THE CASAMANCE: ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 001932

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, PM/WRA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA
AID/W FOR AFR/AA - WARREN, AFR/SD AND AFR/WA
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2011
TAGS: PINS PHUM EAID SG
SUBJECT: THE CASAMANCE: ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENCE

REF: DAKAR 1005 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Janice L, Jacobs for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador visited the Casamance from August 2
through 5 to assess the peace process and the impact of USG
development assistance to the region. After several failed
attempts to initiate meaningful negotiations, the Casamance
continues to hover in the realm of "no war, no peace."
Rather than resorting to direct military confrontation, as in
the past, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
(MFDC) and the GOS now resort to intimidation. The GOS
secondary strategies of neglect and of attempting to divide
the MFDC have not borne fruit. The MFDC admits, however,
that its demand for regional independence has lost popular
support, but it echoes local leaders' views that economic
rebuilding and a role in decision making are critical in the
search for peace. As we continue our efforts to support the
peace process, we need to engage women and civil society more
effectively and help the GOS to address development and land
ownership issues. END SUMMARY.

MUTUAL INTIMIDATION
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2. (U) Although there has been no serious confrontation
between the MFDC and Senegalese army troops in the last five
years, both sides have engaged in acts of intimidation. To
show that it controls the terrain, MFDC rebels occasionally
attack passenger vehicles. We reported on the killing of a
GOS sub-prefect (local administrator) in early 2006 by
radical combatants protesting their marginalization in the
peace process. All branches of MFDC fighters, including
those openly espousing negotiations with the GOS, use
landmines as a way to protect their zones of occupation and
to ensure monopoly over the exploitation of natural
resources, such as orchards and cashew nuts. During a
meeting with the Ambassador, NGO Handicap International
reported there have been nine landmine victims so far this
year, as opposed to ten in all of 2005. One reason they gave
for this is people using rakes to "de-mine." Some reports
indicate that in the Sindian area of the northern Casamance,
the MFDC pressured the GOS to agree to a "demilitarized"
area, which combatants now use to engage in illegal
activities, such as cannabis production.


3. (C) The Senegalese army made its own show of force this
past week when it deployed soldiers to Bignona (near the
Gambian border). The Ambassador and other Embassy staff saw
Senegalese troops and equipment leaving the port in
Ziguinchor. The GOS said it is moving in troops to contain
fighting between the radical MFDC Atika group under the
leadership of Salif Sadio and more moderate groups
(considered "more friendly" to the GOS) trying to eliminate
Sadio and his supporters. Locals fear, however, that the
Senegalese army is preparing to launch sweeps of Bignona to
rid the area of Sadio and his men. Catching the MFDC off
guard, members criticized the move as hindering the peace
process.

CALLS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
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4. (C) Casamance Governor Leopold Wade told the Ambassador
he had not been involved in the peace process, nor have the
women and youth of the region. He urged a dual approach to
peace, combining political-level talks with infrastructural
development. Robert Sagna, Mayor of Ziguinchor and senior
Socialist Party (PS) leader, remarked that the GOS needs to
implement institutional reform that would give the region
more autonomy in decision-making and encourage economic
development. Sagna is encouraging a more coordinated
approach by civil society in the search for a lasting peace.
He blamed the city,s poor infrastructure, particularly its
roads, on tight-fisted GOS policies. Sagna, a leading expert
on the Casamance, was also frustrated by his lack of access
to President Wade. The longstanding sense of neglect held by
most Casamancais was perhaps best expressed by a former
combatant who pointedly told the Ambassador: "The fight for
independence is a fight for freedom . . . freedom to create a
business and have income, freedom to feed your family."

USG PEACE AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS
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5. (U) The Ambassador visited several USAID project sites
and held discussions with local NGO partners to discuss
reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. These visits
included an emotional visit to the grave of Colonel Boissy,

DAKAR 00001932 002 OF 002


the former chief of the village of Mandina Mackagne near
Ziguinchor. This village was decimated and abandoned
following a famous battle in 1998 during which MFDC rebels
exterminated an elite group of 26 Senegalese soldiers sent in
to displace the rebels. In 2002, efforts were launched to
reconstruct and resettle the village to allow former
residents to return from Guinea Bissau, The Gambia, and other
locations where they had dispersed. These efforts were led
by retired Senegalese army officer Colonel Boissy, who was
originally from that village. Boissy, also a former military
Zone Commander for Zuiguinchor in the early 1990s, worked to
organize reconstruction efforts with help from USAID-financed
NGOs, and persuaded villagers to return. Today, a
significant percentage of the population has returned and the
village is thriving. While mines remaining in neighboring
fields prevent a full resumption of prior economic
activities, the return has considerably improved the lives of
villagers. More importantly it provided an incentive for
reconciliation between different families in the village,
some of whom had members in the MFDC while others had members
in the Senegalese armed forces (like Boissy). Reconciliation
efforts initially involved weekend cultural events to build
trust followed by traditional ceremonies of forgiveness
involving active members of the Senegalese military and
former rebel combatants from the village. Colonel Boissy,s
leadership created a model for village-level reconciliation
and reconstruction which USAID has replicated in other
localities. This type of village-level reconciliation and
reconstruction has greatly strengthened grass-roots civil
society effort to pressure the GOS and MFDC to achieve a
definitive peace agreement. Moreover, micro-finance and
other development activities that accompanied the
reconstruction process have created new possibilities for
former rebel families to return to &peacetime8 economic
activities and abandon &wartime8 economic activity such as
holdups and illicit drug and arms trade. During several
different discussions with local officials and village
leaders, the need for a two pronged effort to promote peace
at both the village/community level as well as at the peace
negotiation level was strongly reiterated to the Ambassador
and her delegation.


6. (U) Due to funding shortfalls in 2005, USAID had to close
out several grants supporting village reconciliation and
reconstruction in order to focus very limited resources on
support for peace negotiation efforts. The latter is
considered a priority as larger scale donor funded de-mining
efforts depend on a sustainable peace accord. A multi-year
grant was signed in July with PADCO to continue negotiation
skill building work started last year that was extremely well
received by both the GOS and MFDC. Additional funds are
being sought (either FY-2006 fallout or FY-2007) to fully
fund this program and resume critically needed village level
reconciliation/reconstruction efforts.

COMMENT
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7. (C) The stagnation that has plagued the peace process in
the Casamance bears the potential to move in one of two
directions. Fears associated with the newest deployments of
Senegalese troops and persistent rumors that Sadio was
recently in Cote d'Ivoire to obtain financing from President
Laurent Gbagbo, who accuses President Wade of supporting
Ivorian rebels, indicate the potential for expansion of the
Casamance conflict beyond The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and
Senegal remains. Nevertheless, attempts by the GOS to
present a coherent economic development plan, accompanied by
efforts to decentralize some decision-making to the region,
would demonstrate its seriousness as a negotiating partner
and could serve as the final catalyst needed to bring lasting
peace to the Casamance. END COMMENT.
JACOBS