CULTS AND VIOLENCE: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 002940

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PINS SOCI PINR KISL SG
SUBJECT: CULTS AND VIOLENCE: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS
MILITIAS AND COMING ELECTIONS

REF: A. DAKAR 2271


B. DAKAR 1721

C. DAKAR 0681

D. DAKAR 0565

E. 05 DAKAR 3108

F. 04 DAKAR 2915

G. 04 DAKAR 2201

H. 04 DAKAR 0717

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In conjunction with the presidential decree setting
February 25 as the date for Senegal,s presidential and
parliamentary elections, the Interior Ministry has forbidden
carrying guns, clubs, machetes or knives from now through the
coming elections, possibly out of concern about political or
religious groups that maintain armed private security
details. The former government maintained small gangs of
toughs, but the model of current political militias is
Abdoulaye Wade's "calots bleus," formed to provide
"legitimate self defense" against a state he believed to be
stacking the political deck. Left and religious right
militias, meanwhile, have reflected distrust in the state's
ability to provide adequate safeguards against police or
judicial abuse, while others exist simply to intimidate or
batter rivals. We do not expect any of these militias to
figure prominently in the campaign, but since most are at
least loosely committed to President Wade, they could become
a public security factor if Wade fails to win re-election.
We look at several militias, with special attention to a
recent political-religious phenomenon, the Mouride Bethiou
Thioune. END SUMMARY.

WE ONCE WERE BRUISERS: ACTION COMMITTEES AND BLUE CAPS
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2. (SBU) The former Socialist party government in its early
years supplemented police forces with "comites d'action,"
young ruffians and unemployed wrestlers who kept both the
Left and Abdoulaye Wade's loyal opposition in check,
sometimes preventing or disrupting rallies and busting a few
shins. Even in the otherwise peaceful 2000 election, an
action committee run by then-Socialist and now Conseil de la
Republique President Mbaye Jacques Diop allegedly fired shots
at a Wade procession in Rufisque.


3. (C) In order to mount a "legitimate self defense" against
what he considered state repression, Wade formed the "calots
bleus," or blue cap gangs of toughs. Their one-time captain,
National Assembly Deputy Meissa Sall, recently led a public
celebration of "epic physical battles" he fought for Wade,
though he stressed that his boys were under orders "to never
attack, but respond with proportionate force to attack."
Most calots bleus are integrated in Wade's protective force
or the National Police, though others in the ruling
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) claim they fought alongside
and resent deeply that Wade never gave them jobs. A source
close to Wade's national organizer and Dakar Regional Council
President Abdoulaye Faye, said some of these are abandoning
Wade to join Seck's expanding bodyguard. Nouvel Horizon
reporter Gadiaga Diop, who has written about militias, doubts
that to a degree, but has heard credible accounts that Wade,
through Meissa Sall, is again seeking new recruits. She
editorializes that a President recruiting a militia when he
has control of an army and police force is "hardly consistent
with republican rule."


4. (C) Wade and Seck bodyguards have faced off a few times
this year, and many fear they could do so again. There are
also allegations that calots bleus are targeting those close
to Seck: on December 9 Seck attorney and human rights
activist Boucounta Diallo told Sud-FM radio a calot bleu had
called his home to warn he would be assassinated for holding
onto documents that could supposedly prove Seck guilty of
corruption. Both Wade's and Seck's groups are purely
political, though, with no religious inspiration, affiliation
or cause.

MANOUNE NIASSE'S KAOLACK ROUGHTNECKS
--------------

5. (C) That is not the case with the Tidjane marabout
Mamoune Niasse, who has exploited religious themes to become
the central political figure in the vote-rich Kaolack Region.
Earlier this year, Niasse held a pro-Idrissa Seck rally in
Prime Minister Macky Sall's hometown of Fatick. Sall's
partisans attacked the rally, and Niasse in riposte sent his

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militia to fight it out toe to toe. Our impression is that
Niasse has used his gang only locally or, as in the Fatick
incident, for self-defense. Having dropped his support for
Seck and received a Minister of State title from Wade,
though, he might well be persuaded to employ his militia as
he campaigns throughout the country for Wade and the PDS.

MOUSTARCHIDINES: VOTE FOR SECK BUT FIGHT FOR WADE?
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6. (C) The Tidjane Moustarchidines' willingness to use
violence is well-documented (Ref G),and some believe they
could lend their militia to Wade or Seck for the campaign.
The Moustarchidines have been much less activist in recent
years, though, and their leader Moustapha Sy is conflicted,
uncertain whether to back fellow Tidjane and his father's
spiritual protege, Seck, or "follow power," and support the
Mouride Wade. Sy is maintaining strict public neutrality,
but in recent weeks has allowed the head of his political
wing to "accept a mission" for Wade in the president's
hometown of Kebemer. There is some speculation that Sy is
keeping all options open, keeping Wade happy but putting off
the hard choice he must make if Seck makes the second round
run-off and asks Moustarchidines to provide manpower and
muscle. Or he could just sit the elections out.

THE MOURIDES' AVARICIOUS RADICAL: GENERAL KARA MBACKE
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7. (C) If Moustarchidines are balancing doctrinal preference
for Tidjane Seck versus a prospect of quicker gains with
Wade, Mouride marabout Kara Mbacke probably will try to
follow the money. On November 1, "religious students" who
study Kara, karate and Koran in the key Mouride town of Darou
Mousty raided and occupied a gendarmerie post to rescue two
of their own from jail. When gendarmes threatened
retaliation and the Mouride Khalif's denunciation of the
gendarmes laid groundwork for a real stand-off between Kara
and the state, Kara issued a de facto apology. Kara's
militia accepted his discipline grudgingly and, muttering
about Kara's less-than-militant political pliability,
satisfied themselves with stealing the gendarme post's
national flag.


8. (C) Kara has told us his men are not armed, and indeed,
whenever we have seen them in action, voluntarily keeping
muscular order at Mouride religious celebrations, they have
not carried arms. Kara's political advisor Abbas tells us he
counsels Kara to avoid violence, any sign of doctrinal
extremism or even any emphasis on religious themes, and to
concentrate instead on gaining a Wade appointment to a
cabinet post. Indeed, there were rumors that Kara would be
made minister in a late November reshuffle, but a detested
rival and fellow charismatic Mouride got the ministerial nod
instead.

THE TERPSICHOREAN MARABOUT: BETHIOU THIOUNE
--------------

9. (C) If Wade is to neutralize or eliminate Idrissa Seck
politically, he must first do so in Seck's hometown of Thies.
Over the last year and a half, Wade has sent Dakar Regional
Council President Faye, Prime Minister Macky Sall and others
to do so, and all have so far failed. In mid-November, Wade
enlisted ex-Touba "mayor" Bethio Thioune to help organize a
rally in Thies. 300 of Bethio's men, armed with clubs and
allegedly machetes and a few guns, backed gendarmes and
police to keep Seck fans quiet and off the streets. Some
Thiessois charged "terror tactics." Onstage, the tall and
portly Bethio, who has a reputation of charming his
Brotherhood's women acolytes with ever-so-slightly blue
jokes, pulled off the rare feat of upstaging Wade. He did so
with a rare combination of spiritual appeals, humor and,
unique in Mouridism's austere higher ranks, with political
choreography: "the crowd went delirious ... the rhythm of
tams-tams, clapping hands, music and songs climaxed with
Bethio's remarkable and magisterial dance."


10. (C) Bethio is one of the very rare people outside the
Mouride founder's bloodline to be anointed "serigne" (very
roughly, beatified) by the Khalif. He was Touba rural
council president for five years in the 1990's until eased
out amid corruption charges. A more central reason for his
ouster was bitter reaction to his push to modernize Touba,s
civil administration and alliance with reformist cultural
center Hizbut Tarquiah and its head Atou Diagne. Despite
Khalifal protection, Bethio was undone by concerted
opposition of Mouride traditionalists and replaced by one of
their own. (See Ref E.)


11. (C) We had encountered Bethio before briefly in Touba,

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but spoke with him for the first time at his Dakar home,
infamous in several neighborhoods for screech-volume,
heart-stopping anti-rhythmic Mouride chants played through
the night (and for rumored manhandling of an unlucky minister
who came to complain). Making our way through waves of
faithful seeking blessing, we bumped shoulders with
ex-Urbanism Minister Salif Ba, just released from jail on
corruption charges who had come to seek possibly expiation or
more probably Bethio's intercession with Wade. Bethio
stressed to us that he was not a run-of-the mill religious
leader. He was a western-trained intellectual and
administrator, but also a spiritual guide, identified by the
Khalif as divinely inspired, capable of and responsible for
interpreting the Koran and the Mouride founder's teachings to
a nationwide and increasingly worldwide Mouride audience. He
was above interest in the mundane and uninvolved in politics
-- except insofar as he backs President Wade for reelection.


12. (C) Further emphasizing his distaste for politics,
Bethio denounced religious leaders who formed parties or
traded adherents' votes for official favors: "They may be
religious, but they are not spiritual!" Most are venal, with
little commitment to morality or faith. He had been under
intense pressure to take a government post, but told Wade he
would not be a minister under any condition. Guiding and
governing the Mouride community are his only priorities, and
there would be need for delicacy, agility and strength in
coming years as the elderly Khalif passes his burdens to a
successor. The next Mouride generation lack their fathers'
spiritual authority and have no inborn legitimacy to guide
believers. What was important is not bloodlines but moral
and spiritual purity, and to assure that the Khalif possesses
these, future khalifs may be chosen from outside the ruling
religious family.


13. (C) Bethio emphasized he had won "four million"
disciples through power of faith and the god-given eloquence
of his message. He runs no school, trains no disciples, but
welcomes all who believed in Mouridism. He backs Wade and
Wade is a true Mouride, but he could also very well support a
Tidjane, Q'adr or Catholic depending on the candidate's
personal qualities. As a spiritual leader and western
intellectual, Bethio assured us, he deplores the gathering of
hooligans into religious militias and the recourse to
violence that are now all too common in Senegalese politics.

COMMENT
--------------

14. (C) Senegalese want no repeat of the political violence
they have occasionally seen in previous elections. They fear
that if Idrissa Seck pursues his presidential candidacy and
proves Wade's primary challenger, there will be campaign
confrontations between the bodyguard he is building up and
Wade's calots bleus. There are also allegations that
militias are being used to intimidate civil society and the
press (including, notably, the severe May beating of
"L'Observateur reporter Pape Cheikh Fall in MBacke, allegedly
by Bethio Thioune's followers). The fear is rational. Any
face-off between Wade and Seck partisans could be heated and
possibly violent. There is even more reason to fear calot
bleu reaction if Wade loses the election.


15. (S) The formation of political-religious militias is
potentially more worrisome still, since their leaders demand
unquestioning religious obedience as well as political
loyalty. Most at this point appear to be lining up behind
Wade. Mamoune Niasse has accepted the title of Minister of
State and may be asked to deploy his militia on behalf of
Wade outside his hometown of Kaolack. The Moustarchidines'
Moustapha Sy may privately favor fellow Tidjane Seck, but is
allowing a close associate to work for Wade. Kara MBacke,
who is rapidly dropping the pretense of being primarily a
religious leader, is eager for power and money and will
probably agree to what Wade wants -- either peace and
compromise in the November 1 confrontation with gendarmes, or
some muscular support if Wade needs it.


16. (S) Bethio Thioune, with the virile albeit fattened
charisma of an over-aged Bollywood action star, has become
the most intriguing of the political marabouts. After a
single conversation, we are not sure where his primary
ambitions lie. He is probably already more powerful and has
more access to wealth than almost any minister, and we take
him at his word that he is not ready to accept a ministerial
post. Assuming he does not dream of succeeding Wade as
president, his real aspirations may lie in Touba and
leadership of the powerful and dynamic Mourides. He believes
what in Touba used to amount to heresy or treachery -- that

DAKAR 00002940 004 OF 004


the next Khalif need not come from the current ruling
bloodline. Since he believes strongly that he has the
attributes needed to fill the Khalifal chair, he may be
helping Wade so that some day Wade will help him. We do not
know how such an aspiration would play if Wade asked him to
deploy his religious gangs on Wade's behalf. END COMMENT.


17. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar,s classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.
JACOBS