the banned MB. He represented
the wing of the Ba'ath Party that was ideologically committed
to such outreach, believing it essential for secular
Ba'athists and nationalists to increase their "echo" and
grassroots support by attempting to appeal where possible to
the Syrian (Sunni) Islamic masses. Consequently, it is not
totally out of character for him to reach out to Bayanouni
and the SMB. If press reports are to be believed, Bayanouni
has remained steadfast in supporting Khaddam and the NSF
joint venture, despite the wave of criticism he and his group
were subjected to, which charged them with gross opportunism
and being blind to Khaddam's former service to an oppressive
regime.


8. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(C): DID EITHER SIDE MAKE A CONCESSION
BEFORE THE PRESS STATEMENT ON A COMMON VISION?: We have no
information on this issue but presume Khaddam and Bayanouni
shared some common objectives, primarily a desire to topple
the Asad regime, and were willing to compromise on their
visions for a future Syria. Both sides' adherence to the
principles of democratic change from within likely
facilitated the blurring and compromise needed to agree on a

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common vision.


9. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(D): DID EITHER SMB OR KHADDAM LOSE
CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY WORK TOGETHER? REACTIONS
OF THE "DAMASCUS DECLARATION" GROUPS?: The SMB has more
support in Syria than Khaddam, so it had more to lose from
risking an alliance with him. Many accused Bayanouni and the
MB of unprincipled opportunism for their willingness to ally
themselves with a pillar of the Hafez al-Asad regime that was
responsible for the violent suppression of their movement in
the early 1980's. MB sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized
Bayanouni's Khaddam alliance as "a mistake" which is
receiving criticism from SMB members inside and outside
Syria. Others question the SMB's political calculations in
betting on Khaddam and his limited assets, but are waiting to
see if the former VP is able to deliver. Some contacts
believe that the MB did take a hit, at least initially in
their support base in Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that if one
assumed the SMB had "20 percent street support" in Syria,
then the movement had lost half of it for allying with
Khaddam. Our sense is that as the NSF alliance has endured,
the force of the charge of opportunism has diminished.
XXXXXXXXXXXX's read on Sunni support for Khaddam throughout Syria
seems to indicate that any drop in MB support because of
Bayanouni's move has been temporary. (For Damascus
Declaration group views on the NSF, see paras 2-4.)


10. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(E): HOW DO KHADDAM AND THE SMB PLAN
TO CHANGE THE SYRIAN REGIME? VIOLENT RESISTANCE? INCREASING
PRESSURE UNTIL THE REGIME IMPLODES? SOMETHING ELSE?: So
far, Khaddam and the SMB have not given any indication that
they plan to use violent resistance to topple the Asad
regime, a not surprising view given how heavily armed and
well-protected the regime is. Our contacts here remain
puzzled about precisely how Khaddam and Bayanouni can topple
the regime in the absence of some type of outside
intervention. Most believe they want to gradually increase
pressure on the regime, using Khaddam's public criticism and
revelations (or threats of revelations) about embarrassing
regime secrets. Nonetheless, given the weakness of the
internal opposition, in tandem with the fear that the regime
has instilled in any would-be Khaddam/Bayanouni supporters,
and the apparent resilience of the regime's ties to critical
ally Saudi Arabia, which is keeping Khaddam out of its media,
it is unclear how these efforts, by themselves, could unseat
the Asad regime. Apparently, Khaddam/Bayanouni are hoping
Brammertz in June will issue a follow-up UNIIIC report that
will implicate senior regime officials in the killing of
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri, shaking the foundations of
the regime. Beyond that, they seem to be playing the best
cards that they have and hoping for developments going their
way in the next year or so. The sense that the regime's
legitimacy is slowly draining away is playing in their favor,
while the violence and political instability in Iraq, as well
as resurgent SARG influence in Lebanon, seem to be
undercutting their efforts and reminding many Syrians that
the regime is still a formidable and necessary bulwark
against the threat of instability and sectarian violence.


11. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(F): BY SAYING THEY HAVE A COMMON
VISION, DO KHADDAM-SMB HAVE MORE LEGITIMACY INSIDE SYRIA?
SINCE KHADDAM AND SMB CANNOT ENTER SYRIA HOW DO THEY CONTACT
GROUPS IN SYRIA? WHICH GROUPS?: Overall, Khaddam has
certainly increased his legitimacy by allying himself with
Bayanouni. SMB took an initial hit in its support base, we
surmise, given Sunni/Islamist reservations about a
"principled ideological" movement like the SMB joining a
former Ba'athist henchman such as Khaddam. The extent of
that drop in support is unclear, with some contacts pointing
to now-rising Sunni support for Khaddam. The manner in which
Khaddam or Bayanouni maintains contact with government or
opposition insiders is unclear. There are unconfirmed
reports that insiders not restricted by SARG-imposed
restrictions travel abroad under various pretexts and make
contact with one or both of the two external opposition
leaders. Sometimes trusted travelers in Syria carry messages
to Khaddam and Bayanouni (and report back),according to
other contacts. These two leaders also seem to rely on the
steadfast but quiet support of insiders that is not dependent
on regular contact to shore it up. Khaddam seems to have
arranged some support before he left, although it has not
been visible at all, and is suspected only because a few
contacts refer to it (refs C and E).

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SECHE