SRI LANKA: JVP SOLDIERING ON AFTER DISAPPOINTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000546 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: JVP SOLDIERING ON AFTER DISAPPOINTING SHOW IN LOCAL ELECTION REF: A. COLOMBO 543 ¶B. COLOMBO 528 ¶C. COLOMBO 495 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) In an April 3 meeting with poloff, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) General Secretary Tilvin Silva downplayed his party's dismal showing in March 30 local elections (Ref B). "We knew the SLFP (the governing Sri Lanka Freedom Party) was going to win," he insisted; "we're pleased with our results." Unlike the JVP, the SLFP and the opposition United National Party (UNP) have traditional bases of support; the Marxist nationalist party, on the other hand, has had to build up its own voter base from nothing, he contended. Vigorous campaigning for the recent election helped the JVP expand its existing base; "now we have to strengthen it and go forward." Consulting a spread sheet, Silva reported that the JVP had captured 12 percent of all votes cast islandwide, improving (moderately) on the 9 percent it had won in the 2002 local elections. He noted that even if the JVP had gained control of no more than the one village council it had won in the 2002 election, the party had nonetheless increased the total number of seats it holds on local bodies islandwide from 219 to 363. Although Silva conceded the party had fallen short of its target of 400 seats, he claimed that the JVP still stands a good chance of picking up additional numbers in some of the 22 electorates in which polling has been postponed (Ref B). (Note: One of these races is in the traditional SLFP stronghold of Gampaha, where a JVP challenge to the SLFP nomination list has effectively knocked the lead contender out of the running. End note.) ¶2. (C) Local election results should not be misonstrued as an endorsement of President Mahinda ajapaksa's policies (known as the "Mahinda Chintaa," or "vision"),Silva asserted. There was no "chintana" (vision) in this election, he argued; instead, voters were most concerned with issues like garbage collection and electricity. He predicted that the President would not attempt to translate his party's victory at local polls into a reason to go for snap Parliamentary elections. "The Government is not hoping to go for (general) elections," he observed, although the JVP "don't mind going for elections." ¶3. (C) Poloff observed that the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) had done surprisingly well, capturing control of five local bodies in the eastern districts of Trincomalee and Ampara. Elections in areas where the TNA won do not count as truly democratic elections, Silva scoffed; other political parties "can't do any politics" in areas under TNA--and by association, LTTE--influence. The UNP's relatively strong showing (35 local councils or 13 percent--respectable for the opposition party in local elections) he also dismissed. If the SLFP and JVP had contested together instead of separately, the opposition UNP would have won only one local council, he claimed. ¶4. (SBU) On April 5 local press reports quoted rabble-rousing JVP MP Wimal Weerawansa demanding that President Rajapaksa honor his pledge to the JVP, made in exchange for the reds' support of his presidential bid last November, to amend the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and to oust Norway as peace process facilitator. If the President failed to honor these commitments, press accounts suggested, the JVP would threaten to withdraw its support from the government. Members of the JVP leadership reportedly were to seek a meeting soon with the President to press these demands. ¶5. (C) Comment: The people have spoken--and the JVP still refuses to shut up. Weerawansa's bluster may grab headlines, but the truth is that the President (unlike a Prime Minister) does not need JVP support to retain his position. Although the JVP leadership is trying to put on a brave face, these former Marxist insurgents have to be disappointed with their party's limp performance at the local level (where, according to the JVP's own hype, it is supposed to be strongest). But if the President thought his obstreperous partners would be chastened by their dismal showing, he must be disappointed as well. The JVP's lackluster results at the popular level are COLOMBO 00000546 002 OF 002 not deterring the irrepressible reds from trying to press their hardline views on the peace process. We expect the President will ignore the JVP's threats and continue efforts to re-engage with the Tigers (Ref A). LUNSTEAD