Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06COLOMBO933
2006-06-05 07:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000933 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION ON TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND SECURITY FORCE
CONDUCT


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CE SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER TALKS TOUGH ON TIGERS BUT PRESSES FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION ON TAMIL GRIEVANCES AND SECURITY FORCE CONDUCT Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Following his participation in the May 30 meeting of the Sri Lankan Donor Co-Chairs (US, EU, Norway, and Japan) in Tokyo, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher underscored the messages from the Tokyo Co-Chairs statement during a May 31 trip to Colombo, when he met with Tamil civil society representatives, Sri Lankan government officials, and the leader of the main opposition party. Tamil interlocutors from across the political spectrum expressed their community's sense of disenfranchisement, while Government representatives put an optimistic spin on current government efforts to bridge the ethnic divide. Sri Lankan government officials seemed unaware of the depth of Tamil grievances, and rather focused on building government consensus for a settlement proposal through an All-Party Conference. While building consensus will be a necessary step in any final solution, we are unconvinced that the players are ready to put aside political power plays in the interest of a larger national interest like peace. End summary. -------------- TAMIL COMMUNITY VIEWS: DISENFRANCHISEMENT; DISTRUST -------------- ¶2. (C) After participating in the May 30 meeting of the Co-Chairs donor group (US, EU, Norway, and Japan) in Tokyo, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher visited Colombo May 31 and met with Tamil civil society representatives, President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. Boucher's visit came on the heels of the Co-Chairs' public statement calling on the Government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to carry out their commitments agreed to at talks in Geneva in February, urging the Tigers to refrain from violence, and encouraging the Government to improve human rights protections for Tamils and develop a proposal for a political settlement. A/S Boucher underscored these points in a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce and during press events. ¶3. (C) During a meeting with Tamil civil society representatives, A/S Boucher met with: Deputy Secretary Gene
ral of the Peace Secretariat Kethesh SIPDIS Loganathan; Center for Policy Alternatives Director Dr. Paikaisothy Saravanamuttu; attorney and media- owner Kumar Nadesan; Director of the Nilan Thiruchelvan Trust Patrick Cananasingham; Director of the Point Pedro Institute Dr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan; and Eastern University Professor T. Jeyasingham. Loganathan approved of the Co-Chairs' statement, noting that it addressed Tamil grievances and the need to hold the government accountable for violent acts committed in territories it controls. He also appreciated that the statement did not place the Government and the Tigers on a level moral platform. ¶4. (C) Each of the speakers expounded on Tamil distrust of the Government and the draw of the Tigers as an alternative. Referring to Sri Lankan Government failures to investigate crimes against Tamils, Saravanamuttu said, "Lack of transparency in human rights violations and the alleged complicity of the security forces in some of these violations erodes the confidence of the Tamil community." Jeyasingham encapsulated the views of the average Tamil civilian: "The State owes me more than the Tamil Tigers. The State has to protect me and show it cares about me. COLOMBO 00000933 002 OF 004 When the State fails, what can you do? You tend to get oriented toward the Tigers." ¶5. (C) Despite the obvious challenges in finding a long-term solution, Loganathan and Saravanamuttu felt the Government could take immediate steps to build confidence among the Tamil community. In particular they suggested an improved language policy and the prompt, transparent investigation of abuse allegations. -------------- THE GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: CURRENT EFFORTS ADEQUATE -------------- ¶6. (C) During a meeting with Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, A/S Boucher urged the Government to address violence by the Karuna faction (a Tiger splinter group that broke with the Tigers in 2004) and killings in Tamil areas. Responding to assertions that Karuna operates with government knowledge and possible consent, Samaraweera said such behavior was antithetical to Government interests since the GSL does not want to provoke the LTTE into war. He noted that Karuna's actions have occasionally scuttled instances when the government is "bending over backwards" for a peaceful resolution. Samaraweera also posited that most allegations of Government human rights violations are exaggerated. ¶7. (C) In a separate meeting with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, A/S Boucher, emphasized the Government's obligation to carry out its commitments from the February Geneva talks, not just by limiting Karuna's activities, but also by investigating killings. A/S Boucher noted there had been questions surrounding civilian control over the security services. Rajapaksa responded, "Our army is disciplined," going on to add that he sent special investigative teams to examine abuse allegations. In the case of the murder of five students in Trincomalee last January, Rajapaksa said Special Task Force members who had been arrested remain in custody despite ballistic tests on their weapons failing to match to the crime scene. He said he has asked Tamil parliamentarians to solicit witnesses who may be able to build a case against the detainees. Rajapaksa noted that unlike the Tamil Tigers, he cannot use summary justice, and he faces criticism both for violent incidents and the Government's law enforcement responses in trying to bring perpetrators to justice. ¶8. (C) A/S Boucher told Rajapaksa there is a need for outreach to the Tamil community in terms of language policy and employment and to invest in the north and east. Rajapaksa answered that the Government of Sri Lanka has started that process by offering concessions for companies that invest in Jaffna and by attempting to attract foreign direct investment for the north and east. He mentioned the World Bank had agreed to a Government request to fund a toll-free highway in the north. Ambassador Lunstead noted that Tamils outside the north and east also needed signals of government concern and redress for disenfranchisement. "They're not satisfied?" Rajapaksa queried, genuinely surprised and puzzled. He mentioned the anti-Tiger Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) as additional forums for Tamils. The Ambassador explained that those parties, along with the Tiger-backed Tamil National Alliance (TNA),failed to give a voice to the average Tamil. Rajapaksa then suggested the opposition United National Party (UNP) or his own Sri Lanka Freedom COLOMBO 00000933 003 OF 004 Party (SLFP) as alternatives. -------------- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S ROLE -------------- ¶9. (C) Regarding the recent listing of the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organization by the EU, Foreign Minister Samaraweera expressed hope that the action would compel the Tigers to return to the negotiating table. He reiterated the Government's stance against a return to war, noting despite numerous provocations, the government remained steadfast about resolving problems at the negotiating table. Samaraweera viewed the EU listing as a positive step toward curbing Tiger fundraising, stopping money laundering, and limiting arms trade. A/S Boucher stressed that closer cooperation and information sharing between governments could help stop illicit Tiger activities, and the Co-Chairs could foster this type of cooperation by forming working groups with other concerned governments. Samaraweera welcomed the idea and noted that he had recently emphasized closer cooperation on this issue with his Asian counterparts. A/S Boucher also highlighted the benefits of the EU designation and the need for regional cooperation when he later met with President Rajapaksa. -------------- DEVOLUTION AS A SOLUTION? TAMIL DISTRUST, ALL-PARTY TALKS -------------- ¶10. (C) When A/S Boucher's discussion with Tamil civil society representatives turned to possible solutions, Peace Secretariat Deputy Secretary-General Loganathan cited the Tamil Tigers' claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people as a primary hindrance to the Government's ability to address the Tamil issue. He noted, "Clearly there is a distinction between Tiger and Tamil interests. The catch-22 and failing of the Government is that it doesn't recognize the Tigers as representatives, but is not wiling to come out with a package for devolution for Tamils without the Tigers." Jeyasingham noted that Tamils don't believe the Government is willing to implement a devolution of power. "Federalism, unfortunately, is a taboo word for the Southern constituency," Saravanamuttu concurred. Cananasigham added, "If the government would present a roadmap to devolution, most Tamils would support it, but no one has done it." ¶11. (C) In the meeting with Foreign Minister Samaraweera, A/S Boucher said a more detailed government plan for maximum devolution would help address concerns by Tamil groups. Samaraweera responded that any agreement would need consensus among the Southern parties. Samaraweera expressed hope that an All Party Conference (scheduled for June 2) could help produce an official plan for maximum devolution shortly. President Rajapaksa later echoed that view, noting that Sri Lankans demand a voice in the consultative process. Rajapaksa said he intended to appoint a Consultative Committee of legal and constitutional experts to develop a proposed political settlement. This would allow the Government to discuss a long-term solution with the Tigers. "I have my own ideas," Rajapaksa said, but "I am willing to change them" if the Committee agrees on something else. ¶12. (C) A/S Boucher also discussed devolution in a meeting with opposition United National Party (UNP) COLOMBO 00000933 004 OF 004 leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and former Sri Lankan Ambassador to the U.S., Devinda Subasinghe. Wickremesinghe said that maximum devolution, as supported by President Rajapaksa, is enshrined in the thirteenth amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, which grants provincial councils certain authorities. He said the amendment, subject to repeal by Parliament, could never placate the Tigers. Federalism, on the other hand, he noted, would grant some sovereignty to regional legislatures and provide powers not subject to the whim of members of the national parliament. According to Wickremesinghe, federalism was the only solution palatable to the Tigers. He said that if the Sri Lankan government chose to pursue that path, it could begin with the Parliamentary Select Committee proposals regarding federalism first proposed in 2000. ¶13. (C) Wickremesinghe added that his party plans to attend the June 2 All Party Conference but stated that his party's position would be that the Government should affirm its adherence to the Oslo Declaration of December 2002, which said that both sides agreed to "explore a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka." A/S Boucher asked whether the United National Party actually wanted to see consensus, or, considering the Marxist, Sinhalese nationalist Janathi Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP's) strong opposition to devolution, whether Wickremesinghe really intended "just (to) play politics" and watch the Government flounder. Wickremesinghe responded that he would try "to get something the government can support. That's also politics." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Comment: A/S Boucher's visit provided another opportunity for the U.S. to deliver a "tough love" message to the Government: we're with you in your struggle against terrorism, but concrete steps must occur on security force conduct and in putting forth a political vision that gives hope to Tamils and Muslims. ¶15. (U) A/S Boucher cleared this cable. LUNSTEAD LUNSTEAD

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