ASAD VISITS JEDDAH, SHARM, AFTER QUICK SAUDI FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000145 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: ASAD VISITS JEDDAH, SHARM, AFTER QUICK SAUDI FM VISIT TO DAMASCUS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In a rapid, somewhat strangely choreographed set of visits January 8, President Bashar al-Asad met with Saudi King Abdullah in Jeddah and Egyptian President Mubarak in Sharm as-Sheikh, following a quick visit to Damascus by Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal the same day. The two sides issued a relatively anodyne joint communiqu following the Jeddah visit, calling for activating the joint Saudi-Syrian committee. Contacts viewed the Syria-Saudi meetings as an indication that the Saudis, especially King Abdullah, had become uncomfortable with the pressure that the Khaddam media campaign, much of it through Saudi-owned media, was having on the Syrian regime. The meetings were designed as a public show of support for the SARG, with some private arm-twisting urging Bashar al-Asad to cooperate fully with UNIIIC. The visit to Sharm was thought to have been arranged at the last minute, possibly in reaction to Syrian disappointment at not getting the private level of support sought from the Saudis. End Summary. ¶2. (C) SAUDIS WORRIED ABOUT KHADDAM? The January 8 meetings of Syrian President Asad with Saudi FM al-Faisal in Damascus, followed by visits with King Abdullah in Jeddah and Egyptian President Mubarak in Sharm as-Sheikh, were thought to have focused on the ongoing UNIIIC investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri and fallout from the recent media campaign by former Syrian VP Abdul-Halim Khaddam. Contacts suspect that the trip to Sharm to see Mubarak was tacked on at the last minute, possibly in reaction to Syrian disappointment at the substantive results of the discussions with the Saudis. ¶3. (C) SYRIAN SUSPICIONS OF SAUDI INTENTIONS: Contacts insisted that the Saudi visit could only be understood in the context of recent SARG suspicions about the intentions of some in the Saudi royal family toward the Syrian regime and Saudi reservations about the media campaign of former Syrian VP Abdul Halim Khaddam. Long-standing Embassy contact Dr. Samir al-Taki noted that the Saudis, or at least some group of royal family, were definitely involved with Khaddam. This group, angered by the Hariri assassination and the consequent loss of Saudi influence over events in Lebanon (and involving Saudi family members like Abdul-Aziz bin Fahd, who are close friends of Sa'ad al-Hariri) looked favorably on the idea of regime change in Syria, in favor of a Sunni-led government as a bulwark against the rise of Shi'ite political power in Iraq. Iraqi-British businessman Mahdi Sajjad, a confidant of Asad uncle and advisor Mohammed Makhlouf, told Emboffs January 8 that the Syrian regime is absolutely convinced that the Saudis are behind Khaddam and that they have been plotting secretly for months to oust the Syrian regime. ¶4. (C) SAUDIS DIVIDED ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH ASAD REGIME?: Other Saudis, while also hostile to the SARG, are fearful of the instability and terrorism that might be unleashed in Syria if the Asad regime is pressured until it collapsed. Al-Taki speculated that King Abdullah has recently moved tentatively into the latter camp, possibly with some nudging from Mubarak. (Note: Al-Taki also noted that the Saudis are extremely wary of the developing Syria-Iran axis. He said that that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is scheduled to visit Damascus just after the Eid holidays. When asked if this was tentatively set, he said "No, it's definite.") The Saudi meetings were tied to the UNIIIC investigation, with the Saudis likely urging Asad that this is his final chance to take action and cooperate, before "humiliating conditions" are imposed on him, said al-Taki. ¶5. (C) Damascus-based al-Hayat bureau chief Ibrahim Hamidi concurred with this assessment of the Saudi meeting, telling Polchief January 9 that the hastily arranged Saudi FM visit, after more than a year since such a high-level Saudi visit here, followed by the state visit to Jeddah, and the issuance of joint communiqu, signaled that the Saudis wanted to temper the impact that Khaddam was having. Hamidi concurred with al-Taki that there was a division among the Saudi royal family about how harshly the Syrian regime should be treated. The visits and the recent Saudi decision not to allow Khaddam any more access for the time being to Saudi-owned media like al-Arabiyya TV network or al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper indicated that the Saudis, especially King Abdullah, had become uncomfortable with the level of pressure the Syrian regime was under and were concerned about a possible collapse of the regime, and what might come afterwards, said Hamidi. It is also possible that the Saudis and the Egyptians decided to take action after Mubarak heard January 4 in Paris about Chirac's intentions for regime change in Syria, Hamidi speculated. ¶6. (C) SAUDI PUBLIC SHOW OF SUPPORT: While the back-to-back Damascus-Jeddah visits were designed as a public show of support for the Syrians, the Saudis were likely tougher in private on Asad, insisting that he cooperate with UNIIIC. Both Hamidi and civil society activist Amr al-Azm thought Asad added the Mubarak meeting because of not getting the full support of the Saudis. The quick visits to Jeddah and Sharm indicated that the Syrians are "really worried" about the situation, said Hamidi. ¶7. (C) SAUDI DOUBLE GAME?: Despite these positive gestures by the Saudis, Hamidi observed that the Saudi steps to ease the pressure were limited and mirrored previous interventions on their part to attenuate -- at least in the short term -- the pressures that the Syrian regime was facing. Hamidi did not rule out that the Saudis were playing a complicated double game, allowing the pressure on the SARG to continue, and to slowly build, as long as it did not imminently threaten to cause the collapse of the regime. ¶8. (C) IMPACT OF KHADDAM IN EGYPT: An Egyptian diplomat told Polchief January 8 that the Khaddam media campaign had had a huge impact on Egyptian officialdom, converting many Egyptian officials from nominal agnostics on the question of whether the Syrians (and Asad) had killed Hariri to reluctant believers that the SARG had ordered the hit. The diplomat, who is normally well-informed about Egyptian-Syrian exchanges, did not have a readout of the Sharm visit (and in fact seemed to be unaware that it was taking place.) SECHE