KHADDAM'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT GARNERS MIXED

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001357 SIPDIS SIPDIS LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY SUBJECT: KHADDAM'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT GARNERS MIXED REVIEWS REF: DAMASCUS 0702 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b)/(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The March 17 unveiling in Brussels of the National Salvation Front (NSF) has received mixed reviews from civil society activists and other contacts. While activists distanced themselves publicly from the NSF, some contacts took a more nuanced position privately, maintaining that former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam, while not acceptable as the leader of the opposition, could play a useful role in weakening the regime. Damascus Declaration signers expressed varying degrees of concern about the extent to which Khaddam's effort would divide the opposition and pointed to differences between the Declaration's program and that of the NSF. Several also voiced puzzlement and disappointment over the motivations of the Muslim Brothers in signing on to the NSF. One contact noted that Khaddam is serving a useful role in attracting anti-regime support from key Alawite figures who were pillars in the regime of Hafez al-Asad, while many contacts simply expressed puzzlement about what Khaddam is really up to. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The March 17 announcement in Brussels of the creation of the National Salvation Front (NSF),a fourteen-member committee of Syrian exile opposition figures led by former Vice President Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood chief Sadreddin Bayanouni, has received mixed reaction from civil society figures, opposition activists, and other contacts. A number of contacts noted that the identities of the majority of the participating exile politicians remain unknown. Press reports have offered only a limited list of named participants: Khaddam, Bayanouni, U.S.-based Syrian National Congress chief Nagib al-Ghadban, U.S.-based Syrian Liberal National Democratic Party SYG Husam al-Deiri, and Obeid Nahad, the editor of London-based thisissyria.net. Press reports noted other signatories included unidentified representatives from pan-Arabist, liberal, Islamist, Kurdish, and communist groups. ¶3. (C) ANNOUNCEMENT LONG EXPECTED: The announcement of a Khaddam/Bayanouni partnership has been expected by local contacts for several weeks. In late February, key opposition figure XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that he had rejected overtures by Khaddam and Bayanouni to join the front (ref A). Other activists had expected the announcement to be made on March 9 to mark the 43rd anniversary of the Ba'ath Party's seizure of power. ¶4. (C) INTERNAL OPPOSITION PUBLICLY DISTANCES ITSELF FROM NSF: Internal opposition figures quickly distanced themselves from the NSF. Hassan Abdulazeem, spokesman for both the Damascus Declaration and the National Democratic Front, told the regional newspaper al-Hayat that "we have no connection at all with the Brussels meeting... the preliminary stand toward what happened in Brussels is that it was outside the Damascus Declaration framework and has nothing to do with it." He added that the Damascus Declaration provisional committee would soon confer on an official stance vis-a-vis the NSF, with the expanded Damascus Declaration group scheduled to hold an expanded meeting on April 6. ¶5. (C) WHILE PRIVATE VIEWS MORE NUANCED: In private, however, many opposition figures and activists are willing to entertain the notion of a Khaddam-Bayanouni alliance, with some even offering cautious praise. Prominent human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX called the agreement a good step for the opposition movement at large, noting that the Khaddam and Bayanouni combine Khaddam's "best political connections" with the MB's bona fide opposition credentials. ¶6. (C) SALVATION FRONT CHALLENGE TO INTERNAL OPPOSITION? A number of internal opposition figures also described the NSF as a challenge to a relatively immobile domestic opposition. In an interview with al-Hayat on March 20, senior opposition figure and Damascus Declaration signatory Riad al-Turk said that "the formation of the Front is punishment for the Damascus Declaration leaders for lagging behind and hesitating." ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolChief March 23 that, unlike other opposition figures like Abdulazeem, he does not categorically reject the Khaddam-Bayanouni initiative, although he does not accept Khaddam as leader of the opposition. "We don't oppose him, but our program is different." XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the NSF initiative contained two critical mistakes. First, its position on the Kurdish issue goes beyond calling for nationality for all Syrian Kurds and full cultural rights, to the point where it will encourage Kurdish separatism and provoke conflicts with the Arab majority; and second, it does not make explicit that Khaddam supports democracy in Syria. ¶8. (C) KHADDAM'S ALAWITE SUPPORT: Others like former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX viewed Khaddam as acceptable as a "bridging figure" between the opposition and disenchanted regime (and former regime) elements, noting that he believed Khaddam understood the limits of his role. XXXXXXXXXXXX also alleged that Khaddam has important, but thus far silent, support from key Alawites who served as pillars in the regime of Hafez al-Asad, including Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, and Izzedine Nasser. They believe that "there is no future for the Alawites with Bashar" and that a Khaddam-led Sunni transition could protect them from any post-Asad regime. They also see Khaddam as a figure who would ensure the safety and stability of the larger Alawite community, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. ¶9. (C) SKEPTICISM ON KHADDAM ALSO PALPABLE: On the other hand, some activists have criticized the Khaddam-bayanouni coalition from a variety of sides. Human rights activist and Islamist sympathizer XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bayanouni's decision to join forces with Khaddam is "bad for Islamists here." Khaddam has, thus far, refused to take responsibility for his part in the regime's crimes (a point also made by Turk and others). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Khaddam's record of abuses dates back to his governorship of Hama in 1964, when the first crackdown against the MB took place. He must first admit his responsibility if "he wants to lead us again." ¶10. (C) FEARS KHADDAM IS SPLITTING OPPOSITION: While accepting that Khaddam is a useful tool to de-legitimize the regime, because of the secrets he knows, activist intellectual XXXXXXXXXXXX said it was clear from the way Khaddam spoke in interviews that he saw his role in much more ambitious terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX adamantly rejected any notion that Khaddam could lead the opposition, insisting to Polchief that "we have ways to make him fail if he tries." XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed great puzzlement at what motivated the MB to associate itself with Khaddam on the NSF, when they had played and continued to play a critical role in the Damascus Declaration group. "It doesn't make sense unless Khaddam has a putsch planned," said XXXXXXXXXXXX. He criticized the NSF for "splitting the opposition" and undercutting the Damascus Declaration. Finally, he expressed concerns that Khaddam wanted to "save the regime" (the Ba'ath Party and the security services) by getting rid of Bashar al-Asad and his inner circle. He described this notion as totally unacceptable to the internal opposition. While the Ba'ath Party could remain in place to compete in a post-Asad democratic system, the leadership of the security services and military would need to be purged so as to transform them from protectors of a regime into institutions serving the interests of Syria, insisted XXXXXXXXXXXX. ¶11. (C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans in the next few weeks for the Damascus Declaration group to form a leadership group to put in place a plan of action. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned plans to name 17 insiders and eight external leaders, including MB figures. XXXXXXXXXXXX called these plans critical for the future of the Damascus Declaration group while XXXXXXXXXXXX was more ambiguous, hinting with some frustration that perhaps these plans had been undercut by the NSF announcement in Brussels. ¶12. (C) In the meantime, contacts who speak regularly to regime leaders continue to express puzzlement at what Khaddam is trying to do. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a foreign policy analyst, said that Khaddam is "playing roulette," recognizing that he has no external military support for a coup and betting that UNIIIC chief Brammertz will directly accuse Asad in June of complicity in the killing of Hariri. XXXXXXXXXXXX called this a bad bet because the Russians "will not allow" things to reach that level and because even if it happens, Asad has made clear publicly that he is determined to remain in power and fight such accusations. Gadfly economist and former deputy minister XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Khaddam's capabilities had been overrated. "He can't do anything in Syria because he has no support." ¶13. (C) COMMENT: As these reactions indicate, the response to Khaddam's NSF initiative has been all over the map. It is clear that the former VP continues to cast an imposing shadow over both regime and opposition figures in Syria, regardless of dismissals voiced about his lack of external support. Many attribute the regime's current nervousness (in addition to worries over Brammertz's intentions) to worries over what Khaddam has planned and what he might say next. Internal opposition figures for their part are consumed with fears that Khaddam may be trying to hijack their largely immobile movement and may inadvertenly divide and weaken them. Khaddam also stirs fears among them about a compromise opposition position that would accept leaving much of the regime intact. Thus far, Khaddam seems to have stirred up both the regime and internal opposition figures and even mobilized them a bit, without, as far as we can tell, weakening them perceptibly. SECHE