C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 002012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA
ABIDJAN FOR REFCOORD
ACCRA ALSO FOR USAID/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: MOPS PREF PHUM PINS SG PU GA
SUBJECT: CASAMANCE: THE 2004 TRUCE HAS ENDED

REF: DAKAR 1932 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Janice L. Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) The December 30, 2004 truce that many Senegalese
hoped would mark the end of a two-decade conflict has ended.
Arguing that Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance
(MFDC) factional fighting has created a situation in which
the Senegalese Armed Forces (SAF) must intervene to
re-establish order and sovereignty, as well as assure that
seasonal goods reach markets, the SAF has re-established a
sizeable presence in the northern Casamance along the Gambian
border and has begun an assault on the MFDC's Atika faction.
An American citizen with considerbale knowledge of the
Casamance reported that the SAF has tanks and other heavy
equipment in Sindian for the assault on Salif Sadio and his
estimated 180 followers. Embassy Banjul's contacts report
that fighting and shelling have reportedly caused 2,500
people to seek refuge in The Gambia within the last few days.


2. (C) When the Ambassador saw Prime Minister Macky Sall on
August 21, he reported that Casamancais had asked the SAF to
intervene to end the fighting between MFDC factions. He
insisted that the Government remains committed to a peaceful
solution to the conflict but that Abbe Diamacoune no longer
controls the various rebel groups. The Prime Minister
characterized the situation as "very complicated" and
offered that the Government continues to provide food and
medicine to the rebels.


3. (C) COMMENT: In spite of the Prime Minister's comments,
the GOS strategy appears to be to force Sadio to the
bargaining table. For this operation to be successful, The
Gambia must allow other MFDC fighters to prevent Sadio and
his men from also seeking refuge in The Gambia. Second, the
SAF and GOS must not underestimate Sadio as Bissau-Guinean
Chief of Defense Forces (CHOD) Major General Batista Tagme Na
Waie did in March. Tagme reportedly visited Dakar within the
last two weeks to exchange information about Sadio,s
strengths and vulnerabilities. By many accounts, however,
Sadio still has heavy weapons and landmines at his disposal,
as well as access to the sea -) and perhaps to The Gambia --
for resupply and/or escape. He also has fierce, extremely
disciplined followers. Sadio may have one other advantage
)- the weather. Heavy rains in the Casamance at this time
of year can slow down the SAF,s heavy equipment; at the same
time, the weather can also limit Sadio,s ability to move his
equipment.


4. (C) Why the GOS has really chosen to move against Sadio
at this juncture is unclear. Intra-MFDC squabbling has
prevented a second round of peace talks for over a year.
However, it will be extremely difficult for the GOS to
pretend that this operation constitutes anything less than a
renunciation of the 2004 truce. Some speculate that
President Wade,s European vacation played some role in the
timing; if the operation fails, Wade can disavow it. Embassy
continues to believe that the only solution to the Casamance
conflict is a negotiated one, and we are spreading that
message. We e-mailed suggested press guidance to AF/PDPA and
AF/W on August 18. END COMMENT.
JACOBS