AKASHI GETS HARD LINE FROM TIGERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000757 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE SUBJECT: AKASHI GETS HARD LINE FROM TIGERS Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Tigers implied to Akashi they will not go to Geneva until Government stops all violence against Tamils. They insisted President Rajapaksa has the power to do so, but Akashi told us that the President has admitted some doubts about his control. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi traveled to Kilinochchi to meet with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam leadership on May 9. Akashi traveled with Government of Sri Lanka approval; this was in contrast to his last visit to Sri Lanka, when the GSL refused to let him go to Kilinochchi. Akashi asked for a meeting with LTTE chief Prabhakaran, but this request was turned down and he met instead with LTTE Political Wing leader Tamilchelvan plus several other officials. ¶3. (C) Akashi told Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission evening of May 9 that Tamilchelvan had passed on Prabhakaran's apology for being unable to meet. They then had a two-hour discussion followed by lunch. Akashi said that Tamlichelvan made three main points regarding the Tigers' thoughts on whether to go to Geneva for a second round of peace talks: --The Tigers were anxious about full adherence by the GSL to the Ceasefire Agreement, especially controlling the actions of armed groups and other violence against Tamil civilians. --While concerned about the issue of transport for LTTE leaders to allow them to attend a Central Committee meeting before any decision on Geneva II, this was clearly a secondary matter. -------------- The Tigers were also concerned about the manner in which they were treated at Colombo airport when they returned from the first Geneva meeting. Akashi confirmed that the question of whether or not to go to Geneva was most firmly linked to the first point. The Tigers seemed to imply that until violence was completely stopped, they would not go to Geneva. ¶4. (C) Akashi told the Tigers that there were ceasefire violations by both sides, including the recent attack on the Sri Lankan Army chief. Tamilchelvan did not reply directly, but simply repeated that the ceasefire agreement is the cornerstone of the peace process. When Akashi said that President Rajapaksa might have trouble controlling all elements of the security forces, especially at lower levels, Tamilchelvan replied that Rajapaksa is the Commander-in-Chief. (Akashi told Co-Chairs that when he had met President Rajapaksa a day earlier, Rajapaksa told him that he could not control what happened at every level of the security services, and added that he did not trust the Sri Lankan police.) ¶5. (C) Over lunch Akashi told Tamilchelvan that the Co-Chairs would meet at the end of May in Tokyo, and that one item on the agenda would be how to control Tiger financing and weapons procurement. Tamilchelvan "pretended not to attach great importance," Akashi said. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Tamilchelvan's remarks to Akashi appear to confirm what we have suspected all along: the "logistical" issues regarding Geneva, COLOMBO 00000757 002 OF 002 such as transport of cadres, are just a smokescreen. If the Tigers insist that all violence must end before the parties return to Geneva, the second round won't happen. In fact, continual Tiger provocations bring about the inevitable Government reprisals. That being said, the GSL could do more to control actions not only by its own forces, but also by the Karuna group and other armed groups. Rajapaksa's comments to Akashi about his inability to control the security services parallels his recent remarks to us and further underline our concerns about whether the military and the cops are firmly under civilian control. LUNSTEAD