CULTS AND VIOLENCE: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 002940 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016 TAGS: PINS SOCI PINR KISL SG SUBJECT: CULTS AND VIOLENCE: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS MILITIAS AND COMING ELECTIONS REF: A. DAKAR 2271 ¶B. DAKAR 1721 ¶C. DAKAR 0681 ¶D. DAKAR 0565 ¶E. 05 DAKAR 3108 ¶F. 04 DAKAR 2915 ¶G. 04 DAKAR 2201 ¶H. 04 DAKAR 0717 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In conjunction with the presidential decree setting February 25 as the date for Senegal,s presidential and parliamentary elections, the Interior Ministry has forbidden carrying guns, clubs, machetes or knives from now through the coming elections, possibly out of concern about political or religious groups that maintain armed private security details. The former government maintained small gangs of toughs, but the model of current political militias is Abdoulaye Wade's "calots bleus," formed to provide "legitimate self defense" against a state he believed to be stacking the political deck. Left and religious right militias, meanwhile, have reflected distrust in the state's ability to provide adequate safeguards against police or judicial abuse, while others exist simply to intimidate or batter rivals. We do not expect any of these militias to figure prominently in the campaign, but since most are at least loosely committed to President Wade, they could become a public security factor if Wade fails to win re-election. We look at several militias, with special attention to a recent political-religious phenomenon, the Mouride Bethiou Thioune. END SUMMARY. WE ONCE WERE BRUISERS: ACTION COMMITTEES AND BLUE CAPS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The former Socialist party government in its early years supplemented police forces with "comites d'action," young ruffians and unemployed wrestlers who kept both the Left and Abdoulaye Wade's loyal opposition in check, sometimes preventing or disrupting rallies and busting a few shins. Even in the otherwise peaceful 2000 election, an action committee run by then-Socialist and now Conseil de la Republique President Mbaye Jacques Diop allegedly fired shots at a Wade procession in Rufisque. ¶3. (C) In order to mount a "legitimate self defense" against what he considered state repression, Wade formed the "calots bleus," or blue cap gangs of toughs. Their one-time captain, National Assembly Deputy Meissa Sall, recently led a public celebration of "epic physical battles" he fought for Wade, though he stressed that his boys were under orders "to never attack, but respond with proportionate force to attack." Most calots bleus are integrated in Wade's protective force or the National Police, though others in the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) claim they fought alongside and resent deeply that Wade never gave them jobs. A source close to Wade's national organizer and Dakar Regional Council President Abdoulaye Faye, said some of these are abandoning Wade to join Seck's expanding bodyguard. Nouvel Horizon reporter Gadiaga Diop, who has written about militias, doubts that to a degree, but has heard credible accounts that Wade, through Meissa Sall, is again seeking new recruits. She editorializes that a President recruiting a militia when he has control of an army and police force is "hardly consistent with republican rule." ¶4. (C) Wade and Seck bodyguards have faced off a few times this year, and many fear they could do so again. There are also allegations that calots bleus are targeting those close to Seck: on December 9 Seck attorney and human rights activist Boucounta Diallo told Sud-FM radio a calot bleu had called his home to warn he would be assassinated for holding onto documents that could supposedly prove Seck guilty of corruption. Both Wade's and Seck's groups are purely political, though, with no religious inspiration, affiliation or cause. MANOUNE NIASSE'S KAOLACK ROUGHTNECKS -------------- ¶5. (C) That is not the case with the Tidjane marabout Mamoune Niasse, who has exploited religious themes to become the central political figure in the vote-rich Kaolack Region. Earlier this year, Niasse held a pro-Idrissa Seck rally in Prime Minister Macky Sall's hometown of Fatick. Sall's partisans attacked the rally, and Niasse in riposte sent his DAKAR 00002940 002 OF 004 militia to fight it out toe to toe. Our impression is that Niasse has used his gang only locally or, as in the Fatick incident, for self-defense. Having dropped his support for Seck and received a Minister of State title from Wade, though, he might well be persuaded to employ his militia as he campaigns throughout the country for Wade and the PDS. MOUSTARCHIDINES: VOTE FOR SECK BUT FIGHT FOR WADE? -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Tidjane Moustarchidines' willingness to use violence is well-documented (Ref G),and some believe they could lend their militia to Wade or Seck for the campaign. The Moustarchidines have been much less activist in recent years, though, and their leader Moustapha Sy is conflicted, uncertain whether to back fellow Tidjane and his father's spiritual protege, Seck, or "follow power," and support the Mouride Wade. Sy is maintaining strict public neutrality, but in recent weeks has allowed the head of his political wing to "accept a mission" for Wade in the president's hometown of Kebemer. There is some speculation that Sy is keeping all options open, keeping Wade happy but putting off the hard choice he must make if Seck makes the second round run-off and asks Moustarchidines to provide manpower and muscle. Or he could just sit the elections out. THE MOURIDES' AVARICIOUS RADICAL: GENERAL KARA MBACKE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) If Moustarchidines are balancing doctrinal preference for Tidjane Seck versus a prospect of quicker gains with Wade, Mouride marabout Kara Mbacke probably will try to follow the money. On November 1, "religious students" who study Kara, karate and Koran in the key Mouride town of Darou Mousty raided and occupied a gendarmerie post to rescue two of their own from jail. When gendarmes threatened retaliation and the Mouride Khalif's denunciation of the gendarmes laid groundwork for a real stand-off between Kara and the state, Kara issued a de facto apology. Kara's militia accepted his discipline grudgingly and, muttering about Kara's less-than-militant political pliability, satisfied themselves with stealing the gendarme post's national flag. ¶8. (C) Kara has told us his men are not armed, and indeed, whenever we have seen them in action, voluntarily keeping muscular order at Mouride religious celebrations, they have not carried arms. Kara's political advisor Abbas tells us he counsels Kara to avoid violence, any sign of doctrinal extremism or even any emphasis on religious themes, and to concentrate instead on gaining a Wade appointment to a cabinet post. Indeed, there were rumors that Kara would be made minister in a late November reshuffle, but a detested rival and fellow charismatic Mouride got the ministerial nod instead. THE TERPSICHOREAN MARABOUT: BETHIOU THIOUNE -------------- ¶9. (C) If Wade is to neutralize or eliminate Idrissa Seck politically, he must first do so in Seck's hometown of Thies. Over the last year and a half, Wade has sent Dakar Regional Council President Faye, Prime Minister Macky Sall and others to do so, and all have so far failed. In mid-November, Wade enlisted ex-Touba "mayor" Bethio Thioune to help organize a rally in Thies. 300 of Bethio's men, armed with clubs and allegedly machetes and a few guns, backed gendarmes and police to keep Seck fans quiet and off the streets. Some Thiessois charged "terror tactics." Onstage, the tall and portly Bethio, who has a reputation of charming his Brotherhood's women acolytes with ever-so-slightly blue jokes, pulled off the rare feat of upstaging Wade. He did so with a rare combination of spiritual appeals, humor and, unique in Mouridism's austere higher ranks, with political choreography: "the crowd went delirious ... the rhythm of tams-tams, clapping hands, music and songs climaxed with Bethio's remarkable and magisterial dance." ¶10. (C) Bethio is one of the very rare people outside the Mouride founder's bloodline to be anointed "serigne" (very roughly, beatified) by the Khalif. He was Touba rural council president for five years in the 1990's until eased out amid corruption charges. A more central reason for his ouster was bitter reaction to his push to modernize Touba,s civil administration and alliance with reformist cultural center Hizbut Tarquiah and its head Atou Diagne. Despite Khalifal protection, Bethio was undone by concerted opposition of Mouride traditionalists and replaced by one of their own. (See Ref E.) ¶11. (C) We had encountered Bethio before briefly in Touba, DAKAR 00002940 003 OF 004 but spoke with him for the first time at his Dakar home, infamous in several neighborhoods for screech-volume, heart-stopping anti-rhythmic Mouride chants played through the night (and for rumored manhandling of an unlucky minister who came to complain). Making our way through waves of faithful seeking blessing, we bumped shoulders with ex-Urbanism Minister Salif Ba, just released from jail on corruption charges who had come to seek possibly expiation or more probably Bethio's intercession with Wade. Bethio stressed to us that he was not a run-of-the mill religious leader. He was a western-trained intellectual and administrator, but also a spiritual guide, identified by the Khalif as divinely inspired, capable of and responsible for interpreting the Koran and the Mouride founder's teachings to a nationwide and increasingly worldwide Mouride audience. He was above interest in the mundane and uninvolved in politics -- except insofar as he backs President Wade for reelection. ¶12. (C) Further emphasizing his distaste for politics, Bethio denounced religious leaders who formed parties or traded adherents' votes for official favors: "They may be religious, but they are not spiritual!" Most are venal, with little commitment to morality or faith. He had been under intense pressure to take a government post, but told Wade he would not be a minister under any condition. Guiding and governing the Mouride community are his only priorities, and there would be need for delicacy, agility and strength in coming years as the elderly Khalif passes his burdens to a successor. The next Mouride generation lack their fathers' spiritual authority and have no inborn legitimacy to guide believers. What was important is not bloodlines but moral and spiritual purity, and to assure that the Khalif possesses these, future khalifs may be chosen from outside the ruling religious family. ¶13. (C) Bethio emphasized he had won "four million" disciples through power of faith and the god-given eloquence of his message. He runs no school, trains no disciples, but welcomes all who believed in Mouridism. He backs Wade and Wade is a true Mouride, but he could also very well support a Tidjane, Q'adr or Catholic depending on the candidate's personal qualities. As a spiritual leader and western intellectual, Bethio assured us, he deplores the gathering of hooligans into religious militias and the recourse to violence that are now all too common in Senegalese politics. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Senegalese want no repeat of the political violence they have occasionally seen in previous elections. They fear that if Idrissa Seck pursues his presidential candidacy and proves Wade's primary challenger, there will be campaign confrontations between the bodyguard he is building up and Wade's calots bleus. There are also allegations that militias are being used to intimidate civil society and the press (including, notably, the severe May beating of "L'Observateur reporter Pape Cheikh Fall in MBacke, allegedly by Bethio Thioune's followers). The fear is rational. Any face-off between Wade and Seck partisans could be heated and possibly violent. There is even more reason to fear calot bleu reaction if Wade loses the election. ¶15. (S) The formation of political-religious militias is potentially more worrisome still, since their leaders demand unquestioning religious obedience as well as political loyalty. Most at this point appear to be lining up behind Wade. Mamoune Niasse has accepted the title of Minister of State and may be asked to deploy his militia on behalf of Wade outside his hometown of Kaolack. The Moustarchidines' Moustapha Sy may privately favor fellow Tidjane Seck, but is allowing a close associate to work for Wade. Kara MBacke, who is rapidly dropping the pretense of being primarily a religious leader, is eager for power and money and will probably agree to what Wade wants -- either peace and compromise in the November 1 confrontation with gendarmes, or some muscular support if Wade needs it. ¶16. (S) Bethio Thioune, with the virile albeit fattened charisma of an over-aged Bollywood action star, has become the most intriguing of the political marabouts. After a single conversation, we are not sure where his primary ambitions lie. He is probably already more powerful and has more access to wealth than almost any minister, and we take him at his word that he is not ready to accept a ministerial post. Assuming he does not dream of succeeding Wade as president, his real aspirations may lie in Touba and leadership of the powerful and dynamic Mourides. He believes what in Touba used to amount to heresy or treachery -- that DAKAR 00002940 004 OF 004 the next Khalif need not come from the current ruling bloodline. Since he believes strongly that he has the attributes needed to fill the Khalifal chair, he may be helping Wade so that some day Wade will help him. We do not know how such an aspiration would play if Wade asked him to deploy his religious gangs on Wade's behalf. END COMMENT. ¶17. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar,s classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar. JACOBS