TIGERS NOT YET COMMITTED TO SECOND ROUND OF TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000557 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE SUBJECT: TIGERS NOT YET COMMITTED TO SECOND ROUND OF TALKS, GOVERNMENT READY TO BROADEN AGENDA REF: COLOMBO 543 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are not yet willing to commit to attending the second round of peace talks scheduled for April 19-20 in Geneva, according to Solheim and Hanssen-Bauer. While the Tigers want to stick to discussing the Ceasefire Agreement, the GSL wants to broaden the talks to move toward political settlement issues. The Government has no clear plan on how to get there, however. Despite LTTE complaints, the Norwegians feel the next round will go ahead. Solheim feels President Rajapaksa is not getting an accurate picture of the situation from his military and bureaucracy. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) Norwegian International Development Minister Eric Solheim visited Sri Lanka April 6 to join up with new Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer on his initial trip to Sri Lanka. Hanssen-Bauer called on numerous GSL officials and also visited Kilinocchi April 5 for discussions with the LTTE. The two called on Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa on April 6, and they debriefed Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission that same day. LTTE Still Not Committed to Geneva II -------------- ¶3. (C) Hanssen-Bauer, who met Tamilchelvam in Kilinocchi, said that the LTTE was not interested in discussing the overall situation. In fact, the Tigers were not willing to commit to attending the second round of renewed peace talks scheduled for Geneva April 19-20. They had three complaints: --armed groups, they said, including the Karuna faction, were still operating despite GSL promises at Geneva I; --they were concerned about the security of their delegation while transiting Colombo airport; --they wanted GSL transportation for their cadres from the East to attend a Central Committee meeting in Kilinocchi prior to departing for Geneva. Hanssen-Bauer said the Tigers did not present these issues as absolute preconditions for the resumption of talks, but that it was close to that. The Norwegians told them that the international community would react very negatively if the Tigers did not go to Geneva, and that they should not impose conditions based on compliance with Geneva I. ¶4. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said they discussed these issues with chief GSL negotiator Nimal Siripala de Silva, and also with the GSL Peace Secretariat (SCOPP),and felt that the second and third issues could be resolved. Government Wants Broader Agenda -------------- ¶5. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said that all of their GSL interlocutors had expressed a desire to see Geneva II move beyond just a discussion of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and on to more substantive issues--democracy, political pluralism and human rights--as progress towards a final settlement. (Note: we have heard the same thing in our conversations with GSL officials.) Hanssen-Bauer noted that while the GSL has a picture of where it wants to go, it does not have a plan about how to get there. It needs to communicate this to the Tigers and, more important, find a way to build confidence. President Uninformed? -------------- COLOMBO 00000557 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Hanssen-Bauer and Solheim met together with President Rajapaksa for ten minutes and then Solheim had a one hour one-on-one session. Solheim said that he discussed three main matters with Rajapaksa: the Karuna faction, the need for confidence building measures, and the desirability of a consensus with the main opposition UNP. Solheim said that the President seemed unaware that there had been 10-12 killings of LTTE members since Geneva I by "other armed groups," presumably the Karuna faction. This could not have happened without Sri Lankan military acquiescence. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was providing weekly reports to the GSL, but this news was apparently not being passed to the President. Solheim said that he had arranged for the SLMM to provide a report directly to the President. The President in turn firmly promised to clamp down on Karuna. ¶7. (C) On the other issues, Solheim urged the President to look for confidence building measures to use with the LTTE, not just constantly beat up on them. At Rajapaksa's request, Norway would come up with some ideas for CBM's. On working with the UNP, Rajapaksa made it clear he was ready to deal with UNP leader Ranil Wickremasinghe--but not in a way that would make the JVP bolt and end up as the main opposition. Rajapaksa also said that there were as many as 35 UNP Members of Parliament who were ready to join the SLFP. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The LTTE appears determined to play the pre-Geneva situation for whatever they can get, but Hanssen-Bauer said he was fairly confident they would in the end show up. The GSL's desire to move on to more substantive issues is understandable, but to make it happen they will need to come up with a reasoned plan for how to make the transition--and also will need to show the Tigers why they should be willing to do so. A major part of that involves clamping down on Karuna. LUNSTEAD