SEEKING TRANSFORMATIONAL PRESSURE POINTS IN THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 001721

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL KDEM KISL SG
SUBJECT: SEEKING TRANSFORMATIONAL PRESSURE POINTS IN THE
TIDJANE BROTHERHOOD

REF: A. 6/15/06 IVANOVA/JACOBS EMAIL (NOTAL)


B. DAKAR 1427 (NOTAL)

C. DAKAR 1149 (NOTAL)

D. DAKAR 0681 (NOTAL)

E. DAKAR 0565 (NOTAL)

F. 05 DAKAR 3139 (NOTAL)

G. 05 DAKAR 2756 (NOTAL)

H. 05 DAKAR 0664 (NOTAL)

I. 05 DAKAR 0332 (NOTAL)

J. 04 DAKAR 2915 (NOTAL)

K. 04 DAKAR 2681 (NOTAL)

L. 04 DAKAR 2201 (NOTAL)

DAKAR 00001721 001.2 OF 005


M. 04 DAKAR 1468 (NOTAL)

N. 04 DAKAR 0797 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Counselor Roy L. Whitaker for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Ref A sums up interagency talks on Senegal's 2007
elections and suggests "engaging ... Muslim Brotherhoods ...
to ensure peaceful, fair and free elections." Our first
reaction was that this would be a delicate exercise, given
our focus on promoting Islamic-Christian dialogue, doctrinal
moderation and cooperation in the fight against global
terrorism. On reflection, we believe identifying religious
leaders who have the most influence, and those who might be
willing to work with us, may well be useful as longer-term
transformational diplomacy. With application of diplomatic
pressure in mind, we designed this cable as a primer on
political influence in the largest and most decentralized of
Senegal's Islamic brotherhoods, the Tidjanes. END SUMMARY.

WHO'S YOUR (DOCTRINAL) DADDY?
--------------

2. (SBU) Senegalese Tidjania's main branch traces roots to
the 1850's jihadist El Hadj Omar Tall and his disciple El
Hadj Malick Sy, who founded a Khalifate in 1902 in Tivouane.
Recognized as inspirational center, Tivouane is
organizationally only first among equals for nominally
subsidiary congregations spread around the country.


3. (SBU) A second branch of Senegalese Tidjania is wholly
autonomous, though its ties to Tivouane are correct and
largely cooperative. In the early 20th centry, Moroccan
educated Abdoulaye Niasse challenge El Hadj Malick Sy's
supremacy and established a mosque in Kaolack. The Niassenes
are heavily invested in education and proselytize actively in
West Africa and the Sahel.

THE TIVAOUANE KHALIFATE: BATTLIN' BROTHERS ...
-------------- -

4. (C) When El Hadj Malick Sy died in 1922, the khalifate
passed to elder son Ababacar Sy (1922-57) then younger son
Abdoul Aziz Sy (1957-97). Since a succession struggle in
1957, Tivaouane City politics has been the story of
Ababacar's three sons' ambitions, and bitter and at times
potentially deadly fraternal rivalries.


5. (S) Current Khalif, Serigne Mansour Sy, is 80, ill,
intellectually dull and lacking in gravitas or moral
authority -- a political cipher.


6. (S) When Mansour dies, his about-the-same-age half
brother Cheikh Tidjane Sy, spiritual guide to the radical and
violence-prone Moustarchidines led by his son Moustapha Sy),
will claim the throne. Cheikh Tidjane will argue that
authority flows from brother to brother, a doctrinal
flip-flop given that he tried to take over in 1957 by arguing
that succession stemmed from father to son. He lost out to
his uncle, but tried again in 1997, this time arguing he was
only four months younger than his brother (and, privately,
that he was also smarter). His uncle, though, perhaps still
bitter from the contest 40 years earlier, had left behind a
written testament anointing Mansour. Cheikh Tidjane
desperately wants to be Khalif, but may again be derailed by
palace intrigue.


7. (S) The man to derail him is his 78 year old younger
brother, Abdoul Aziz Sy Junior (everyone calls him Junior).
Junior has told us the Khalif should emulate his uncle in
naming a successor by confidential letter to be read after
death (Ref L). As Brotherhood spokesman, de facto Tivouane
mayor and master of palace, mosque and annual religious
celebrations, Junior is well poised to shape such a letter.
Junior's public stance, and even close adherents believe it,

DAKAR 00001721 002.2 OF 005


is that despite differences, he respects his elder brother
and recognizes his right of succession. He has told us
privately in disgust, though, that "the Moustarchidines have
tried to kill me," and we notice his bodyguards are armed.


8. (C) In politics, Junior is an unabashed Socialist but
keeps an oar on both sides of the boat: he is friendly with
Prime Minister Macky Sall, and Tivouane MP, Astou Kane Sall,
representing Wade's ruling Senegalese Democratic Party, is
Junior's adoptive daughter. Junior has been taking Wade to
task for years, at first privately but recently in public,
for "neglecting" Tidjanes in favor of Wade's own Mourides.
Lately, he asked the Mouride Khalif to join in a united
effort to assure free, transparent, on-schedule elections
(Ref C).


9. (C) Junior is at the center of an impressive and
diplomatically sophisticated circle of intellectuals:

-- Moustaph Serigne Mbaye Sy Mansour, a modest, direct and
highly serious former diplomat closely linked to the Italian
Tidjane community and an outspoken critic of Wade's governing
style;

-- ex-University of Memphis lecturer and long-time Islamic
Institute head Rawane MBaye is among Senegal's leading
theologians and religious itellectuals; and, .

-- While not yet in the same league, Junior's son, another
Moustapha Sy, is rapidly coming into his own as a youth
organizer (and is a 2006 IVP nominee).

... AND CONCILIATORY COUSINS
--------------

10. (C) If the Khalif, Junior and Tidjane Sy all died,
ex-Khalif Abdoul Aziz's son would succeed them. To avoid
exacerbating jealousies and observe and participate in (or he
would say above) national politics, Maudou Sy has exiled
himself from Tivouane to a Dakar seaside home, right next to
Wade's coastal property. Maoudou appears to enjoy that
indefinable moral and ethical authority that Senegalese value
so highly, and, therefore, has a widespread high-level
following. (At the 2006 July 4th reception, new Armed Forces
Chief of Staff LTG Abdoulaye Fall practically snapped to
attention for him.). He has been warning us of fragility in
the national political consensus and potential electoral
problems since 2005.

RIVER VALLEY TRADITIONALS
--------------

11. (C) There is distinctly variant style and outlook
between the ethnically or culturally Wolof marabouts who run
most of Senegalese Tidjania, and the traditionalist
Toucouleurs (Ref I). El Hadj Oumar Tall and Malick Sy's
Toucouleurs introduced Tidjania to Senegal from their River
Valley base; the Talls still dominate religion in the rural
north, and compete for primacy in Saint Louis. Khalif
Mountaga Tall, though, is in Dakar, as is the family
mausoleum, its four giant minarets strikingly visible from
the Corniche. Wade has by some accounts tried to win over
the Talls by donating funds to finish the mausoleum; and
despite Wade's Mouridism, secularism and opposition to
practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM),they have
not publicly criticized him.


12. (S) In a July 14 conversation dedicated to military
themes during the writing of this cable, retired Colonel
Abdoulaye Tall, who on his own initiative led troops to block
an armed 1994 Moustarchidine incursion into the Presidential
palace and in the late 90's undertook a United Nations
commissioned study tour of West Africa's potentially "at
risk" states, told us Senegal is now at risk. He fears there
will be a contested election and that the army will
intervene. The only question in his mind is whether the army
will intercede as peacekeeper and honest broker, or whether
Wade and his inner circle will by then have won or bought the
senior officer corps' unquestioning loyalty. He suggested
without prompting that the Tall Khalif could be enlisted to
cooperate with the U.S. to assure fair elections.


13. (C) Toucouleurs moved south in the 1930's to establish
mosques in Mbour and, especially, Medina Gounass. The
Gounass community retains cultural and family ties in the
River Valley (for example, with the imam of Mboumba, a
current recipient of Trans-Saharan Counuterterrorism
Initiative (TSCTI) funding, but is doctrinally and
organizationally autonomous and aims at complete

DAKAR 00001721 003.2 OF 005


self-reliance (Refs F and H). Gounass' marabout has
complained directly to Prime Minister Sall about lack of
economic development, but Gounass' only political interest
appears to be in remaining undisturbed by the central
government or by modern education.

SOME LOCAL MARABOUTS
--------------

14. (C) In almost all other cases, local Tidjane leaders or
communities lack political heft, either because they are too
small or too dependent on government favor. In descending
order of importance:

-- Pire, home to an ancient, Libyan Islamic Call-restored
Islamic university (Ref M),is led by capable three-time
Ambassador Moustapha Cisse. Many think Pire, with its long
and deeply entrenched traditions, could break away if Cheikh
Tidjane Sy becomes Khalif, but Moustapha Cisse is close
friends with Junior.

-- Tienaba Village is tiny and jealous of its autonomy.
Despite its tiny size, though, we have been told its
marabout's teachings "resonate" throughout Senegal.

-- In Thies, the proud but modest marabout runs a tightly
knit and locally-oriented community that draws energy from
Thies' busy educational and religious life.

-- In Louga, the Wolofized Toucouleur Salls concentrate on
their Saudi-sponsored school. Marabout Mansour Sall is well
respected but soft-spoken and deferential and not, as far as
we know, politically active.

-- In Saint Louis, home of Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom and
Justice Minister Cheikh Tidjane Sy, the Cisse family marabout
is more likely to seek Wade's political support than to
challenge him (Ref I).

-- In Dakar, two rival ethnic Lebou claimants to the imamship
of the grand mosque eagerly seek government political support
and financial largesse.

THE KAOLACK NIASSENES: UPTOWN ...
--------------

15. (C) The Niassene Tidjanes of Kaolack appear to have
gained in wealth and prominence fairly recently. An Amcit
who did volunteer work in Kaolack twenty-some years ago, for
instance, reports they did not then seem a major factor in
the city's life. That is certainly not the case now, but in
Tidjane fashion, growth has brought schism, with rival
cousins claiming the khalifate in two separate neighborhoods,
a majority in Medina Baye and a minority in Leonas. For
purposes of diplomatic interlocution, the two may be equally
important.


16. (C) Medina Baye Niassenes try to channel all contacts
with the U.S. through Northwestern University-educated Cheikh
Assane Cisse, to the point that Cisse has become known in
some circles as "America's marabout." When we made an
impromptu call on the ageing Khalif, for example, he received
us courteously but made a point of putting us on the phone to
Cisse in Dakar. Politically, the Medina Bayes dominate
Kaolack though they are torn between Wade-loyalist Mayor
Ahmed Khalifa Niasse and Idrissa Seck ally Mamoune Niasse
with, also, some fans of opposition co-leader and distant
cousin Moustapha Niasse.


17. (S) Both Niassene branches are heavily involved, on
behalf of Tidjania, in the Sahel, West Africa and above all
in Nigeria. To get a better idea of the nature of these
activities, we called July 13 in Dakar on Ibrahima Mahmoud
Diop, leader of the League of Moroccan and Senegalese Imams
and Oulemas. Sitting below portraits of Wade and Mohammed
VI, and of himself with Hassan II, Diop described his
activities in the Sudan, Chad, Niger and, especially, in the
Kano region of Nigeria, where he says his open-air speeches
have drawn massive crowds despite resistance of local Q'adria
or Senussi religious leaders. He said Niasse family
daughters often marry Sahelian or Nigerian religious notables
in order to sink deeper roots. Everywhere in West Africa, he
claimed, with the "puzzling" exception of Guinea, Tidjania is
expanding. When we asked whether this expansion would bring
further fractionalization, he agreed it would. Autonomy,
though, he argued, is at the heart of Tidjane philosophy: it
does not really matter which marabout a believer may follow,
since a marabout is after all only a "mukhadem," or
transmitter of knowledge, and fidelity and allegiance are

DAKAR 00001721 004.2 OF 005


owed only to the Prophet and Tidjania's founders.

... AND DOWNTOWN
--------------

18. (C) While the Medina Baye khalif's palace is a large and
comfortable affair, the Leonas headquarters is a bare and
spartan school with a hint of flies. Given their relative
impecuniousness and minority status, the Leonas Niassenes
would not be a political factor, except that their members
include Sidi Lamine Niasse, owner of the influential radio
and newspaper company Walfadjri Group, and his
political/diplomatic gadfly brother, another Ahmed Khalifa
Niasse. Sidi Lamine has been trying recently to bring the
two neighborhoods together, presumably to avoid a total
rupture, increase Niassene weight within the Tidjane
community, and coordinate West African activities.


19. (S) There is no question Sidi Lamine could be a valuable
interlocutors, but there are problems: 1) he has a history
of well-informed, articulate and wide-ranging opposition to
U.S. Middle East policies, and, 2) despite youthful media
rabblerousing, ownership of one of the liveliest and most
outspoken dailies, and December 2005 denunciation of official
pressure on a Sud-FM reporter in the Casamance (Ref G),he is
said to have been politically domesticated. Critics allege
he has become so eager to protect business and other personal
interests from governmental restrictions, that he has tamely
accepted Wade's co-optation and thereby lost credibility.

NON-ALIGNED TIDJANIA: DAKAR'S ISLAMIC INSTITUTE
-------------- --

20. (SBU) Dakar's Islamic Institute and to a lesser extent
the Education Ministry,s Arabic language department contain
some intellectuals of standing, though they are essentially
civil servants. The current director, as we understand it,
was hired because he is a leading theologian, but also
because he was seen as well poised to bridge the gaps between
Tivouane and Kaolack and between Tidjanes and Mourides.

WHO'S GOT IT?/WHO'S WITH US?
--------------

21. (S) As this review of the Tidjane theological,
intellectual and political leaders shows, there are very few
with status or, we believe, potential willingness to run
risks of mediating with Wade on behalf of fair elections.
Further, many marabouts have already chosen a political camp,
are being offered money to do so, or prefer to back the
status quo as the best guarantee of freedom from government
interference.


22. (S) Probably the single most influential Tidjane leader,
with an added plus of having backed Wade in 1993 (though he
remained neutral in 2000),is khalifal contender Cheikh
Tidjane Sy. He is especially potent since his son, Moustapha
Sy, is moral (meaning operational) leader of the radical
Moustarchines' estimated following of 300,000. Unfortunately
for our purposes, though, Cheikh Tidjane Sy distrusts the
U.S. and often denounces U.S. policies, and it is difficult
to imagine him joining us readily as intermediary on behalf
of free elections. He is politically significant and should
not be ignored, but neither could he figure at the center of
U.S. encouragement of free elections.


23. (S) Abdoul Aziz Sy Junior, Cheikh Tidjane Sy's younger
brother and rival for the khalifate, is probably Senegal's
best-known moderate marabout. Junior has most of the
qualities -- charisma, eloquence, determination, energy,
commitment and friendship or working ties with other Tidjane
leaders -- needed to campaign on behalf of democratic
procedures. Indeed, he is already doing so, though
especially on behalf of Tidjanes faced with what he sees as
Wade's favoritism toward Mourides. We could certainly
encourage Junior to continue his pro-democracy work, but it
is hard to imagine that our intervention with him could
result in his doing much more than he does at present. There
are few or no others in the Tivaouane branch who could match
his abilities. As for a retired military officer's offer to
help us enlist the Tall family on behalf of peaceful
elections (para 12),we need some time for reflection.


24. (S) Among the Niassene Tidjanes of Kaolack, it has been
suggested that Assane Cisse could make a greater effort on
behalf of democratic governance. Certainly, he is close
enough to the U.S. to react positively if we asked him to
intercede with Wade and the PDS. We do not know, however,
how much influence he actually has. This is especially true
since the Medina Baye neighborhood of which he is a part has

DAKAR 00001721 005.2 OF 005


been split between Wade loyalists like the mayor and
advocates of a third political force like Mamoune Niasse.


25. (S) Turning to the other Kaolack neighborhood, Leonas,
we identified Walfadjri Group owner Sidi Lamine Niasse as a
critical thinker willing to allow a broad scope of criticism
in his media. In younger days he was quite the scourge of
the political and religious establishments, as well as a
severe critic of U.S. policies in the Middle East. We do not
know, though, despite recent aggressive defense of press
freedom, how much independence he has managed to retain in
recent years, and there is talk that he, like his venal
one-time-radical brother, has been co-opted lock and barrel
by Wade. Sidi Lamine might be interested in a ferocious
defense of democracy, but it is uncertain if he still has the
stomach for it.
JACOBS