TWO IMPORTANT SUNNI LEADERS ASSESS KHADDAM'S IMPACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001692 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: TWO IMPORTANT SUNNI LEADERS ASSESS KHADDAM'S IMPACT REF: DAM 0392 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Two Sunni leaders, XXXXXXXXXXXX, assess that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam is a useful tool who has already weakened the regime. They are counseling their friends in the opposition not to attack Khaddam publicly, regardless of their private reservations. One of these Sunnis XXXXXXXXXXXX, claims that Khaddam has majority support among Sunnis in several cities in Syria. Both insisted that the regime has lost support and legitimacy in recent months, despite efforts to appeal to nationalism and Islam. They also expressed deep concern about increasing Iranian and Shiite influence in Iraq. End Summary. ¶2. (C) ASSESSING KHADDAM'S SUNNI SUPPORT: According to former MP and influential behind-the-scenes Sunni opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX, Abdul Halim Khaddam has the support of a majority of Sunnis in Homs, Latakia, and Tartous, and some support in Hama. In Damascus, it is a "wait and see" posture. However, the support in all these locales is "very quiet." XXXXXXXXXXXX also mentioned that former Minister of Industry XXXXXXXXXXXX supports Khaddam and that some 50 percent of Ba'athists also support him. (Other contacts, like XXXXXXXXXXXX, dispute this notion of significant Ba'athist support for Khaddam.) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that 90 percent of Ba'athists don't like the President and criticize him for allowing his friends to monopolize the economy and for bringing problems to the country with his mistaken decisions. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX has made clear in the past that Khaddam also has significant support among a group of Alawite former regime insiders like XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Reftel.) ¶3. (C) ADVISING OPPOSITION NOT TO ATTACK KHADDAM: XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that he had advised his friends in the Damascus Declaration group (DD),such as XXXXXXXXXXXX, in advance of the April 6 DD meeting, not to attack Khaddam publicly (see septel). Instead they should just say "we are the internal opposition" and leave Khaddam to speak for himself and weaken regime in his own way. He had also told them that Khaddam is "not our enemy now; it is the regime that is imprisoning people, not Khaddam." XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was fearful of possible splits in DD/opposition and of their ;efforts to form a steering committee or organizational structure to accompany their statement of principles. He called such a move inevitably divisive. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he supports but did not sign the DD, claiming that it did not represent well the interests of the "conservatives" in Syria, meaning the Muslim population. In his view, the DD effort to reach out to Muslims through the Muslim Brotherhood was not completely successful and could not disguise the fact that the driving forces behind the DD were secular activists. ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX FRIEND CONCURS: Sunni tribal leader and former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was visiting his friend XXXXXXXXXXXX, also called Khaddam a useful tool. When asked what role Khaddam could play in the opposition, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could create strife and discord among the regime forces arrayed against the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX concurred with XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Damascus Declaration group should avoid attacking Khaddam. ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX ¶6. (C) STRENGTH OF REGIME ASSESSED: XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the regime is weakening "this time," unlike in the 2000-2001 period when others had mistakenly predicted that the regime was weakening and might fall. The Brammertz investigation is definitely contributing to the uncertainty the regime is experiencing, as are economic problems, and falling support among officers and advisors inside the regime. The draining away of the regime's legitimacy is also having an impact, especially because it is a minority regime. He assessed that the regime has only 15-20 percent support among the people. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is not clear if people "are ready to go into DAMASCUS 00001692 002 OF 003 the streets to protest against the regime." (Comment: Most contacts tell us they are not ready.) It they do, he asserted, any SARG military and security forces reaction could be unpredictable. Although for example, the Republican Guard is 90 percent Alawite, the rest of the military is 70 percent Sunni and non-Alawite minorities. Consequently the regime might find it difficult to use the armed forces to repress any street demonstrations. Because of the lack of internal support, an invasion, as was done in Iraq, is not necessary to topple the regime, but "a gesture of support" at the right time might be needed, he added, without specifying exactly what he had in mind. ¶7. (C) REGIME USE OF ISLAM DISMISSED: XXXXXXXXXXXX rejected the notion that Syrians had been persuaded by President Asad's recent appeals to nationalism and to Islam, calling such appeals "hand-me-down clothes" that had fooled no one. Like XXXXXXXXXXXX, he said the regime had lost its legitimacy and noted that as a minority regime it would have increasing difficulty ruling the country under those circumstances. He requested that the U.S. keep up the verbal pressure on the regime, criticizing it for corruption, lack of democracy, and absence of any reforms. On that same note, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed appreciation for the recent USG message on human rights, which he said was good, but that a more specific statement on Kamal Labwani was needed. (Comment: Some human rights activists take issue with this view and believe that the USG should not name individuals but keep its statements of support for human rights general. More on this issue and Labwani's condition will be reported septel.) ¶8. (C) COUNSELING ISLAMIC LEADERS: XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he had begun counseling certain Islamic leaders to be careful about their support for the regime, telling them it could be problematic for their future credibility. He had also conveyed the importance of teaching a message of tolerance, justice, and respect for non-Muslims ("the other") in an initial effort to stop an intolerant strain of mosque preaching that was spreading. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he maintained good relations with all the major religious leaders in Damascus and in other major cities. ¶9. (C) CONCERN OVER SHIITE, IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ: Both men expressed concern about the signs of rising Iranian influence in Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX called the influence dangerous and said it is everywhere in Iraq. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Iranians are spending hundreds of millions of dollars in Iraq to spread their influence, and that the Saudis and the Kuwaitis are now pouring in money to the Sunnis to try to balance that influence. He called the rising Shiite influence in the country frightening for the region. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that the Iranian cultural attache from Damascus had visited him recently XXXXXXXXXXXX and invited him to Tehran for a visit, hinting it was an invitation he did not plan to accept. XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted that he is not sectarian but noted that the situation in Iraq and the region lends itself to calls for "sectarian balancing." He claimed the SARG is giving signals to the imams XXXXXXXXXXXX to criticize the U.S. for its responsibility for the situation in Iraq. ¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Polchief that he met recently with Iraqi tribal leader XXXXXXXXXXXX underlining to him that the American forces occupying Iraq were there temporarily but that Iranian influence would be permanent. He told XXXXXXXXXXXX, as he tells other Iraqi Sunni leaders that he meets with, that the Sunnis in Iraq are making a fundamental miscalculation in supporting the insurgency against U.S. forces. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX also told XXXXXXXXXXXX he had the sense that the Syrians were exerting great efforts to keep Iraq unstable. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: It should be noted that views about Khaddam's level of support among Sunnis, or Syrians in general, vary widely. The majority view among most of our contacts is that his impact, thus far, has been limited, although some of these contacts seem to be passing along a SARG-manufactured talking point to downplay his significance. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are extremely plugged in to the Sunni communities in Syria and are offering a minority view but one that we do not dismiss. Their view that the regime is weakening is also hotly disputed. Most contacts agree that DAMASCUS 00001692 003 OF 003 the regime has seen some of its legitimacy drain away and that it is moving somewhat unpredictably in different directions to shore up that legitimacy. Most contacts assert that in the short and intermediate term, the regime is and will remain strong, but over the longer term, especially if Brammertz weighs in with damning accusations, the regime could face problems. SECHE