SRI LANKA: CLAYMORES, CYANIDE, AND CIVILIANS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000661 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA, SCA/INS NSC FOR E.MILLARD PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2014 TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: CLAYMORES, CYANIDE, AND CIVILIANS: TIGERS RABBLE ROUSE, GSL OFFERS HELICOPTER TRANSPORT REF: A. COLOMBO 654 ¶B. COLOMBO 650 ¶C. COLOMBO 646 ¶D. COLOMBO 634 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason: 1.4(b,d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued small-scale attacks against military and civilian targets in the north and east April 21-23, killing eleven members of the security forces and six Sinhalese villagers in separate incidents. For the second time in as many weeks, a Sinhalese mob in Trincomalee responded to LTTE provocation by torching Tamil homes on April 21, reviving grim memories of the communal violence that tore through Sri Lanka in the early 1980s. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) attempted to deny the LTTE any pretext to back out of a second round of talks in Geneva, issuing several tough statements April 21-23 and offering a larger helicopter to transport eastern LTTE cadres to Tiger Headquarters in Kilinochchi. The LTTE has indicated interest in the helo offer "in principle," according to the Norwegian Ambassador, but has not confirmed acceptance. The Norwegians are pressing for an April 28 Co-chairs meeting in Oslo. Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara contacted the Ambassador April 23 to express concern at the escalating violence and to ask that the international community issue a "strong warning" to the LTTE. The Government's concession on a larger helicopter seems to offer the only ray of hope left for resurrecting talks in Geneva in the near term. It remains to be seen if the LTTE will find yet another reason to reject this offer and continue the killing. End summary. -------------- Claymores and Cyanide Capsules -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued small-scale attacks against Sri Lanka security forces April 21-23. Five police and one Homeguard soldier (a member of a local militia) died in LTTE claymore mine attacks on April 21 in the eastern district of Trincomalee. A USAID contractor in the East confirmed to poloff that a Sinhalese mob in Trincomalee, in apparent retaliation, burned about 10 Tamil houses in the vicinity later the same day. There were reports that one Tamil civilian was killed in the ensuing violence. On April 22, a claymore mine at a checkpoint in the northern district of Vavuniya killed four Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers and injured ten others, while a claymore mine explosion injured two other soldiers in Polonnaruwa District. At an eastern railway crossing on April 23, security forces shot and killed two Tiger cadres as they reportedly attempted to throw a hand grenade at the checkpoint. Three policemen were injured in Batticaloa on the same evening when suspected LTTE cadres threw a hand grenade into the police station. ¶3. (SBU) Security Forces claim to have discovered a large stock of explosives at the scene of another incident on April 23 in which Air Force personnel shot and killed a suspected LTTE cadre during a cordon and search operation in Trincomalee. On April 23, a suspected LTTE cadre, apprehended by police near Polonnaruwa, swallowed a cyanide capsule in an apparent suicide attempt, according to military spokesperson Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe. ¶4. (C) Following the market-place bomb in Trincomalee on April 12, the LTTE launched a second assault on local COLOMBO 00000661 002 OF 003 civilians, apparently primed to incite communal violence, when suspected Tigers murdered six young Sinhalese farmers in the district on April 23. According to USAID's office there, Trincomalee remained tense April 24 as the bodies of the dead farmers were transported to the provincial hospital. A curfew remains in place since April 12 and security forces have established additional checkpoints in response to the violence. -------------- Foreign Ministry Calls for "Strong Warning" -------------- ¶5. (C) In an April 23 telephone call to the Ambassador, Foreign Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, expressing concern at the escalating violence, reported that President Rajapaksa, in a bid to break the deadlock, had authorized the use of a 10-panssenger helicopter to transport eastern LTTE cadres to Tiger headquarters in Kilinochchi. This showed the Government was willing to make every effort to keep talks going, Palihakkara asserted. The Foreign Secretary reported the President intended to go on TV soon to make an appeal for calm. (As of COB April 24, he had not yet appeared on television.) Palihakkara speculated that the Tigers were attempting to generate a communal backlash in order to influence the impending elections in Tamil Nadu. He asked that the international community issue a "strong warning" to the Tigers. The Ambassador agreed that the Tiger campaign of violence was deplorable, but wondered that "warning" we would give. Ambassador responded that the continuing Tiger campaign of violence was deplorable, but wondered that "warning" we would give. Ambassador also asked Palihakkara if he thought the killing of the six Sinhalese civilians might be retaliation for shooting of five Tamil civilians in Jaffna on April 17, whose bodies were discovered just outside a Sri Lankan Army camp. -------------- Facilitators Respond -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador also spoke April 24 with Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, who said that the GSL had agreed in principle to the provision of a larger helicopter, but had provided no details. Press stories that morning in which the GSL complained there had been no response from the LTTE were incorrect, Brattskar emphasized; the LTTE had communicated its interest "in principle," but needed further details. Brattskar said that he was "pretty fed up" with Government-inspired anti-Norway stories which had been appearing in the recent local press. (There was a spate of such stories in the weekend papers, including one which detailed a conversation between Ambassador Lunstead and the President's Secretary.) Brattskar added that Norway wanted to have a Co-Chairs meeting on Friday, April 28 in Oslo. The GSL, he said, did not want this meeting--perhaps, Brattskar speculated, because it was afraid of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) report on how the parties had fulfilled the commitments made during the first round of talks in February, which would be provided to the Co-Chairs at the meeting. ¶7. (C) Ambassador spoke later that same day with Peace Secretariat head Palitha Kohona, who said that there was SIPDIS "nothing back from Kilinochchi" on the Government offer of a larger helicopter. He was hoping for a positive response and had all the details in front of him if the Tigers agreed. Kohona added that they had one other transport option -- a Sri Lankan Airlines seaplane to ferry the LTTE cadres north. "Our objective is to call the LTTE bluff" on Geneva, he said. -------------- COLOMBO 00000661 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) While the LTTE continues to refuse resumed dialogue until its transportation demands are met, the body toll among both Sinhalese and Tamils, civilian and military, keeps climbing. With each new incident of bloodshed comes the grim possibility of communal mob violence, already unleashed on hard-pressed Tamil villagers twice in the past two weeks. Whatever or whoever may be behind the "Sinhalese goons" who have terrorized Tamil civilians--and regardless of whether the gangs are organized or a spontaneous outburst of long-simmering ethnic enmities--the Government has got to get a handle on it soon or risk a reenactment of the bloody 1983 massacre that helped kick off the 23-year conflict. As the Ambassador urged the Foreign Minister last week (Ref C),the President needs to get out ahead of the accelerating cycle of attack and retaliatory attack with a strong message to all Sri Lankans that mob rule and ethnic score-settling will not be tolerated. End comment. LUNSTEAD