Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO933
2006-06-05 07:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000933 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION ON TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND SECURITY FORCE
CONDUCT


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION ON TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND SECURITY FORCE
CONDUCT


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary: Following his participation in the
May 30 meeting of the Sri Lankan Donor Co-Chairs (US,
EU, Norway, and Japan) in Tokyo, Assistant Secretary
for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher
underscored the messages from the Tokyo Co-Chairs
statement during a May 31 trip to Colombo, when he met
with Tamil civil society representatives, Sri Lankan
government officials, and the leader of the main
opposition party. Tamil interlocutors from across the
political spectrum expressed their community's sense
of disenfranchisement, while Government representatives
put an optimistic spin on current government efforts to
bridge the ethnic divide. Sri Lankan government officials
seemed unaware of the depth of Tamil grievances, and
rather focused on building government consensus for a
settlement proposal through an All-Party Conference.
While building consensus will be a necessary step in any
final solution, we are unconvinced that the players
are ready to put aside political power plays in the
interest of a larger national interest like peace.
End summary.

--------------
TAMIL COMMUNITY VIEWS:
DISENFRANCHISEMENT; DISTRUST
--------------


2. (C) After participating in the May 30 meeting of
the Co-Chairs donor group (US, EU, Norway, and Japan)
in Tokyo, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian
Affairs Richard Boucher visited Colombo May 31 and met
with Tamil civil society representatives, President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister Mangala
Samaraweera, and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Boucher's visit came on the heels of the Co-Chairs'
public statement calling on the Government of Sri Lanka
and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to carry out
their commitments agreed to at talks in Geneva in February,
urging the Tigers to refrain from violence, and encouraging
the Government to improve human rights protections for Tamils
and develop a proposal for a political settlement. A/S
Boucher underscored these points in a speech to the
American Chamber of Commerce and during press events.


3. (C) During a meeting with Tamil civil society
representatives, A/S Boucher met with: Deputy
Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Kethesh

SIPDIS
Loganathan; Center for Policy Alternatives Director
Dr. Paikaisothy Saravanamuttu; attorney and media-
owner Kumar Nadesan; Director of the Nilan
Thiruchelvan Trust Patrick Cananasingham; Director of

the Point Pedro Institute Dr. Muttukrishna
Sarvananthan; and Eastern University Professor T.
Jeyasingham. Loganathan approved of the Co-Chairs'
statement, noting that it addressed Tamil grievances
and the need to hold the government accountable for
violent acts committed in territories it controls. He
also appreciated that the statement did not place the
Government and the Tigers on a level moral platform.


4. (C) Each of the speakers expounded on Tamil
distrust of the Government and the draw of the Tigers
as an alternative. Referring to Sri Lankan Government
failures to investigate crimes against Tamils,
Saravanamuttu said, "Lack of transparency in human
rights violations and the alleged complicity of the
security forces in some of these violations erodes the
confidence of the Tamil community." Jeyasingham
encapsulated the views of the average Tamil civilian:
"The State owes me more than the Tamil Tigers. The
State has to protect me and show it cares about me.

COLOMBO 00000933 002 OF 004


When the State fails, what can you do? You tend to
get oriented toward the Tigers."


5. (C) Despite the obvious challenges in finding a
long-term solution, Loganathan and Saravanamuttu felt
the Government could take immediate steps to build
confidence among the Tamil community. In particular
they suggested an improved language policy and the
prompt, transparent investigation of abuse
allegations.

--------------
THE GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE:
CURRENT EFFORTS ADEQUATE
--------------


6. (C) During a meeting with Foreign Minister Mangala
Samaraweera, A/S Boucher urged the Government to
address violence by the Karuna faction (a Tiger
splinter group that broke with the Tigers in 2004) and
killings in Tamil areas. Responding to assertions that
Karuna operates with government knowledge and possible
consent, Samaraweera said such behavior was
antithetical to Government interests since the GSL
does not want to provoke the LTTE into war. He noted
that Karuna's actions have occasionally scuttled
instances when the government is "bending over
backwards" for a peaceful resolution. Samaraweera
also posited that most allegations of Government human
rights violations are exaggerated.


7. (C) In a separate meeting with Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaksa, A/S Boucher, emphasized the
Government's obligation to carry out its commitments
from the February Geneva talks, not just by limiting
Karuna's activities, but also by investigating
killings. A/S Boucher noted there had been questions
surrounding civilian control over the security
services. Rajapaksa responded, "Our army is
disciplined," going on to add that he sent special
investigative teams to examine abuse allegations. In
the case of the murder of five students in Trincomalee
last January, Rajapaksa said Special Task Force
members who had been arrested remain in custody
despite ballistic tests on their weapons failing to
match to the crime scene. He said he has asked Tamil
parliamentarians to solicit witnesses who may be able
to build a case against the detainees. Rajapaksa noted
that unlike the Tamil Tigers, he cannot use summary
justice, and he faces criticism both for violent
incidents and the Government's law enforcement
responses in trying to bring perpetrators to justice.


8. (C) A/S Boucher told Rajapaksa there is a need for
outreach to the Tamil community in terms of language
policy and employment and to invest in the north and
east. Rajapaksa answered that the Government of Sri
Lanka has started that process by offering concessions
for companies that invest in Jaffna and by attempting
to attract foreign direct investment for the north and
east. He mentioned the World Bank had agreed to a
Government request to fund a toll-free highway in the
north. Ambassador Lunstead noted that Tamils outside
the north and east also needed signals of government
concern and redress for disenfranchisement. "They're
not satisfied?" Rajapaksa queried, genuinely surprised
and puzzled. He mentioned the anti-Tiger Eelam
People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Ceylon
Workers' Congress (CWC) as additional forums for
Tamils. The Ambassador explained that those parties,
along with the Tiger-backed Tamil National Alliance
(TNA),failed to give a voice to the average Tamil.
Rajapaksa then suggested the opposition United
National Party (UNP) or his own Sri Lanka Freedom

COLOMBO 00000933 003 OF 004


Party (SLFP) as alternatives.

--------------
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S ROLE
--------------


9. (C) Regarding the recent listing of the Tamil
Tigers as a terrorist organization by the EU, Foreign
Minister Samaraweera expressed hope that the action
would compel the Tigers to return to the negotiating
table. He reiterated the Government's stance against
a return to war, noting despite numerous provocations,
the government remained steadfast about resolving
problems at the negotiating table. Samaraweera viewed
the EU listing as a positive step toward curbing Tiger
fundraising, stopping money laundering, and limiting
arms trade. A/S Boucher stressed that closer
cooperation and information sharing between
governments could help stop illicit Tiger activities,
and the Co-Chairs could foster this type of
cooperation by forming working groups with other
concerned governments. Samaraweera welcomed the idea
and noted that he had recently emphasized closer
cooperation on this issue with his Asian counterparts.
A/S Boucher also highlighted the benefits of the EU
designation and the need for regional cooperation when
he later met with President Rajapaksa.

--------------
DEVOLUTION AS A SOLUTION?
TAMIL DISTRUST, ALL-PARTY TALKS
--------------


10. (C) When A/S Boucher's discussion with Tamil civil
society representatives turned to possible solutions,
Peace Secretariat Deputy Secretary-General Loganathan
cited the Tamil Tigers' claim to be the sole
representative of the Tamil people as a primary
hindrance to the Government's ability to address the
Tamil issue. He noted, "Clearly there is a
distinction between Tiger and Tamil interests. The
catch-22 and failing of the Government is that it
doesn't recognize the Tigers as representatives, but
is not wiling to come out with a package for
devolution for Tamils without the Tigers."
Jeyasingham noted that Tamils don't believe the
Government is willing to implement a devolution of
power. "Federalism, unfortunately, is a taboo word
for the Southern constituency," Saravanamuttu
concurred. Cananasigham added, "If the government
would present a roadmap to devolution, most Tamils
would support it, but no one has done it."


11. (C) In the meeting with Foreign Minister
Samaraweera, A/S Boucher said a more detailed
government plan for maximum devolution would help
address concerns by Tamil groups. Samaraweera
responded that any agreement would need consensus
among the Southern parties. Samaraweera expressed
hope that an All Party Conference (scheduled for June
2) could help produce an official plan for maximum
devolution shortly. President Rajapaksa later echoed
that view, noting that Sri Lankans demand a voice in
the consultative process. Rajapaksa said he intended
to appoint a Consultative Committee of legal and
constitutional experts to develop a proposed political
settlement. This would allow the Government to
discuss a long-term solution with the Tigers. "I have
my own ideas," Rajapaksa said, but "I am willing to
change them" if the Committee agrees on something
else.


12. (C) A/S Boucher also discussed devolution in a
meeting with opposition United National Party (UNP)

COLOMBO 00000933 004 OF 004


leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and former Sri Lankan
Ambassador to the U.S., Devinda Subasinghe.
Wickremesinghe said that maximum devolution, as
supported by President Rajapaksa, is enshrined in the
thirteenth amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution,
which grants provincial councils certain authorities.
He said the amendment, subject to repeal by Parliament,
could never placate the Tigers. Federalism, on the
other hand, he noted, would grant some sovereignty
to regional legislatures and provide powers not subject
to the whim of members of the national parliament.
According to Wickremesinghe, federalism was the only
solution palatable to the Tigers. He said that if the
Sri Lankan government chose to pursue that path, it
could begin with the Parliamentary Select Committee
proposals regarding federalism first proposed in 2000.


13. (C) Wickremesinghe added that his party plans to
attend the June 2 All Party Conference but stated that
his party's position would be that the Government
should affirm its adherence to the Oslo Declaration of
December 2002, which said that both sides agreed to
"explore a federal solution within a united Sri
Lanka." A/S Boucher asked whether the United National
Party actually wanted to see consensus, or,
considering the Marxist, Sinhalese nationalist Janathi
Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP's) strong opposition to
devolution, whether Wickremesinghe really intended
"just (to) play politics" and watch the Government
flounder. Wickremesinghe responded that he would try
"to get something the government can support. That's
also politics."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) Comment: A/S Boucher's visit provided another
opportunity for the U.S. to deliver a "tough love"
message to the Government: we're with you in your
struggle against terrorism, but concrete steps must
occur on security force conduct and in putting forth a
political vision that gives hope to Tamils and
Muslims.


15. (U) A/S Boucher cleared this cable.

LUNSTEAD
LUNSTEAD

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