SRI LANKA: TIGER TRANSPORT STILL ON TABLE AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000713 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016 TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PHUM CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TIGER TRANSPORT STILL ON TABLE AS LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT CONTINUES REF: A. COLOMBO 697 ¶B. COLOMBO 686 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Low-intensity conflict between Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued April 29-May 2, including an April 30 LTTE attack on camps run by the dissident Karuna faction on the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa border. Despite the violence--and despite the LTTE's April 25 attempt on the life of the Army Commander--a GSL offer to use Sri Lankan Air seaplanes to transport eastern LTTE cadres to Tiger headquarters in the north got a "positive" initial reception from the LTTE, according to Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, although the Tigers may still impose additional conditions on the proposal. An April 29 statement by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) faulting the GSL for the April 25-26 aerial and artillery strikes against Tiger targets and expressing "fear" that GSL security forces were involved in extrajudicial killings drew the wrath of Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. The SLMM issued a SIPDIS significantly revised statement on May 2, saying it believed the Government was "sincere" in denying any knowledge of such activities. While we have not seen the SLMM "background note" on extrajudicial killings, if it offers credible evidence of even one instance of such an abuse, the GSL should investigate the allegations as quickly as possible. It is hard to welcome the LTTE's "positive" response to the seaplane offer if it carries with it additional Tiger demands, and we remain skeptical that the Tigers really want to return to the table in Geneva. End summary. -------------- MORE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Low-level conflict between Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued over the May Day holiday weekend (April 29-May 1) in the north and east. On April 29 the LTTE fired on a military bunker in a fishing village in the northern district of Mannar, wounding a civilian. In the northern district of Vavuniya a police officer was shot and killed on April 29 by suspected LTTE gunmen. The same night the LTTE and Sri Lanka Army (SLA) fired on each other's positions near Vavunithivu (where they are less than half a kilometer apart) and Paduwankarai in the eastern district of Batticaloa. Although there were no reports of casualties, the Dutch NGO ZOA reported that an estimated 700 villagers in the area had fled their homes for the jungle since April 25. ZOA, along with French NGO Action Contre le Faim and the local NGO Sarvodaya, were providing humanitarian assistance to the displaced, while the Divisional Secretary for Batticaloa was reportedly visiting the area May 2 to assess the situation. ¶3. (SBU) On April 30 the LTTE attacked three camps run by the dissident Karuna faction east of Welikanda in the northern district of Polonnaruwa. (The camps' location is in a densely wooded "no man's land" between the borders of Polonnaruwa and Batticaloa, a gray area that appears to be neither under GSL nor Tiger control.) The LTTE claimed that at least 15 Karuna cadres were killed in the attacks, while Tamil Net, the pro-LTTE website, claimed that five SLA soldiers, including a captain, were killed when they intervened to assist the Karuna cadres in repulsing the attack. The SLA, however, has officially denied that report. A claymore mine attack in Kayts in the northern district of Jaffna the same day wounded two Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) sailors. COLOMBO 00000713 002 OF 004 ¶4. (C) The local media reported that on April 30 the LTTE fired on GSL Forward Defense Lines on the Trincomalee-Mullaithivu border. According to an Army source, artillery and mortars have been fired on SLA positions at Kokilai and Kokkuttodvai in the border area intermittently for the past several days. No casualties have been reported. ¶5. (SBU) Traditional May Day political rallies and parades were cancelled throughout the island on May 1 amid fears that the large crowds and rabble-rousing speeches might prove too inviting a target for the LTTE. (There may also have been some concern that the penchant for saber-rattling, incendiary rhetoric typical on such occasions from parties like the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna might further inflame ethnic tensions.) On the same day a claymore mine attached to a bicycle detonated in Trincomalee town as an Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) patrol was passing, killing four civilians and two SLN sailors. An Army soldier wounded in the April 25 assassination attempt on Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka died of his injuries May 1, bringing the death toll in the suicide bombing at Army Headquarters to 11. ¶6. (C) According to Army sources, five LTTE "Sea Tiger" vessels fired on SLN naval craft near Trincomalee on May 1, damaging one SLN Dvora craft and wounding five SLN sailors. The SLN returned fire, destroying one of the Sea Tiger vessels. The military was unable to verify Tiger casualties. (Note: Pro-LTTE Tamil Net offered a different version of events, reporting that the SLN fired on the Sea Tigers first--and omitting any mention of damage to LTTE vessels.) ¶7. (SBU) On May 2 the LTTE and the dissident Karuna faction reportedly traded fire in "uncleared" territory near Mutur in the eastern district of Trincomalee. The SLA denied initial LTTE claims that the Army was firing on LTTE positions. Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Spokesperson Helen Olafsdottir confirmed to poloff that there had been some "small skirmishes" in "uncleared" territory in the area earlier in the day but stressed that neither party "was expressing concern" about the incident. Media reports had overblown the encounter, she indicated. -------------- INVESTIGATION CONTINUES -------------- ¶8. (U) On April 29 Army Commander Fonseka, who sustained stomach and lung injuries in the April 25 LTTE suicide bomb, was reportedly taken off the ventilator. The following day the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) announced that only about 35 of the approximately 300 people taken in for questioning in connection with the attack remained in custody. According to local press reports, the female suicide bomber, who was originally from the northern district of Vavuniya, had visited the maternity clinic at the Army Hospital several times before April 25. Information about how the suicide bomber obtained permission to visit the Army Hospital, which is supposed to be open only to Army personnel and their dependents, has not been made public. Eyewitnesses reported observing her waiting near the entrance of the hospital before the bombing and, after receiving a call on her cell phone, rushing forward toward the Army Commander's vehicle. The attack planners' access to certain key information---that Fonseka did not use an armored vehicle for transportation within the Army Headquarters compound; that he usually left for lunch at home on the compound following a staff meeting on Tuesday--as well as the cell phone call presumably tipping the bomber off to Fonseka's movements, has raised speculation that someone on the Army Headquarters compound may have been an accomplice in the attack. -------------- SLMM STATEMENT DRAWS GSL FIRE COLOMBO 00000713 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶9. (U) On April 29 the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) issued a statement ruling the April 25-26 GSL aerial and artillery strikes on Tiger targets in the eastern district of Trincomalee (Ref B) "a clear violation of the Ceasefire Agreement." The release, which also faulted the LTTE for positioning military and political targets "amongst the civilian population close to schools and private houses" and which called on the Tigers to halt all "military activities and attacks on Government forces," expressed "fear" that GSL security forces have "been involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians" in the north and east. The truce monitoring organization said that its conclusion "is based on our observation and inquiries on the ground." ¶10. (C) The SLMM statement provoked immediate GSL ire--especially since it omitted any mention of the LTTE attack on Fonseka. (The April 30 edition of the pro-JVP Sunday Island ran a front-page story with the title: "SLMM rules air strikes violation of truce; no word yet on suicide bombing.") SLMM Spokeswoman Helen Olafsdottir described the GSL as "really upset with the statement" to emboff. She said that Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa "nearly physically laid into" SLMM Head of Mission Ulf Henricsson in an April 30 meeting and accused Olafsdottir of being "a female Tiger cadre." According to Olafsdottir, GSL Peace Secretariat head Dr. Palitha Kohona expressed "concern" about her releases in a separate meeting with Henricsson on May 1 and had to be reminded that official SLMM statements are cleared by the Head of Mission. Henricsson was to meet Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera on May 2--presumably on the same subject. (At a May 1 conference on World Press Freedom in Colombo, Kohona said that the SLMM had told the GSL it would "revise" its April 29 statement. Olafsdottir confirmed to Embassy Information Officer on May 2 that SLMM would issue a "clarification" of the statement. That said, SLMM "cannot close our eyes to what is happening on the ground," she noted; "(Henricsson) wants above all to be honest and reveal all the truth.") ¶11. (U) Later on May 2 the SLMM subsequently issued a release reporting that, after consultations with the GSL, the truce monitoring organization was "clarifying" its April 29 statement regarding "certain unexplained violent deaths of civilians," noting that "SLMM monitors on the ground have expressed some concerns over the last few weeks and months regarding the behavior of some individuals . . .that might have been directly or indirectly involved in clandestine activities against civilians. It was not the SLMM's intention to generalize or pass judgements on the Sri Lankan armed forces and police. The Sri Lankan Government has conveyed to us that they are not aware of any such activities within their ranks. We believe that the Sri Lankan Government is sincere in this respect and are committed to prevent any such clandestine activities from taking place." ¶12. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar told the Ambassador on May 1 that he had seen the SLMM's "background note" on GSL security forces' involvement in some extrajudicial killings and believed it convincing and well documented. He added that the background note provided ample recent evidence of both parties violating the Ceasefire Agreement. -------------- SEAPLANES--AND THUS GENEVA--STILL AN OPTION -------------- ¶13. (C) Brattskar reported to the Ambassador on May 1 that the SLMM had received a "positive' answer from the LTTE on the GSL's offer to provide one or two Sri Lankan Air seaplanes to transport eastern cadres to the north for a meeting at LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, which the LTTE has stipulated as an unofficial precondition to a second COLOMBO 00000713 004 OF 004 round of talks in Geneva. The Tigers' "positive" response was tempered, however, by an unspecified additional condition on the land movement of the cadres to the seaplane(s), Brattskar advised. If this late-breaking Tiger add-on cannot be resolved by SLMM soon, Brattskar said, Norwegian facilitators will have to draw "conclusions" about the Tigers' sincerity in seeking dialogue. He added that the Tigers were claiming to have captured some Karuna cadres in the April 30 attack on the breakaway faction's camps and that the prisoners had supposedly been brought to Kilinochchi for "interrogation." The Norwegian envoy summarized the situation on the ground--as well as the atmospherics on both sides--as "pretty terrible." ¶14. (C) In a May 2 telephone conversation, the Peace Secretariat's Kohona told the Ambassador that the Tigers' SIPDIS "positive" reaction to the seaplane offer had been largely limited to an agreement on the proposed landing sites, leaving other questions--including whether the Tigers would ultimately accept the transportation--still unanswered. He described the April 29 SLMM reference to extrajudicial killings as exaggerated. The Ambassador stressed the importance of investigating any report of human rights abuses by GSL security forces, raising the apparent extrajudicial killings of five Tamil students in Trincomalee on January 2 as an example. Kohona assured him the investigation was "proceeding"; the Ambassador urged the GSL to publicize its efforts in this case. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) There was no attempt to cover up the GSL's April 25-26 aerial and artillery strikes against the LTTE; thus the SLMM finding that the attacks violated the Ceasefire Agreement should come as a surprise to no one. The Tigers' typical refusal to acknowledge responsibility makes an SLMM ruling of LTTE guilt in the April 25 attempt on Fonseka's life--no matter how overwhelming the circumstantial evidence--more difficult. Such nuances are understandably lost on the GSL, especially when that same SLMM ruling also refers to a "conviction" and "fear" of GSL security forces' involvement in extrajudicial killings. While we have not seen the SLMM "background note" on extrajudicial killings, if it offers credible evidence of even one instance of such an abuse, the GSL should look into the allegations as quickly and dispassionately as possible. Shooting the messenger is no way to defuse steadily mounting ethnic tensions, and the GSL reaction (which has been widely publicized in the local press) only feeds the xenophobic paranoia that prevails in some quarters of the majority community. ¶16. (C) Comment (cont.): It is hard to welcome the LTTE's "positive" response to the seaplane offer if it carries with it additional Tiger demands. Some observers had speculated in the immediate aftermath of the Fonseka assassination attempt that after some residual "show-of-strength" operations from both sides, dialogue would resume. As the list of violent "incidents" lengthens with each passing day--and with the disturbing new addition of LTTE attacks on the renegade Karuna faction--this prospect seems increasingly fantastic. We remain skeptical that the Tigers really want to go to Geneva--but they will provably stretch out the seaplane talks for as long as they can. LUNSTEAD