C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 001754 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PINR PREL PHUM SY SUBJECT: C-NE6-00262: KHADDAM'S AND BAYANOUNI'S FAUSTIAN PACT REF: A. STATE 51913 ¶B. DAMASCUS 1698 ¶C. DAMASCUS 1692 ¶D. DAMASCUS 1357 ¶E. DAMASCUS 0392 ¶F. DAMASCUS 0311 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam's public criticism of the regime and his move to ally himself -- via the National Salvation Front -- with Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Sadreddin al-Bayanouni continue to provoke the regime and stir tremendous speculation among the public and the opposition about potential impact in Syria. For now, given the NSF's uncertain potential, most people are adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude, a posture not likely to shift in any fundamental way before the June release of the Brammertz report. The answers provided below respond to the questions posed in Ref A. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) QUESTION 3 (A): WHAT IS THE REACTION AMONG THE OPPOSITION, THE PUBLIC AND THE SARG TO KHADDAM-BAYANOUNI (SMB) COMMON VISION? As detailed in refs B, C, and D, the reaction of the opposition to the Khaddam-Bayanouni formation of the National Salvation Front in Brussels has been nuanced and relatively pragmatic, with one significant disagreement. The dominant opposition view on Khaddam's decision to join forces with the MB is that this will increase his effectiveness and strengthen his efforts to weaken the regime, although there is uncertainty about how much Khaddam has been strengthened. Many still feel that his potential as an opposition figure is greatly weakened by his well-earned reputation for corruption and his decades-long loyal service to the Asad regimes. Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX point out that Khaddam has said nothing critical about Hafez al-Asad and his brutal reign, limiting himself to criticizing Bashar al-Asad, and that Khaddam has not apologized for his long service to the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX also believes that the NSF's program is too pro-Kurd and risks creating an anti-Kurd backlash among Arabs in Syria. ¶3. (S/NF) Despite these reservations, the dominant opposition view, certainly within the Damascus Declaration (DD) group, is that Khaddam is a useful tool for weakening the regime, all the more so after his joining forces with Bayanouni. There is also a sense among the opposition that the initial "shock" at having to consider Khaddam as an opposition figure has worn off and people are more willing to see what he can accomplish. The opposition group that has coalesced around the DD met on April 6 and decided not to publicly criticize Khaddam, despite intense SARG pressure to do so (Ref B). Instead, the group decided to maintain a relatively vague position that could not be used by the regime to try to weaken Khaddam, issuing a statement merely pointing out that the opposition inside Syria was not connected to Khaddam. Some, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, blamed Khaddam's NSF initiative on the failure of the internal opposition and DD signatories to organize and follow up more rapidly after the issuance of the original Damascus Declaration in October. ¶4. (S/NF) A minority view within the opposition, led by XXXXXXXXXXXX, pressed for a more publicly critical opposition attitude towards Khaddam in the run-up to the April 6 meeting. Some activists, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, have told us the primary motivation of XXXXXXXXXXXX and his group was fear of regime retaliation, rather than real opposition to Khaddam on ideological grounds. Nonetheless, it is true that opposition figures (and DD activists) such as XXXXXXXXXXXX held very strong views, prior to the April 6 meeting, about Khaddam's blemishes (ref D). These people were willing to grant Khaddam and the NSF a limited role in the opposition but were strongly opposed to granting Khaddam the leadership of the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that Khaddam is unfit for such a role and "we have ways to make him fail" if he tries to usurp such a role. (XXXXXXXXXXXX also speculated that Khaddam may want to try to preserve much of the Ba'athist regime, aiming to topple merely the Asad family and the inner-most circle of the regime, but leaving the armed forces, security services and Ba'ath party intact.) Others, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, thought that fears DAMASCUS 00001754 002 OF 004 about Khaddam's ambitions were exaggerated, insisting that Khaddam understood the limits of his role. ¶5. (S/NF) THE PUBLIC'S VIEW: The Syrian public's view of Khaddam and his NSF union with the SMB is harder to ascertain , with his level of support remaining a matter of conjecture. The majority view seems to be that his impact to date has been limited, primarily because of the regime's success at painting him as a corrupt, embittered traitor with foolish, impractical ambitions of overthrowing the Asad regime. Some contacts insist, nonetheless, that Khaddam, with his sustained criticism of the regime carried over various satellite TV channels (and to a lesser degree via print media) has made inroads, especially among the majority Sunni population. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained recently (ref C) that Khaddam is attaining quiet "majority support" among Sunnis in cities other than Damascus, where the Sunni population is maintaining a wait-and-see attitude towards the former VP. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Khaddam has substantial (also quiet) support among Ba'athists and among a key group of Alawites, including former (Hafez al-Asad) regime figures such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and senior army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref E). Our best sense is that Khaddam's support so far is relatively limited among the Syrian public. ¶6. (S/NF) THE SARG'S VIEW: The SARG's reaction to Khaddam and the NSF has combined hostility and fear. The regime has apparently complained to the Saudis about their initial decision to allow Khaddam access to al-Arabiya to air his regime criticism. Since late December, Khaddam has not had access to any Saudi-owned media, either satellite or print. The SARG, as noted, unsuccessfully put pressure on the DD group to publicly attack Khaddam and the NSF. Despite the SARG's repeated attempts to dismiss Khaddam as unimportant, it is clear that his initial efforts, and his success in joining forces with Bayanouni, rattled the regime and have kept it on the defensive about his next moves and how much support he is quietly building. Besides trying to portray Khaddam as a traitor, the regime has initiated two sets of legal proceedings against him, one relating to corruption charges involving transactions and business deals done by Khaddam or his family, and another charging him with inciting a foreign attack against Syria and plotting to overthrow the government. Both moves appear aimed at preventing any increase in internal support for Khaddam. The government has also apparently moved to prevent the travel -- and to freeze the assets -- of at least one former senior official (XXXXXXXXXXXX) reportedly sympathetic to Khaddam. There were unconfirmed reports of a SARG-compiled list of such officials banned from foreign travel on suspicion they might constitute "future Khaddams" or might try to coordinate with Khaddam (Ref F). ¶7. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(B): ARE KHADDAM AND THE SMB DEDICATED TO WORKING TOGETHER? IS IT A PARTNERSHIP OR IS THERE A SINGLE LEADER?: Embassy Damascus's insight into the relationship between Khaddam and Bayanouni's SMB is relatively limited, but our best assessment is that it is a partnership, with both sides contributing. Khaddam, despite his reputation as an Asad regime henchman, also has a long history of outreach to Sunni groups in Syria, including Islamist groups sympathetic to the banned MB. He represented the wing of the Ba'ath Party that was ideologically committed to such outreach, believing it essential for secular Ba'athists and nationalists to increase their "echo" and grassroots support by attempting to appeal where possible to the Syrian (Sunni) Islamic masses. Consequently, it is not totally out of character for him to reach out to Bayanouni and the SMB. If press reports are to be believed, Bayanouni has remained steadfast in supporting Khaddam and the NSF joint venture, despite the wave of criticism he and his group were subjected to, which charged them with gross opportunism and being blind to Khaddam's former service to an oppressive regime. ¶8. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(C): DID EITHER SIDE MAKE A CONCESSION BEFORE THE PRESS STATEMENT ON A COMMON VISION?: We have no information on this issue but presume Khaddam and Bayanouni shared some common objectives, primarily a desire to topple the Asad regime, and were willing to compromise on their visions for a future Syria. Both sides' adherence to the principles of democratic change from within likely facilitated the blurring and compromise needed to agree on a DAMASCUS 00001754 003 OF 004 common vision. ¶9. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(D): DID EITHER SMB OR KHADDAM LOSE CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY WORK TOGETHER? REACTIONS OF THE "DAMASCUS DECLARATION" GROUPS?: The SMB has more support in Syria than Khaddam, so it had more to lose from risking an alliance with him. Many accused Bayanouni and the MB of unprincipled opportunism for their willingness to ally themselves with a pillar of the Hafez al-Asad regime that was responsible for the violent suppression of their movement in the early 1980's. MB sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized Bayanouni's Khaddam alliance as "a mistake" which is receiving criticism from SMB members inside and outside Syria. Others question the SMB's political calculations in betting on Khaddam and his limited assets, but are waiting to see if the former VP is able to deliver. Some contacts believe that the MB did take a hit, at least initially in their support base in Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that if one assumed the SMB had "20 percent street support" in Syria, then the movement had lost half of it for allying with Khaddam. Our sense is that as the NSF alliance has endured, the force of the charge of opportunism has diminished. XXXXXXXXXXXX's read on Sunni support for Khaddam throughout Syria seems to indicate that any drop in MB support because of Bayanouni's move has been temporary. (For Damascus Declaration group views on the NSF, see paras 2-4.) ¶10. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(E): HOW DO KHADDAM AND THE SMB PLAN TO CHANGE THE SYRIAN REGIME? VIOLENT RESISTANCE? INCREASING PRESSURE UNTIL THE REGIME IMPLODES? SOMETHING ELSE?: So far, Khaddam and the SMB have not given any indication that they plan to use violent resistance to topple the Asad regime, a not surprising view given how heavily armed and well-protected the regime is. Our contacts here remain puzzled about precisely how Khaddam and Bayanouni can topple the regime in the absence of some type of outside intervention. Most believe they want to gradually increase pressure on the regime, using Khaddam's public criticism and revelations (or threats of revelations) about embarrassing regime secrets. Nonetheless, given the weakness of the internal opposition, in tandem with the fear that the regime has instilled in any would-be Khaddam/Bayanouni supporters, and the apparent resilience of the regime's ties to critical ally Saudi Arabia, which is keeping Khaddam out of its media, it is unclear how these efforts, by themselves, could unseat the Asad regime. Apparently, Khaddam/Bayanouni are hoping Brammertz in June will issue a follow-up UNIIIC report that will implicate senior regime officials in the killing of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri, shaking the foundations of the regime. Beyond that, they seem to be playing the best cards that they have and hoping for developments going their way in the next year or so. The sense that the regime's legitimacy is slowly draining away is playing in their favor, while the violence and political instability in Iraq, as well as resurgent SARG influence in Lebanon, seem to be undercutting their efforts and reminding many Syrians that the regime is still a formidable and necessary bulwark against the threat of instability and sectarian violence. ¶11. (S/NF) QUESTION 3(F): BY SAYING THEY HAVE A COMMON VISION, DO KHADDAM-SMB HAVE MORE LEGITIMACY INSIDE SYRIA? SINCE KHADDAM AND SMB CANNOT ENTER SYRIA HOW DO THEY CONTACT GROUPS IN SYRIA? WHICH GROUPS?: Overall, Khaddam has certainly increased his legitimacy by allying himself with Bayanouni. SMB took an initial hit in its support base, we surmise, given Sunni/Islamist reservations about a "principled ideological" movement like the SMB joining a former Ba'athist henchman such as Khaddam. The extent of that drop in support is unclear, with some contacts pointing to now-rising Sunni support for Khaddam. The manner in which Khaddam or Bayanouni maintains contact with government or opposition insiders is unclear. There are unconfirmed reports that insiders not restricted by SARG-imposed restrictions travel abroad under various pretexts and make contact with one or both of the two external opposition leaders. Sometimes trusted travelers in Syria carry messages to Khaddam and Bayanouni (and report back),according to other contacts. These two leaders also seem to rely on the steadfast but quiet support of insiders that is not dependent on regular contact to shore it up. Khaddam seems to have arranged some support before he left, although it has not been visible at all, and is suspected only because a few contacts refer to it (refs C and E). DAMASCUS 00001754 004 OF 004 SECHE