IS SENEGAL'S DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS AT RISK?

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001427

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR SG
SUBJECT: IS SENEGAL'S DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS AT RISK?

REF: A)DAKAR 1149; B)DAKAR 1011; C)DAKAR 0817;
D)DAKAR 0681; E)DAKAR 0565; F)05 DAKAR 1243

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROY L. WHITAKER, FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (SBU) There is deep-rooted Senegalese consensus in
favor of freedom of expression, rule of law, respect of
national institutions, conformity to parliamentary or
executive rules or custom, civilian control of security
forces, the desirability of dialog between authorities
and opposition, and an expectation that leaders will
respond to public needs. The 2000 election proved the
value of the democratic consensus, showing voters that
failed leaders could be replaced by ballot without threat
to public order.


2. (C) President Wade, in disdaining the French-
bequeathed bureaucratic system and reliance on inter-
institutional arrangements for a more flexible and
egocentric style, has called elements of the democratic
consensus into question. We are not by any means
convinced he lacks commitment to democratic rule or free
elections. Still, we review below what constitutes
Senegalese democracy, examine growing concerns that it
could be at some risk, and explore ways the U.S. could
help assure fair elections in 2007. END SUMMARY

AN IMPERFECT AFRICAN DEMOCRACY
--------------

3. (C) Senegalese have never accepted an all-powerful
and all-consuming "big man" as leader. Founding
President Leopold Senghor, as much French Catholic as he
was African, combined his Independence movement with
French colonial institutions to establish a severely-
curtailed but effective democracy. Citizens of 1960s and
1970s Senegal could rally, speak out and criticize even
the president, though their power to challenge the de
facto single-party government was limited by Socialist
control of the media; close links between state,
religious leaders and traditional chiefs; and legal
restrictions on the Left and other political parties.


4. (C) In this real but limited democracy, the National
Assembly was free to debate but expected to approve any
bill Senghor sent it. The single legal labor union was
incorporated in the state. Rules of law and
institutional predictability were respected, though as
time went on a measure of corruption was allowed to
grease the wheels. The army was well paid and under
civilian control, though Senghor used it sometimes
politically, as when he ordered enlistment of unruly
Marxists. Police and gendarmes were republican
institutions, but Senghor also had young loyalist toughs
whom he could use for rare instances when an arm had to
be twisted.


5. (C) Within the one-party democracy, factions or
inchoate interest groups championed their region,
ethnicity or religion and the energetic and to-politics-
born Senghor networked closely with them all. In 1974,
he allowed Wade to lead the first loyal opposition,
though he identified whenever Wade surpassed proper
bounds and quickly acted by law or rougher methods to
limit Wade's room to maneuver.


6. (C) The underlying rules of one-party democracy
remained intact even as Senghor's system declined in
efficiency and decayed in public confidence under his
more lethargic and less astute successor Abdou Diouf
(1980-2000). The rules reinforced the predictable
performance of national institutions. Combined with
occasional electoral chicanery, they also permitted
exercise of democratic rights while ultimately denying
the opposition any real chance during either the campaign
or the vote count.


7. (C) Until 2000, Senegalese may have seen elections
as a form of the idle conversation they love so much --
pleasant and often exhilarating but without consequences.
Only in 2000 did they realize their vote let them hold
leaders accountable and replace them. It was a
psychological boost, one we hear voters will not
relinquish lightly.

2000: WADE'S COALITION EXPECTED TO PLAY BY THE RULES
-------------- --------------

8. (C) A deep, massive, widespread, decade-long
revulsion against Socialist-led economic decline,

DAKAR 00001427 002 OF 003


combined with an unprecedented coalition of Wade's PDS
plus the Left and a significant rebel Socialist faction,
allowed Wade to hold the Socialists under 50 percent in
the first-round 2000 presidential election. This
shattered the Socialist aura of invincibility and paved
the way for a rout in the second round. Once elected,
Wade's allies expected Wade to enact new policies, but
they also expected him to play by old rules.


9. (C) Wade had other ideas. His enforcer Idrissa Seck
replaced Wade coalition allies with Socialist turncoats
who from the moment of defection would owe their futures
to Wade. Seck overreached and was sidelined, but not
before strengthening the already extensive powers of the
presidency and removing from government those with
political weight to influence Wade's decisions. Wade's
decisions since have often seemed whimsical, self-serving
or even an outright challenge to the democratic
consensus, as in his widely-resented late 2004 decision
to allow Parliament to pass a bill pardoning political
crimes.

CLEVER, DASTARDLY OR DOWNRIGHT SUBVERSIVE?
--------------

10. (C) Dakarois avidly consume news, and private radio
has made political junkies of illiterates, isolated
farmers and grassland herdsmen. As far as we can tell,
most agree Wade is manipulating the pre-campaign. Some
praise him as a canny politician committing allowable
mischief, while others deplore alleged misuse of
republican institutions and violation of the democratic
consensus.


11. (C) We have heard Senegalese deconstruct and re-
imagine worst-case political analyses for hours. Some
popular assumptions are:

-- there is deep rural disappointment with Wade;

-- Wade may not be able to count on the youth or urban
poor support he had in 2000;

-- the Interior Ministry may be suppressing voter
registration in rural areas where Wade is weak, and
encouraging it in cities where he is strong;

-- Wade prolonged MPs' mandates and coupled National
Assembly and presidential elections so that his presumed
coat-tails would help him win parliament. (Almost surely
true. Critics charge prolongation of MP terms was not
constitutional, but the law allowing it was passed in due
form by Wade's parliamentary majority.)

-- despite coupling of elections and allegedly biased
registration, both opposition and PDS largely agree the
PDS may/may lose parliamentary elections. (To compensate,
Wade has indicated he may increase the overall number of
MPs, and especially those chosen on the national list,
which he can more easily influence);

-- to avoid cohabitation with an opposition parliament
or loss of the presidential election, many think Wade
will postpone or cancel elections, unilaterally or in
cahoots with the opposition (Ref A);

-- ultimately, some fear Wade and his cronies -- if he
actually holds free elections and loses them -- will use
force, either friends in the police and gendarmerie or
youthful thugs, to hold onto power (Ref D).

U.S. LEVERAGE AND FREE ELECTIONS
--------------

12. (C) Nine months before elections, we agree Wade is
hiding, obscuring or obfuscating his intentions, but that
may fall, just barely, within the realm of acceptable
albeit dirty-trick-flavored politics. We are encouraged
that media, labor unions, NGOs and some religious leaders
have joined the opposition in insisting that coming
elections be as free as in 2000. This proves again how
deeply the democratic consensus is entrenched. Wade's
less scrupulous hangers-on, including some in powerful
ministries, may want to preserve privileges of power at
all cost. Wade, though, has spoken often, widely and
persuasively of his commitment to democracy.


13. (S) To help Wade act on his best instincts and
ensure free, fair and transparent elections, we have
identified ways in which the U.S. might best make its
voice heard. Each measure has advantages and
disadvantages, which we have also tried to define:


DAKAR 00001427 003 OF 003


-- The most powerful leverage we have is Wade's deep
appreciation of Senegal's ties to America, and above all
his warm relationship with President Bush. We would want
to use such leverage only in an extreme situation, such
as postponement or cancellation of elections. In such
case, a statement from President Bush (or Secretary Rice)
encouraging Wade's commitment to hold free elections
would intensify pressure on Wade to actually do so.
There would be a negative side, though. Wade would
splash the U.S. message across the media, and this would
be seen as an endorsement. This in turn would provoke
two criticisms: that the U.S. was naive about Wade's
intentions; and that its intervention, no matter how
well-meant, was reinforcing rather than correcting Wade's
supposed manipulations.

-- Wade expects signature of an MCA compact before the
elections to show U.S. support for his economic programs,
as Foreign Minister Gadio recently indicated to the
Secretary. Assuming technical progress permits signing

SIPDIS
of a compact before the elections, the signing ceremony
could be used to stress the need for transparency. Wade
would also exploit such a statement, though, and critics
will in any case denounce any signing ceremony that takes
place during the campaign. If greater pressure were
required, scheduling could be subject to review of U.S.
and other observers' evaluation of progress toward free
elections.

-- The forms of pressure which we would at present
prefer include: visits at the Assistant Secretary level
(which again could be seen as U.S. favoritism to Wade);
messages from the Assistant Secretary to Foreign Minister
Gadio; an expanded series of speakers on democratic
procedures and values; or aid to those with specific
criteria for judging the electoral process' integrity
(for example a manual for election observers being
prepared by Law Professor Mamadou Kamara). We could also
help, through our Public Affairs Section, to provide
greater visibility to civil society NGOs we are aiding to
strengthen democracy and good governance.


14. (C) Other ideas come to mind:

-- We could announce that we would send election
observers to Senegal, but that would be essentially
meaningless, since any manipulation will come during the
registration process or in parliamentary-approved changes
to institutions such as an increase in the number of MPs.

-- Any suggestion that we might reduce aid would have all
the diplomatic delicacy of a sledgehammer with a double-
long handle. Doing so would put into question all that
the donor community are achieving in reduction of poverty
and the Casamance peace process, not to mention U.S.-
Senegalese cooperation in peacekeeping.

-- In past Senegalese elections, the National Democratic
Institute has helped in the registration of voters. Such
a program would require approximately a nine-month lead-
time, though, and there is currently no funding
available.


15. (C) The best tack to take for now, we believe,
continues to be normal if intensified expression of
interest in free elections, combined with continued close
monitoring of election mechanisms and the campaign.

Jacobs