UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAKAR 001005

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/PHD AND INR/AA
ACCRA ALSO FOR WARP
GENEVA FOR RMA
LISBON ALSO FOR DAO
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS PINS PGOV PREL PU SG
SUBJECT: CASAMANCE: CHIEF REBEL STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED

REF: DAKAR 1004

DAKAR 00001005 001.4 OF 002


SUMMARY
--------------

1. (SBU) Beginning in mid-March the Bissau-Guinean
military lent a helping hand to Senegal, putting into
execution its threat to cleanse the border area of
Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC)
recalcitrant Salif Sadio and his supporters. Bissau-
Guinean troops have succeeded in purging villages that
harbored Sadio's men, his supporters and their families
both east and west areas of Sao Domingos, Guinea-Bissau.
It is not clear, however, how much Sadio has been weakened
by this operation. He has redeployed to regain positions
he was forced to abandon in the Sindian area of the
northern Casamance near The Gambia. Casamancais are
frustrated by the situation of "no war, no peace" but the
move to attack Sadio, with extensive media coverage, has
not provided the boost to the peace process that the GOS
and GOGB had anticipated. END SUMMARY.

IMPACT OF BISSAU-GUINEAN INTERVENTION LIMITED
--------------

2. (SBU) General Baptista Tagme na Waie, the Chief of
Staff of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces, announced two
months ago to Senegalese negotiators in the Casamance
peace process that removing Sadio as an element of the
Casamance puzzle is the only way to find a solution.
Guinea-Bissau deployed hundreds of soldiers and shelled
Sadio's main positions located in the forests near the
border, east and west of Sao Domingos at Baraca Mandioca,
Bazere, Koumere, Kassou and four other locations. An
Embassy contact indicated that Sadio's counter-attack
against Sao Domingos was launched by his elite troops in
Bazere (north-east of Sao Domingos), and it is those
troops who mined the road from Sao Domingos to Varela,
where a Bissau-Guinean passenger vehicle was destroyed by
a land mine with 11 deaths. It seems that the Bissau-
Guinean attacks have deprived Sadio of his safe havens in

Guinea-Bissau. However, the intervention seems to have
realigned forces.

RADICAL TROOPS RECONQUER OLD POSITIONS
--------------

3. (SBU) To avoid a concentration of troops under Bissau-
Guinean attack, Sadio's men fled to the Sindian area,
north of Ziguinchor. During the weekend of April 23, they
attacked a Senegalese army position in Nyassia, to make
sure that these soldiers would not move while their men
were crossing towards the north to escape the Bissau-
Guinean forces. A few months ago, Sadio's commanders had
been driven from the same area by younger leaders who were
more open to the peace process, but it seems the Bissau-
Guinean attack may have enhanced MFDC solidarity around
Sadio, whose men have recaptured the MFDC bases of
Kadialouck, Tambaf and Petit Banlandine in the Sindian
area. On April 25, an Embassy source indicated there were
exchanges of fire in the area and it is probable that
Sadio's men have captured the fourth MFDC base at
Keurounor.

CIVILIANS ARE CONCERNED
--------------

4. (SBU) So far there is no movement of refugees or IDPS
except those noted previously in Guinea-Bissau and
Ziguinchor. As long as the fighting is limited to
factions within the rebellion, most Casamancais villagers
appear to have confidence that traditional mechanisms will
work to regulate the conflict. Their main fear is a
return of the Senegalese army, which would entail villages
being caught between two sides and conflict of allegiances
between the nation and the ethnic group.

COMMENT
--------------

5. (SBU) The intervention of Bissau-Guinean troops with
the blessing of Senegalese authorities has not resulted in
the surgical operation to extirpate Sadio that was
anticipated. It has, however, driven enemy rebel forces
back to the Sindian area. There is a potential danger
that if they fail to lay aside their arms, the Senegalese
military may be forced to return to the area to restore
law and order. To avoid such escalation, there is a move

DAKAR 00001005 002 OF 002


among Casamance leaders close to Sadio to push for a
return to the step-by-step approach to peace that allowed
the area to remain stable for the last three years.


6. (SBU) Embassy notes that the GOS's continuing failure
to provide regular, reliable air service from Dakar to
Ziguinchor or Cap Skirring has also fanned Casamance anger
and renewed allegations that President Wade and his
government do not care about the Casamance. Recent
violence in the area may yet bring Senegalese authorities
to focus more on the Casamance, despite their preparation
for 2007 elections. END COMMENT.

JACOBS