UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000249 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, PRM, PRM/AFA AND INR/AA ABIDJAN FOR REFCOORD GENEVA FOR RMA ACCRA FOR REFUGEE OFFICER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/11 TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MR SG SUBJECT: UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL REFS: A) NOUAKCHOTT 087; B) 05 DAKAR 0480 CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS ROBERT P. JACKSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) African-Mauritanian leaders in northern Senegal told visiting Ambassador Joseph LeBaron and Dakar Political Counselor January 24 and 25 that they want organized repatriation as a group under international auspices, and insist on restoration of Mauritanian citizenship and full recovery of land and property they lost in 1989 expulsions. They voiced gratitude to local villagers, frustration at what they see as neglect of their plight by the USG and the international community, ongoing if minor annoyance with the GOS, fears about returning home and demands for a new UNHCR census and provision of adequate documentation. A new generation born, raised and educated in Senegal may be less committed to repatriation. End Summary. A CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVE CAMPS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador LeBaron visited three sites (Dagana, Dodel and N'Dioum) among what the African- Mauritanians themselves claim to be 283 locations. These stretch from Saint Louis, through Diawara, the island in the middle of the Senegal River where villagers last year told us the 1989 killings began, to the Malian border and beyond. The sites range from well-populated and settled ones on the outskirts of Senegalese villages, like the ones we visited, to nomads' overnight encampments of a family or single individual. None that we have seen could readily be identified as a refugee camp: there are no fences, no guards, and no UNHCR offices. A handful of families have opted to live in houses in the middle of Senegalese villages. ¶3. (C) We ascertained that the overwhelming majority, like most River Valley Senegalese from Matam to Richard Toll, are ethnically and linguistically Toucouleur/Peuhl. (Some Wolofs and Soninke also sought refuge in 1989.) There is little intermarriage with Senegalese but, as we reported last year, many seek and sometimes find work locally. Interaction with the locals is generally amicable. Some children attend school, in buildings provided by the GOS and with Senegalese teachers. A few, estimated at 30 or more by a student and at about 15 by an older leader, attend university in either Dakar or Saint Louis. THE "REFUGEE" APPELATION -------------- ¶4. (C) The African-Mauritanians demand the status of refugees, though ONE resident of N'Dioum said he felt a sense of shame at being called a refugee and, like many, prefers to call himself an exile or deportee. Recalling that the Mauritanian government had insisted on treating them as displaced persons, another said the GOM had at one point allowed returns, but only as individuals, without organization or leadership and absent international oversight. Some did return, but were allegedly ill-treated. Former GOM civil servants, for example, were not reintegrated, and no land was returned to rightful owners. ¶5. (C) We were told that UNHCR aid strategy was stringent from the start. ONE leader in Dodel charged UNHCR with attempts to "destabilize" the refugee community, refusing aid in 1989 to those in Dakar, and ceasing food aid and closing support stations in Dagana and Saint Louis in 1995. They told us other aid organizations, such as Medecins sans Frontieres, had followed UNHCR in cutting services. The result, ONE claimed, was life in "draconian conditions." WHAT LIFE IS LIKE DAKAR 00000249 002 OF 003 -------------- ¶6. (C) In fact, as we were told in Dodel, Mauritanians and Senegalese in the River Valley live in similar conditions: most are poor. Yet refugees do face some special problems, many stemming from lack of official documentation that would allow them travel or access to Senegalese government services. The refugees see themselves as falling into three categories: the relative few who are UNHCR-registered and receive assistance; some who initially received "the wrong identity cards" and were sent back to Mauritania; and the large majority with no documents at all. ¶7. (C) Facts are unclear and there are exceptions, but it appears refugees for the most part do not and cannot own land locally; they cannot usually gain permanent jobs either in the Senegalese civil service or the private sector; and the daily agricultural wage jobs available do not provide sufficient support for HEALTH care or schooling. Local hospitals demand a valid ID card for admission. UNHCR aid, we learned last year and on this trip, is minimal. As a result, we heard, refugees' "social fabric is falling apart." ¶8. (C) Refugees are grateful to local villagers who have allowed them space and provide some help when they are able, but often feel annoyed by Senegalese police. When trying to travel, a student complained, they are often caught at security checkpoints without papers and police cause them "trouble." When we asked for details, he explained, "they'll try to get bribes from us, and if we don't give them, they'll hold us for hours, until they get tired of us; then they'll tell us either to go on or go back." ...AND COULD BE -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador LeBaron asked refugees how their lives would be better in Mauritania. Answers included: "we will be able to be better organized there," "we want water, medical care, schools and development projects to create jobs," and "more space." It is clear, they believe, that they would live better back home. No refugees ever cross the narrow and often shallow river back to Mauritania, ONE speaker tried hard to convince us, but relatives from their old home villages do cross into Senegal to bring supplies from home. Ambassador LeBaron also asked refugee leaders if they would accept being returned to land in Mauritania other than that which they had previously occupied. At first, they seemed unable even to process the question. Once they had considered it, though, they adamantly rejected return to any place other than their old family homes. ¶10. (C) The problem, many argued, is that Mauritanian armed forces and police who forced them out in 1989 confiscated or destroyed all proof that they were indeed Mauritanian citizens. ONE village chief lamented that, "without papers, if I go back, someone will slaughter me!" Opinions varied on whether chances for peaceful and safe repatriation have improved since the August coup. In Dagana, we heard, "Taya was responsible for the killings, but the new leader also played a role as chief of police." In N'Dioum, though, there was hope for positive change with the new leadership and hope for a democratic election. Indeed, refugee leaders ask "don't we have the right to participate in the transition?" and declare, "any election we don't take part in will be unfair." ¶11. (C) Because of these fears, refugees believe repatriation can be possible only under five conditions: -- there must be an accord for repatriation between UNHCR and the governments of Mauritania and Senegal; -- refugees must be returned as a group rather than individually; DAKAR 00000249 003 OF 003 -- return must be under the sponsorship and supervision of international organizations including UNHCR and the African Union, with the close attention of western countries and especially the U.S.; -- Mauritanian citizenship must be returned; and, -- there must be a return of all property lost, or, failing that, adequate compensation. IN THE MEANTIME: CENSUS AND ID CARDS -------------- ¶12. (C) No ONE really knows how many Mauritanian refugees are in Senegal. We heard that 68,000 had been expelled in 1989, but that, after virtual cutoff of UNHCR aid in 1994 and subsequent return by many individuals and families, some 20,000 remained. In 1995, we heard, a census was begun but then suspended. In the intervening 10 years, however, while there have been many deaths "because of poor HEALTH conditions," the birth rate has been "heavy .. the usual big African families .. on average seven children." UNHCR continues to use 20,000 as its best guess. ¶13. (C) Refugee leaders say "we don't want to apply for Senegalese citizenship," but they do want to be counted and to receive UNHCR identity cards to allow more privileges within Senegal and eventual repatriation. The only oblique reference we heard to any potential solution other than repatriation was a leader who demanded safety guarantees from the GOM, but conceded that if that were not possible, "then we'll wait in Senegal until another event moves us to another place." ¶14. (C) In fact, refugee children have been born in Senegal for 16 years now, and even some young adults have been largely raised and educated here. While not ready to question their leaders' disciplined pro-repatriation message, they would clearly be comfortable continuing to live in Senegal, though they would prefer adequate documentation and greater privileges than they now enjoy. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Refugee leaders in northern Senegal consider themselves Mauritanian, want to repatriate, and would like to participate in the transition from the Taya government to its successor. Yet demands for full restitution of all property lost in the 1989 expulsions mean that they will only be able to return with the full support of the Mauritanian government. That, in turn, will depend on political developments in Nouakchott, and we wonder if the refugees would be easily or quickly satisfied with the incremental approach which UNHCR Nouakchott Head of Mission Laye laid out to Ambassador LeBaron (Ref A). ¶16. (C) While waiting for a solution, refugees insist on a new census to count their real numbers, and documentation which will allow them fuller privileges while they remain in Senegal. End Comment. JACKSON