SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000771 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016 TAGS: PHUM PTER PGOV CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS PLAY CATCH UP ON ABUSE ALLEGATIONS REF: A. COLOMBO 759 ¶B. COLOMBO 723 ¶C. COLOMBO 713 ¶D. COLOMBO 090 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Since the April 7 assassination of a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP-nominee in Trincomalee--and in tandem with stepped-up violence against Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) military targets--the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is increasingly attempting to depict GSL security forces as systematic violators of human rights. Many of the alleged incidents are purported to occur in the heavily fortified northern district of Jaffna, where the LTTE aims to stoke popular sentiment against the security forces. While many of the more sensational allegations have not been substantiated so far, neutral observers like the ICRC (Ref A) and Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission have indicated they have credible evidence that abuses have occurred in some instances, with SLMM expressing private concern that civilians may not exert full control over the military. In an effort to improve its own public relations effort, the GSL has appointed a Defense Spokesman, in addition to the Military Spokesman, to give "a political flavor" to its own spin efforts. But with TamilNet and other pro-LTTE media organs cranking out their faster, more professional-looking (and often more plausible-sounding) version of events, the GSL and human rights organizations are often left playing catch up. End summary. -------------- THE WORLD ACCORDING TO TAMILNET -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In tandem with its stepped-up campaign of violence against Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) military targets, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has launched an extensive public relations campaign against GSL security forces as well, plastering TamilNet and Tamil-language media with accusations of summary executions, extrajudicial killings and GSL-instigated disappearances of innocent civilians in the north and east. The gravest allegations/insinuations focus on purported events in the northern district of Jaffna, where 40,000 (overwhelmingly Sinhalese) soldiers are viewed as an occupying force by the (completely) Tamil civilian population they are hypothetically protecting from the LTTE. These allegations include that security forces extrajudicially shot and killed five Tamil men (four in a trishaw and one passer-by) near a Sri Lanka Army (SLA) checkpoint on April 19; that the Army shot and killed seven Tamil men (in two trishaws) at another Army checkpoint on May 4; and that the military was involved in the disappearance and likely killing of eight Tamil men who had been staying at a Hindu temple the night of May 6/morning of May 7. ¶3. (C) In each of these cases, the military and GSL have emphatically denied the TamilNet version of events. With respect to the April 19 and May 4 incidents, GSL spokesmen asserted that the allegedly innocent victims were actually LTTE cadres who had attempted to lob hand grenades or other explosives at checkpoints. Since no bodies of the alleged victims of the May 6-7 temple killings have been found, the military denies that the incident ever occurred. Human rights organizations, as well as neutral observers like the ICRC and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),often arrive on the scene well after the fact (in the case of ICRC, SLMM and the Human Rights Commission) or not at all (in the case of some other human rights organizations) and thus have difficulty substantiating either version of events. COLOMBO 00000771 002 OF 004 -------------- THE WORLD AS SEEN BY (MANY) TAMILS -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite the typical lack of conclusive evidence on either side, however, popular Tamil suspicion (including among non-LTTE Tamils in Colombo) usually comes down squarely against the security forces. When asked why they feel so sure, our Tamil contacts (including businesspeople, NGO workers and mainstream journalists) frequently cite four factors as circumstantial evidence. First: location--most of the alleged incidents occur close to or at a military checkpoint or other such installation. Second: opportunity--given the ubiquity of military checkpoints throughout Jaffna, the only armed people able to move about freely are those connected to the military. Third: timing--most alleged incidents occur at night, when most ordinary residents of Jaffna are loath to be out and about (for obvious reasons) and security checks are intensified (also for obvious reasons). Fourth (and probably most cogent): their own personal observations/experience with GSL security forces, especially during the late 1980s and 1990s, make them willing to believe the worst about the military. -------------- HE SAID/SHE SAID . . .WHO KNOWS? -------------- ¶5. (C) Attempting to sort through the spectacular allegations and couter-allegations can be a daunting task, especially since witnesses may be unable or unwilling to provide impartial and accurate information. Fr. A.I. Bernard, a Catholic priest who heads a human rights organization in Jaffna, told poloff he was encountering difficulty in attempting to piece together the facts surrounding the April 19 incident because so many purported witnesses offering evidence had obvious agendas of their own to pursue. He noted, however, that in October two of the victims had spearheaded a protest against the military presence in Jaffna, following allegations that some soldiers had attempted to molest a local woman. The SLA had been observed videotaping the protest (similar protests have been instigated by LTTE front organizations) and were thus presumably on the look-out for the two men, Fr. Bernard speculated. In a separate conversation, ICRC Protection Coordinator Christoph Sutter said that all his organization had been able to determine about the incident was that the trishaw and its luckless occupants had indeed passed a military checkpoint at one point in its travels that night. ¶6. (C) In a May 8 meeting, Defense Spokesman and Plan Implementation Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told poloff that the seven men killed in the May 4 incident had tried to throw hand grenades at a military checkpoint. When the soldiers fired on the two trishaws, one of them exploded, he said, proving that it was jam-packed with explosives. V.S. Ganeshalingam, head of the Home for Human Rights, dismissed those assertions in a separate meeting the following day, saying, "Do you really think the LTTE rides around in trishaws to throw grenades? That is not their modus operandi." (Comment: That may be true, but someone is throwing grenades at security forces in Jaffna and elsewhere. Some of our contacts have reported LTTE training of a "civil defense force" in Jaffna that includes such skills as grenade throwing.) A May 5 letter from pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs circulated to diplomatic Heads of Mission in Colombo complaining of GSL human rights abuses acknowledges that a grenade had indeed been tossed at a SLA checkpoint before the killings but contends that the seven victims had been observed celebrating a birthday at a bar at the time of the explosion and did not cross the checkpoint until 20 minutes later. Other NGO and media contacts reiterated to us the TNA version--with the (seemingly plausible) addition that the seven victims had imbibed a COLOMBO 00000771 003 OF 004 little too much at the bar, failed to stop as required at the checkpoint, and were subsequently shot by understandably jittery soldiers manning the post. ¶7. (C) Reports that eight men were abducted from a Jaffna temple May 6 or 7 and then possibly executed are even murkier. On May 7 a story began circulating that the eight had disappeared from the temple premises, leaving behind bloodstains and some shell casings on the floor of the room where they were said to have slept. (Note: The temple in question is about 500 meters from a checkpoint.) Almost simultaneously another story cropped up--the bodies had been dumped in a nearby field, but the security forces were preventing people from seeing them. Early on May 8 the GSL declared a daytime curfew in Jaffna for unspecified security reasons and closed the A9 highway leading into LTTE territory--further fueling popular suspicions of foul play. (Note: Military sources told DAO that the road had been closed because the GSL feared the LTTE was planning to bring "demonstrators" from Tiger-controlled territory to stage a massive protest.) Reports grew increasingly insistent throughout the day that the bodies had been found--although no one seemed to know anyone who had actually seen them. SLMM dispelled these rumors to emboff the following day, reporting that monitors who travelled to the site where the bodies were supposed to have been dumped found no such evidence. Moreover, according to SLMM, the small amount of blood and the positioning of the shell casings observed on the temple floor were inconsistent with the execution of eight men. Military sources told DAO that no bodies had been found and that no complaints that the alleged victims had disappeared had been lodged with the police. The military sources opined that the story was a Tiger plant calculated to inflame local sentiment. If so, the Tigers' plan may be working. Despite SLMM's dispassionate analysis, rumors persist that the bodies had at one point been seen in the field but had were subsequently removed by the security forces under cover of the curfew before SLMM monitors could reach the site. -------------- DEFENSE SPOKESMAN: TRYING TO STAY ON MESSAGE -------------- ¶8. (SBU) On April 5 the GSL appointed Minister for Policy Development and Plan Implementation Keheliya Rambukwella as Defense Spokesman. (Note: Rambukwella had crossed over to the GSL from the opposition United National Party in January. His appointment is in addition to Government Spokesman and Media Minister Anura Priyadarshana Yapa and Military Spokesman Brig. Gen. Prasad Samarasinghe.) In a May 8 meeting, Rambukwella told poloff that the President had appointed him to project a more robust public relations effort that provided a greater "political flavor" to successive incident reports. Rambukwella conceded that the GSL seems habitually behind the LTTE in getting its message out to domestic and international audiences. "Our dissemination of information is a little backward," he acknowledged, adding that the GSL's greatest disadvantage is the lack of qualified English writers and journalists willing to work for a GSL salary. To attract such writers and encourage greater productivity on the woefully out-of-date official GSL website, Rambukwella said he wants to offer pay based on "piece work," rather than straight salary. In addition, he is proposing to the President the establishment of a Media Center for National Security, which would consolidate and strengthen the GSL's public relations capacity, while making the GSL "message" more uniform. ¶9. (C) When asked about reports of the eight missing men in Jaffna, Rambukwella indicated he had information that the men were involved in unspecified "activities." He characterized the April 25-26 GSL aerial and artillery strikes following the assassination attempt against the Army Commander as COLOMBO 00000771 004 OF 004 "deterrent," rather than "retaliatory" action, because of military fears that the LTTE might follow up the attack on Army Headquarters with an assault on the Navy Base in Trincomalee. (Comment: On the other hand, the GSL has long been worried about LTTE installations in Sampur and may have decided to take that opportunity to knock them out.) He stressed that the GSL would take similar action again if the need arose. Later in the conversation he said that the GSL had to do something against the Tigers after the attack on the Army Commander or risk "our people" taking the law into their own hands. -------------- SLMM: PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN -------------- ¶10. (C) In a May 10 discussion, SLMM Head of Mission Major General Ulf Henricsson told the Ambassador that he believes that civilian authorities do not exercise full control over the military. While ruling out any possibility of a coup or other military attempts to change the government, Henricsson indicated concern that the civilian authorities are more likely to take direction from the military than vice versa. Whatever the GSL may be saying in public about severing links with the Karuna faction, the order is not being implemented on the ground, he noted, adding that SLMM monitors in Mutur in Trincomalee recently saw armed Karuna cadres entering and exiting SLA installations (sometimes in the company of SLA soldiers) with no attempt to conceal their relationship. He cited as another example the defense establishment's blow-up at the SLMM's April 29 public statement regarding security forces' involvement in extrajudicial killings (Ref C). According to Henricsson, GSL Peace Secretariat head Palitha Kohona told him the SLMM statement had undermined relations between the Secretariat and the military, and the military was exerting pressure on him to get SLMM to retract the statement. Henricsson said he decided to issue the revised May 2 climb-down (Ref C) to help Kohona. SLMM officer Paul Erik Bjerke told poloff that the SLMM had notified the GSL of the evidence of extrajudicial killings it had compiled and issued the April 29 statement to give the civilian GSL some political cover under which to announce its plans to investigate the allegations. The GSL should not have been surprised by the statement, he indicated. He would not commit, when asked, to sharing any of the information/evidence on extrajudicial killings SLMM had collected. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) LTTE allegations of human rights abuses against GSL security forces are flying too fast and too furious for the GSL and human rights monitors to catch up. It remains difficult to substantiate the claims, even in part, and many of the allegations may well be completely spurious. But just because some of the allegations--or even most of the allegations--may not be true doesn't mean that none of them are. LTTE accusations of GSL human rights abuses fall on very receptive ears here, and the best way for the GSL to refute such claims is to conduct thorough, good-faith investigations of credible allegations, punish the perpetrators and publicize those findings. Even in cases where there should be sufficient evidence to mount a case, however, like the killings of five Tamil students in Trincomalee in January (Ref D),the GSL has so far failed to do so. As long as this remains the GSL's standard operating procedure, members of the Tamil community will be only too willing to believe even the most ridiculous of allegations against the military. LUNSTEAD