COLOMBO CO-CHAIRS HUDDLE IN FACE OF POST-GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000471 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM CE NO SUBJECT: COLOMBO CO-CHAIRS HUDDLE IN FACE OF POST-GENEVA DRIFT ON PEACE FRONT REF: (A) COLOMBO 467 (B) COLOMBO 460 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reason 1 .5 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. In the face of tepid performances by both the GSL and the LTTE in fulfilling their Geneva commitments, local co- chair representatives plan to beard each side in early April, after March 30 local government elections. That said, violence remains down which is quite encouraging. The Norwegian facilitators see little sign of a serious GSL policy process to get ready for "Geneva Two" April 19-20. Local co- chair representatives agreed that momentum in capitals seems to be for a high-level co-chair meeting in Tokyo on the margins of the April 24 EU summit there. Local reps also agreed on the merit of a capital-level public statement on the eve of the next round in Geneva, although the substance of that statement will depend on events over the next few weeks. End Summary ¶2. (C) Charge' attended March 24 Colombo co-chairs meeting, hosted by EC Ambassador Wilson. Japanese Ambassador Suda, Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar and Dutch Ambassador Van Dijk also participated. "Not Going Well," but Violence is Down -------------- ¶3. (C) Brattskar opened with an overview of the "post-Geneva" situation on the ground, from his perspective as peace process facilitator. "It is not going well," Brattskar said. Neither side is takings its commitments as spelled out in the joint statement seriously, Brattskar stated, although he emphasized that it is extremely important to note that the overall level of violence is still down significantly. In the Norwegian view, the government (GSL) is not taking active steps to rein in armed groups and takes the position that since violence by those armed groups is down there is nothing that the GSL needs to do. For its part, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continue to abduct children. While there has been no resurgence of LTTE attacks on GSL soldiers and sailors, Brattskar noted that when he met LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi last week, Thamilchelvan told him that frustration was increasing with the GSL's "failure" to meet its Geneva obligations and that the "Tamil people" might begin "spontaneous attacks" on the Army and Navy as they had done in the December/January period (Brattskar hastened to note, correctly, that this was nonsense; any such attacks had been and would be conducted by the LTTE). Brattskar said he (and outgoing SLMM head Haukland who was with him) had a "very heated exchange" with Thamilchelvan on the child abduction issue. ¶4. (C) Brattskar advised the co-chairs that both sides were involved in a "complaints competition" with the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), trying to increase the number of official reports of possible violations by the other side. He has advised the SLMM not to worry about the numbers of violations ("which could range from raising a flag to shooting at a ship") but rather on the substantive nature of the allegations. Brattskar told the co-chairs ("in strictest confidence") that the SLMM was delivering weekly "report cards" on violations to both the GSL and the LTTE. Moreover, the SLMM will over the next few weeks COLOMBO 00000471 002 OF 004 issue several "rulings" on violations such as numerous child abductions, some early March killings and recent incidents around Muttur near Trincomalee. The SLMM "rulings" will inevitably irritate one side or the other. "No Policy Process" -------------- ¶5. (C) Brattskar noted that there did not seem to be much of a GSL policy process under way to get ready for "Geneva Two." Delegation leader Nimal Siripala de Silva seemed to be in discussions with President Rajapaksa and his inner circle about "Geneva Two" but none of the other Geneva delegation members had any idea what was going on. Moreover, a number of unhelpful statements had been made by GSL officials (in fairness, Brattskar conceded, in the context of the intensifying campaign for the March 30 local government elections). "But, as we've told them many times, they can't support the process in private and savage it in public." Brattskar said (shaking his head wearily) that GSL delegation member H.L. deSilva (who unhelpfully posited after the first round that the joint statement constituted an amendment to the cease-fire agreement (CFA)) had the night before stated at a public seminar that the joint statement had not been the product of GSL-LTTE interaction and negotiation but had been foisted on the parties by the Norwegians. "Lots of people will believe him." Wilson observed that the treatment Foreign Minister Samaraweera had received in his recent swing through European capitals probably hadn't helped since his European interlocutors had tended to "stroke him" for what the GSL had committed itself to in Geneva rather than press him about how it would be implemented. Brattskar and van Dijk agreed. ¶6. (C) Asked whether he thought "Geneva Two" would take place, Brattskar said the GSL would definitely be there. He would not want to attempt to portray LTTE thinking at the moment although in his meetings in Kilinochchi last week "Thamilchelvan didn't say they would not go." If both sides show up, Brattskar speculated, the LTTE will want to stick to discussion on the CFA and the GSL will want to move on to broader peace issues although each will realize they have to accommodate the other's agenda to a certain extent. In conclusion, Brattskar noted, Norway finds itself in a very difficult position as facilitator in the run-up to the second round in Geneva: "We're expected to produce another miracle with neither side appearing to be committed to it." Focusing the Parties on Their Obligations Prior to "Geneva Two" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Agreeing that both sides needed to be asked to account for their tepid implementation of their Geneva commitments, the co-chairs discussed a number of scenarios. They agreed on the following plan, taking into account the realities that the GSL is currently focused almost exclusively on the March 30 local government elections and that posing general questions about the overall Geneva situation would result in each side spelling out an encyclopedic list of the other side's depredations: -- during the first week of April, local COLOMBO 00000471 003 OF 004 co-chair representatives will call on President Rajapaksa and engage him in a discussion focused around two questions: what is the GSL doing to implement what it committed itself to in the Geneva joint statement? Beyond that, what is the GSL doing to create a general atmosphere of mutual confidence in the run-up to "Geneva Two?" -- shortly after meeting with the President, the local co-chair representatives (minus the U.S.) will travel to Kilinochchi and attempt to have a similar discussion with LTTE interlocutors about its post-Geneva sincerity. -- after the two meetings, the local co-chairs representatives would put out a brief public statement that they had met with both sides to assess their commitment to the Geneva process and hear what each side was doing to demonstrate that commitment. This statement would be intended, since both meetings would inevitably leak, to make sure the co-chair effort was accurately portrayed in the local media. -- One or two co-chair reps (probably Wilson and van Dijk) would next week quietly tell Foreign Secretary Palihakkara that the co-chairs would SIPDIS like to call on the President and (minus the U.S.) go to Kilinochchi the first week of April in order to help move the Geneva process along. ¶8. (C) Brattskar noted that new Norwegian "special envoy" Jon Hanssen-Bauer might be in Sri Lanka for orientation the first week of April (and Erik Solheim might come in for one of those days), which could complicate the plan for local co-chair reps to beard the two sides that week. But, he undertook to sort the details out with Oslo. The other co-chair reps agreed to run the plan by their capitals. Next High-Level Co-Chair Meeting in Japan After Geneva? -------------- -- ¶9. (C) Comparing notes on various discussions with and between capitals, local co-chair representatives agreed that momentum seemed to be developing for the next capital-level co-chairs meeting to take place in Tokyo o/a April 24 on the margins of the EU summit scheduled for Japan at that time. Wilson said it appeared Ferraro- Waldner would be available; Brattskar said the same regarding Solheim (who, according to Brattskar, had discussed the topic with U/S Burns the night before). Suda cautioned that an "extra meeting" in addition to the EU summit might be difficult and noted that Japanese envoy Akashi did not plan to be in Japan around April 24 (although Suda made clear he had no instructions from Tokyo regarding the next co-chair meeting). Suda conceded that his government has wanted to host the next co-chairs meeting for some time and thus undertook to engage with Tokyo regarding the April 24 timeframe. ¶10. (C) Colombo co-chair representatives also agreed that a co-chair statement issued by capitals shortly before "Geneva Two" probably is a good idea. Such a statement would presumably call on both sides to negotiate with good faith and flexibility, meet their joint statement COLOMBO 00000471 004 OF 004 commitments, pledge co-chair support for the process, etc. Final statement language would depend on the situation on the ground and the results of the co-chair engagement with the President and the LTTE outlined above. Co-chair reps agreed to begin circulating drafts in early April. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The Norwegian assessment is, in our view, on the mark. Both sides are focused on picking apart the other's post-Geneva performance rather than demonstrating their seriousness of purpose about fulfilling their own commitments, although the overall reduction in violence continues to be encouraging. The proposal outlined above should give the co-chairs the opportunity to quietly ask each side to account for its post-Geneva actions (or lack thereof) and what they are willing to do to ensure that a substantive, productive second round takes place. End Comment. ENTWISTLE