THERE'S TALK OF ANOTHER ELECTION POSTPONEMENT, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001149 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/PHD AND INR/AA PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2011 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS PINR SG SUBJECT: THERE'S TALK OF ANOTHER ELECTION POSTPONEMENT, BUT WADE PRESSES AHEAD WITH PREPARATIONS REF: A. DAKAR 1011 ¶B. DAKAR 0817 ¶C. DAKAR 0681 ¶D. DAKAR 0565 ¶E. 05 DAKAR 1563 Classified By: Political Counselor Roy L. Whitaker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Some in the ruling Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) say poor logistics will require technical postponement of the February presidential and parliamentary elections to June 2007, past expiration of Wade's constitutional term. We have told them we would find that unacceptable. The opposition may propose Wade stay in office until 2009 in return for a national unity cabinet and guarantees of a transparent election. Wade, meanwhile, appears intent on engineering electoral victory: he is micromanaging PDS factional spats and would defy tradition by giving the security forces the vote. Ex-Prime Minister and presidential candidate Idrissa Seck has become all but invisible. END SUMMARY. DARNED NEWFANGLED ELECTION TECHNOLOGY! -------------- ¶2. (C) We have reported (Refs A and B) that a new computerized system to register voters has not worked well in rural areas. As of early May, the national election commission did not have enough computers nor vehicles to send them to remote villages, while electricity shortages and lack of portable generators made the few available computers unusable. Election commission consultant Mouhamadou MBodj assured us May 10, though, that sufficient equipment and transport had been found, were now en route to rural constituencies, and should allow widespread registration before a new extended deadline of August 30. ¶3. (C) On May 11, Senegalese Radio and Television (RTS) Administrative Director Mouhamadou Moutapha Dieng, who is close to Interior Minister Ousmane NGom, said it was "logistically impossible" to complete election preparations by the end of Wade's presidential term in February. A technical postponement of up to four months was necessary, with elections likely just before late June's heavy rains. We expressed surprise because on May 3 NGom had told the Ambassador that preparations were going well, with over 3.5 million voters registered nationwide and over 1.5 million registered in the greater Dakar area. NGom added that 600,000 new biometric identity and voter registration cards had already been distributed. On May 12, we saw Dieng again to voice strong concern about any delay beyond Wade's mandate. AVIAN INFURIATION: THE OPPOSITION AND WADE'S FALCONS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The opposition coalition was recently expanded, and now includes ex-Socialist spokesman and Parliamentary Chair Abdourahim Agne. Agne, arrested in 2005 for calling people into the streets to remove Wade from power (Ref E),told us over lunch the opposition feared Wade would "do anything" including use violence to remain in power. Even if Wade were reluctant, Agne said, hard-line "falcons" Justice Minister Sheikh Tidjane Sy, Interior Minister NGom and Wade's palace staff would press to use strong-arm measures. Since it was unclear whether Wade would allow elections in 2007, and to avert violent confrontation, the opposition was preparing to respond to Wade's repeated calls for a national dialog and to offer him a deal. ¶5. (C) Calling Wade old and tired, Agne said he did not really wish to stay in power another five years. Rather, all he wanted was to complete the large-scale construction projects he has just begun, and, if Arab capitals allow it, hold a Dakar summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conferences. Agne says the opposition will thus propose a deal allowing Wade to stay in office until 2009, and giving him and his family immunity from prosecution. In return, Wade would bring senior members of opposition into his cabinet, with firmer guarantees of authority than he gave them in 2000. This national unity government would then establish transparent election ground rules. ¶6. (C) Sensing that Agne's proposed deal with Wade was his own initiative, we checked it out with Ibrahima Sene, a major labor movement figure and ally of Independent Labor Party leader and key opposition strategist Amath Dansokho. Sene agrees the falcons will not leave power readily and will push Wade to postpone and in effect cancel 2007 elections. Wade will need a major pretext for doing so, one based on major DAKAR 00001149 002 OF 003 social instability. Sene thinks there are three situations Wade will try to turn into such a pretext: renewed fighting in the Casamance or the possibility of ethnic violence either by Northern River Valley Toucouleur against resettled Casamancais rebels, or by southern Peuhl against in-migrating Mouride Baye Fall peanut farmers. A deal may well be necessary to ease Wade out of the presidency, Sene assumes, though he thinks a referendum may be necessary to legitimize it. ¶7. (C) We have not yet been able to determine if major opposition players Moustapha Niasse and the Socialists are on board with any deal to prolong Wade's term. For the moment, they appear preoccupied with another question: whether MP's should leave the National Assembly on June 30, as they believe the Constitution mandates, or remain until parliamentary elections postponed from May 2005 are finally held. WADE APPEARS TO BE PREPARING HIS CAMPAIGN -------------- ¶8. (C) While his underlings and foes may be thinking of putting elections off, Wade appears to be tweaking and twisting law, custom and ruling Democratic Party of Senegal (PDS) machinery to assure an effective campaign for 2007. ¶9. (C) We have reported on the PDS' sometimes almost kaleidoscopic factionalization (20 internal "tendencies" in one region alone). Prime Minister Macky Sall began in late 2005 to curb faction power and autonomy and restructure the party, but he failed openly in Saint Louis and managed at best elsewhere to paper over differences. Wade has now dismissed and reversed Sall's efforts and asked him instead to preside over a commission that will share posts among "longtime militants, ... local notables, ... and new militants from other parties." In a show of not totally forlorn hope, though, Wade will allow his Prime Minister to "pursue party renewal in all institutions where consensus exists." ¶10. (C) At the same time, Wade is proposing to broaden the vote by allowing the army, gendarmerie and police to vote. This is a break from Senegalese (and French colonial) tradition, and has predictably been roundly criticized by the opposition. Wade probably predicts gendarmerie, police and army officer corps will vote heavily for him, though this is not certain, and some argue army enlistees will mirror the population-at-large's multi-party diversity. ¶11. (SBU) In what may be a trial balloon, Wade has allowed friendly media to speculate he will hold two electoral rounds, but that the second round will include four rather than two candidates. Some call this absurd and a patent attempt to divide his key rivals' vote, and ask for any examples of multiple candidate run-off elections elsewhere. WADE'S NEMESIS SECK MAY TELECOMMUTE THE CAMPAIGN -------------- --- ¶12. (C) Ex-Prime Miniter Idrissa Seck began his insurgent campaign well with an enthusiastic early April turnout in Kaolack. Things have not gone as smoothly since. Saying he is still in the PDS, Seck rejected the calls by Kaolack religious leader Mamoune Niasse to form a "third force." Another potential ally, youth leader Talla Sylla, signaled to us that he now intends to contest the election independently. Finally, Seck cancelled a trip to Saint Louis, home to several bitter PDS enemies, over concerns about threats to his personal security. MP Awa Gueye Kebe told us Seck's bodyguard was not enough; the gendarmerie was unwilling to give effective protection; but Seck rejected her strong recommendation to set up a personal militia. Instead, she said, Seck may run his campaign from home or headquarters via private radio and travel by surrogates. The strategy would be to hold back, avoid being arrested and imprisoned again, and mount a dramatic and decisive January campaign. ¶13. (C) There are signs he still hopes to reconcile with Wade. His elder cousin, Alioune Badara Niang, torn between family obligation to protect Idrissa and deep fealty to the old friend and President whose watercolor image he displays reverentially on his living room wall, is trying to bring the two together. Niang, after looking at informal polls, sees deep discontent with Wade but thinks Socialists are still widely despised and the opposition coalition bereft of a good candidate. He concludes Seck will finish first or second in the first round and Wade third, at which point he will persuade Wade to rein in the falcons and back Seck for president. Seck, in return, would grant Wade and his family members immunity from prosecution and allow him to retire in DAKAR 00001149 003 OF 003 dignity. MARABOUT FEARS OF VIOLENCE -------------- ¶14. (C) The Tidjane Brotherhood has long been critical of Wade's closeness to the rival Mourides. They are also increasingly fearful of social or political violence. Within the last weeks, an influential Tidjane politician told us, Tidjane spokesman Abdou Aziz Sy Junior urged the Mouride Khalif in Touba to dissuade Wade from taking any provocative political measures. The Mouride Khalif replied that he "didn't follow politics all that closely," but of course would do anything to encourage social peace. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Many Senegalese are certain Wade, and especially the hard-line and allegedly violence-prone "falcons" around him "will do anything" to retain power. At the same time, and somewhat inconsistently, some believe he seeks to stay in office only long enough to leave public works projects as his legacy; assure legal preconditions he and his family need to retire in comfort and dignity; and, perhaps, to host an Islamic summit in Dakar. To avoid violence and yet assure Wade does not serve an entire second term, some in the opposition want to offer him extension of his time in office until 2009 and immunity from prosecution, in return for a national unity government and guarantees of transparency when elections are finally held. ¶16. (C) Unfortunately, the deal the opposition may offer would mean further manipulation of the Constitution and national political consensus. In late 2004, the PDS-dominated Parliament passed a law amnestying political crimes. Last year, Wade determined parliament should stay in office beyond its constitutionally described term. Wade's retention of power for another two years, even if approved by referendum, would be a step back from the successful 2000 election, when a government that had been in power for 40 years opted to accept rejection in a free and fair election. END COMMENT. ¶17. (U) Visit Embassy Dakar's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/dakar/. JACOBS