STAFFDEL BRANEGAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 002748

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR H, S/CT, AF/RSA, AF/W AND DS/ATA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2011
TAGS: PTER PINR ASEC OREP SG
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL BRANEGAN


Classified By: A/DCM Claud Young for reason 1.4 (g).


1. (U) SUMMARY: Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff
member Jay Branegan visited Dakar, November 2-3, 2006, to
study the processes and procedures whereby the State and
Defense Departments coordinate in embassies overseas,
particularly in pursuing activities related to the Global War
on Terror (GWOT). In the course of two days, Mr. Branegan
met with country team members, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
representatives, the DCM of the French Embassy, and
participated in a round table discussion with senior
Senegalese officers attending an Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) seminar. Coordination and cooperation were the themes
that arose again and again. Senegal has avoided major
terrorist incidents to date, and Branegan learned about the
Mission,s model Muslim outreach program, which is one
vehicle we use to help maintain Senegal,s record. END
SUMMARY.

SENEGALESE MFA: OUR GOAL IS PREVENTION
--------------

2. (U) Senate staffer Jay Branegan called on Ambassador
Claude Absa Diallo, Acting Foreign Minister and Secretary
General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also present
were Pape NDiaye, Director of the International Organizations
Department, and the Embassy Political Counselor. The
conversation was friendly, with emphasis on shared values and
cooperation in combating terrorism. For counterterrorism
operational details, Diallo referred Branegan to the Interior
Ministry.


3. (C) Diallo called the U.S. more sensitive to the threat
of terror because it was directly targeted, but emphasized
that Senegal, as a port of entry to Africa and host to
numerous international conferences, could also be a
tangential victim of terrorism. She said such "secondary"
terrorism could affect Senegal's transportation network and
thereby mobility and logistics. Senegal was trying to take
measures to prevent terror, such as augmenting Dakar airport
and port security, but could use greater financial help from
its friends. She added that the world as a whole needed to
be aware of the terror threat, but Senegal's primary concern
was that the West should not conclude that terrorism is
synonymous with one culture, race, religion or region of the
world.


4. (C) Diallo and especially NDiaye emphasized that Senegal
is fully supportive of the U.S., even though its votes at the
United Nations more often reflect African Union consensus
rather than Senegal,s viewpoint on U.S. policy. Diallo
said President Wade and President Bush shared many values,
and that Wade's willingness to mediate with Iran proved this.
When Branegan asked for advice for the U.S., Diallo
suggested that the U.S. listen more carefully to African
opinion. The U.S. is the world's only superpower, but might
be even more effective diplomatically if it were willing to
take a more conciliatory approach with smaller countries.

COORDINATE AND COOPERATE TO FACILITATE PREVENTION
-------------- --------------

5. (SBU) Branegan also called on French DCM Philippe LaCoste
for a wide-ranging, amicable discussion of the French
perspective on Senegal, possible areas of rivalry and
opportunities for cooperation. LaCoste emphasized the
uniqueness of Senegal's brand of Islam, noting that Arabs
found some local features strange or even un-Islamic.
Senegalese students who had gone to the Arab world to study,
especially countries such as Saudi Arabia, might well be
returning to Senegal with the intention of reforming
traditional practices. A small but telling example, LaCoste
said, was Senegalese Muslims nonchalance about bowing
precisely toward Mecca while praying. While there was no
evidence that any Senegalese were engaged in terror, it did
appear that Islamic radicals transited Dakar and were housed
and supported by friendly local mosques. The threat of
terror was small, but there was a need nonetheless for
counter-terror measures, such as augmented port security.


6. (C) LaCoste said the economic situation in Senegal could
well lead to political unrest, especially if the coming
elections are perceived as unfair. Major French/European
companies such as Total were very pessimistic about the
Senegalese economy and small businessmen were very
discouraged by overregulation and the unreliability of legal
rules and judicial decisions, although LaCoste commented as a
personal observation, it seemed that most French businessmen
were still managing to make money. Referring to the many
problems of the Sahel as a region, he emphasized that the
problems were so many and resources so few, that there was
plenty of room for all donors, and that it was in the

DAKAR 00002748 002 OF 002


interest of France and the U.S. to communicate and coordinate
as closely as possible to avoid duplication of effort.

GOS SENIOR SECURITY AND POLICE IDENTIFY VULNERABILITIES
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Mr. Branegan also met with a group of 10 senior
Senegalese officers representing the ministries of Interior,
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Finance; the
Presidency; the Prime Minister,s Office; and the National
Gendarmarie. The officers were concluding the first week of
a three-week Anti-Terrorism Assistance training program
titled "Integrating Counter-Terrorist Strategies at the
National Level." While the group agreed that Senegal has
escaped international terrorism to date, it believed that the
potential is present and would most likely be sparked by
elements from outside the country. They also agreed that
Senegal was not fully prepared to address the problem.


8. (C) Colonel Charles Gueye, Defense Advisor to the Prime
Minister and the senior GOS officer present, noted that the
agency responsible, under current Senegalese law, for
combating terrorism is the Ministry of the Interior. If the
threat or incident is beyond the Ministry of Interior's
capacity, the Gendarme, first, followed by the Senegalese
Armed Forces would assist. Colonel Gueye said the law was
very clear on this matter and identified a lack of
interoperability, coordination, and communications between
the various GOS institutions as a serious vulnerability to
their response. He noted that often USG assistance was
"stove-piped" to specific groups, e.g., the military or
police, and reinforced this vulnerability rather than
resolved it.

COMMENT
--------------

9. (U) Mr. Branegan did not have the opportunity to clear
this telegram prior to his departure. However, he had the
opportunity to meet with FBI and EUCOM staff during the visit
and exchanged ideas with them as well as those focusing on
bilateral issues. Branegan also learned about the mission,s
model Muslim outreach program, which includes working with
koranic schools, sending imams and Islamic teachers to the
United States, and Arabic-language book donations.


10. (C) While Senegal has been fortunate to escape
terrorism, the potential is here. Senegal is a strong U.S.
partner in the Global War on Terror. To increase the
effectiveness of our counterterrorism assistance, the USG
should recognize that Senegal's traditional partners, e.g.,
France, share our concerns, and merit closer coordination.
Additionally, USG assistance, particularly the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP),should acknowledge
existing Senegalese law and direct assistance to the agencies
that will be called to respond. Moreover, USG efforts should
foster cooperation between the distinct GOS elements that
will be called to respond, collectively, to any terrorist
incident that occurs within the borders of Senegal. END
COMMENT.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar,s classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar.

Jacobs
JACOBS