SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEE SLIGHT HOPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000634 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEE SLIGHT HOPE FOR GENEVA TALKS REF: A. COLOMBO 613 ¶B. COLOMBO 620 ¶C. COLOMBO 601 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an April 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said they still held out some hope that talks in Geneva between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) might take place April 24-25 but expressed concern that the LTTE might use vague "security considerations" as yet another pretext to pull out. While the LTTE's campaign of violence raises serious questions about its commitment to the peace process, the Norwegians also questioned whether President Mahinda Rajapaksa (who refused to meet Hanssen-Bauer on the eve of his April 20 trip to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi) has the political will to pursue a peace process that may lead toward a "federal solution." Ambassador Lunstead observed that while Rajapaksa's intentions about the peace process seem good, his understanding of what might constitute an acceptable resolution--and what the political costs of advancing that proposal might be--seems weak. The Norwegians agreed that the rapidly deteriorating situation warrants an early Co-chair meeting--perhaps in Europe on April 28. End summary. -------------- ONE "HAPPY MOMENT," SUCCEEDED BY UNCERTAINTY -------------- ¶2. (C) In an April 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar said they were seeking advice from him on next steps, following the postponement of talks between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) in Geneva and the continued disagreement between the two parties on transporting Tiger cadres from the east to LTTE headquarters in the north for consultations (Refs A and B). The Norwegians said some slight hope remains that talks in Geneva could still take place on April 24-25 if the transportation issue were resolved. Hanssen-Bauer said he had one "happy moment" April 15 when it appeared that the Tigers would accept transportation to the north by civilian ferry, accompanied by the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), but these plans fell through when the LTTE rejected the arrangement at the last minute for "tremendously complex reasons" (Ref B). The SLMM is now working on another plan--originally suggested by President Rajapaksa 10 days ago--to have the eastern LTTE military commanders brought to the north by private helicopter, Hanssen-Bauer reported. Although GSL Peace Secretariat head Palitha Kohona has finally identified a private helicopter operator to ferry the Tigers, Brattskar noted, two days of valuable time have already been lost. (Note: The Tigers have stipulated that they need a seven-day window before talks begin for internal consultations with their cadres. End note.) ¶3. (C) The Norwegians have already warned the GSL it may be too late to proceed with talks on April 24-25, Hanssen-Bauer said, adding "we have signaled to both sides we have done all that we could" and it is now up to the parties to decide if they want to pursue talks. When LTTE Peace Secretariat head Pulidevan had called him to explain why the Tigers had rejected the ferry transport at the eleventh hour, Hanssen-Bauer said, "I told him, 'I'm not interested.'" Hanssen-Bauer said that he tried to impress on Pulidevan that the Tigers had hurt themselves by backing out of the talks, arguing that the Tigers' unreasonable behavior had only made the GSL look good. He noted that the LTTE had mentioned vague "security considerations" about accepting the private helo arrangement. Should the Tigers push that position COLOMBO 00000634 002 OF 004 during his April 20 visit to Kilinochchi, Hanssen-Bauer said, "we would find that argument hard to accept." -------------- ARE THE TIGERS SINCERE? EVEN NORWEGIANS BEGINNING TO WONDER -------------- ¶4. (C) The Tigers' surprise cancellation of the SLMM-brokered travel arrangements on April 15, coupled with their campaign of violence against civilian and military targets (Ref B),raise troubling questions about the Tigers' sincerity in the peace process, Hanssen-Bauer continued. He said that he had told the LTTE the violence is detrimental to its own goals and must stop. The Tigers have long-term goals but short-term tactics that they adjust when they believe it suits their purposes, Ambassador Lunstead observed. For the Tigers, violence is a matter of simple tactics, rather than principle or ideology; they turn the violence on or off according to their own internal calculations about what best serves their purpose at a given time. That said, the April 12 bombing of a vegetable market in Trincomalee (Ref C) was qualitatively different from other Tiger attacks since the ceasefire, the Ambassador observed, in that it targeted civilians and seemed intended to ignite communal tensions. ¶5. (C) If the LTTE set off the bomb in the market (of which he said he was not certain),does it mean that the Tigers view the entire peace process as an exercise in futility, Hanssen-Bauer asked rhetorically. Unhappy with the prospect of a terrorist listing by the EU, have they decided to end any attempt at achieving a peaceful resolution? Or was the market attack meant as a warning to the GSL that it must comply with its commitments (to restrain the Karuna faction) from the first round of talks in February? Any of these possibilities is disturbing, Ambassador Lunstead replied, especially since the Tigers have made an obvious decision not to worry about civilian casualties to achieve their ends. He noted, however, that sources in military intelligence do not believe recent small-scale attacks by the LTTE presage a return to full-scale conflict but speculate instead that the LTTE may attempt a grab at Jaffna before (re)settling down to peace talks from a position of enhanced strength. According to these sources, the attacks in Trincomalee and Vavuniya may be an attempt by the Tigers to force the military to divert resources away from Jaffna--which so far the military has not done. -------------- -- ALSO WONDERING IF GSL UNDERSTANDS IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUING PEACE TALKS (I.E., FEDERALISM) -------------- -- ¶6. (C) Continuing the peace talks implies, at the end of the road, some kind of federal solution, Hanssen-Bauer commented. Does the GSL understand that? Ambassador Lunstead replied that President Rajapaksa seems sincere in wanting peace but unsure about how to go about achieving it. Rajapaksa does not seem to understand the depth of Tamil grievances and thus underestimates the profound changes that will be needed to address them, the Ambassador said. Rajapaksa's repeated and simplistic suggestion that the provincial council system allows adequate provision for Tamil aspirations is an example of how little he understands the situation. Rajapaksa's intentions are good, but his understanding of Tamil grievances and aspirations is weak, the Ambassador said. On the other hand, the President is willing to listen to arguments and to change his mind. ¶7. (C) Another potential problem for the President is that he wants a southern consensus on a final solution--which means keeping the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) on board, the Ambassador said. Rajapaksa may be mistaken in his belief that he can eventually bring the JVP around, the Ambassador noted. However, while Rajapaksa has an aversion to the term "federalism," he does not seem to object to its basic premise, the Ambassador observed, and has COLOMBO 00000634 003 OF 004 indicated that the Indian "system" (which he does not seem to consider federalism) might be worth reviewing. Regrettably, however, the GSL has not developed a single, uniform message articulating its goals, the Ambassador commented, noting that various GSL spokesmen and ministers shift back and forth between calling for a "unified" and "unitary" state. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Brattskar noted that President Rajapaksa had turned down a Norwegian request to meet Hanssen-Bauer before he travels to Kilinochchi on April 20. Brattskar speculated that the President may be basing his decision on the fact that the Norwegian facilitator will not be meeting Tiger supreme leader Prabhakaran on this trip, but stressed that, even in the worst of times, they had never had any problem meeting President Kumaratunga. He noted recent press reports criticizing the Norwegians and the SLMM for "going the extra mile for the Tigers" in trying to resolve the transportation issue--when all they were really doing was trying to salvage the fast-deteriorating peace process. "We don't want to lose our relationship with the LTTE, but the public perception is that we're biased," Hanssen-Bauer said. Now is the time for the GSL to signal flexibility to move the peace process ahead, he added, rather than sticking on points of protocol. Ambassador Lunstead offered to raise the matter with Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera and Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga. (The Ambassador spoke to SIPDIS Weeratunga later in the day, and he promised to see if the President could find time to meet Hanssen-Bauer. Weeratunga also said there was no protocol or pride issue involved.) -------------- EU WRITING ON THE WALL? -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador Brattskar said he believes the Tigers may view an EU listing of the LTTE as a terrorist organization as inevitable and permanent until a final resolution of the conflict is achieved. Once the EU designates the LTTE, will the Japanese follow? It is important that the Tigers know any designation is linked (as the US has done) to their behavior, Ambassador Lunstead replied; if their behavior changes, the designation can be lifted. The Tigers' repeated and flagrant ceasefire violations have driven the designation process to this point, he continued; for the EU to continue to overlook Tiger behavior would be difficult. It would tell the Tigers that their behavior has no consequences. Brattskar agreed, but noted the difficulties an EU designation might raise for the continued participation of Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the SLMM. "We absolutely need to know what it means for the SLMM," he said. Ambassador Lunstead suggested the possibility of an "SLMM set-aside" in the designation. -------------- NEXT CO-CHAIRS MEETING -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador Brattskar agreed that shifting the next Co-chairs meeting until the end of May was inadvisable. He reported that International Development Minister Erik Solheim planned to call Japanese facilitator Yasushi Akashi to propose an earlier, more immediate co-chairs meeting in a European capital o/a April 28 but would try to sweeten the message by proposing a Co-chairs meeting in Tokyo at a later date, perhaps in September. Ambassador Lunstead said that April 28 in Europe could work and agreed that planning a later meeting in Tokyo would be a good idea. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) New to Sri Lanka and its bloody history, Hanssen-Bauer seemed genuinely perplexed by the LTTE's about-face on the transportation issue and searching for an explanation of the Tigers' stepped-up violence. While he and COLOMBO 00000634 004 OF 004 Brattskar still hold out (faint) hope of salvaging talks in Geneva, the Norwegians seem increasingly uncertain, absent clearer evidence of Tiger commitment to the peace process and GSL willingness to begin serious consideration of a political settlement, where those talks might lead. Like the Norwegians, we believe a Co-chairs meeting is needed sooner, rather than later, to discuss implications of the rapidly changing situation. LUNSTEAD