SRI LANKA: NORWEGIANS CONCERNED ABOUT PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000467 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV PHUM CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIANS CONCERNED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SECOND ROUND OF TALKS REF: A. COLOMBO 408 ¶B. COLOMBO 414 ¶C. COLOMBO 460 Classified By: CDA JAMES F. ENTWISTLE. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 23 meeting, Norwegian emboffs expressed concern that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), absent greater evidence that the Government is disarming the Karuna paramilitary and/or other confidence building measures, may pull out of talks with the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) in Geneva April 19-21. The LTTE is also pushing to take child recruitment off the agenda in the next meeting, the Norwegians reported, but the Norwegian Ambassador and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) have refused. Expanding the April agenda to accommodate discussion of a permanent settlement (as the GSL wishes) is possible, the Norwegians commented, but the LTTE is unlikely to agree unless it sees progress on the issues raised in the February meeting. The Norwegian Embassy has tried repeatedly to arrange a visit by members of the Muslim Peace Secretariat to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, but the LTTE so far has not accommodated that request. End summary. -------------- TIGERS COMPLAINING (AGAIN); NORWEGIANS WORRIED (AGAIN) -------------- ¶2. (C) In a March 23 meeting, Norwegian emboffs Erik Nurnberg and Tom Knappskog told poloff of their concerns that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) might pull out of a second round of talks, scheduled for April 19-21 in Geneva, with the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL). Nurnberg, who had accompanied the Norwegian Ambassador on a March 16 trip to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, said that Tiger political chief Thamilchelvan had complained that the GSL was not disarming the dissident Karuna group. Nor had the GSL offered any other confidence-building measures, according to Thamilchelvan. Thamilchelvan had repeatedly stressed in the meeting that expected "steps toward normalcy" after the first round in Geneva had failed to materialize, the Norwegians said, raising fears that the Tigers might decide the GSL had not done enough to warrant a second meeting in April. For example, Knappskog said, an LTTE plan to reopen its political offices in GSL-controlled territory (Ref B) had been stymied when the GSL imposed a host of informational requirements (names of people staffing the offices; operating hours; telephone numbers and addresses) as a condition. In addition, the Norwegian diplomat noted the GSL's refusal to provide LTTE cadres with helicopter transport when they were moving from north to east (not a requirement of the Ceasefire Agreement but something that the previous government of Ranil Wickremesinghe had provided regularly). ¶3. (C) Poloff noted that the February 23 joint statement does not explicitly commit the GSL to disarm the Karuna faction--just to prevent persons or groups from carrying arms or conducting armed operations. As long as no one sees the Karuna group carrying arms and there are no armed operations in GSL-controlled territory, the GSL will likely take the position that it has fulfilled its commitment--and may push to move on to more substantive issues (Ref A). (Note: This also seems to be the view of the Indian High Commission. An Indian diplomat here told us recently that a post-Geneva "reduction" in violence ought to be enough to satisfy both sides.) Knappskog acknowledged that the GSL may well wish to move the talks on to the next level, but commented that he saw no evidence of a GSL strategy on how to achieve this. Moreover, the LTTE will likely resist any initiative to move the talks past the ceasefire, he predicted, absent any signs COLOMBO 00000467 002 OF 003 of progress on the matters discussed in the first round. "The LTTE will want to see tangible signs of improvement before moving ahead," he commented, and "needs to see (GSL) sincerity in a step-by-step approach." The Norwegians want to avoid being stuck with the task of determining the agenda, Knappskog emphasized; disagreement about various agenda items could be used by either side as a pretext to call off the meeting. Nurnberg added that Housing Minister Ferial Ashraff, who had been part of the GSL delegation to Geneva in February, told them that she had attended no meetings on mapping out the strategy for the next round since her return and had no idea if she will be included as a team member in April. -------------- THOSE CHILDREN AREN'T SOLDIERS; THEY'RE CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISTS -------------- ¶4. (C) During the Kilinochchi meeting, Thamilchelvan had "sent a very strong message" that child recruitment should be taken off the agenda for the April talks because the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) does not specifically address it, Nurnberg reported. Both Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar and outgoing Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) head Hagrup Hauckland countered that contention by noting that the CFA covers abductions (a tried-and-true Tiger method of "recruitment"),with Hauckland stressing that his organization must respond to the numerous complaints of such incidents it receives from affected family members. Thamilchelvan also argued that many of the children who flee to the LTTE for "protection" are not employed as soldiers, but are instead participating in LTTE "civilian activities"; that many of the children reportedly abducted by the LTTE are actually abducted by "other groups" (i.e., Karuna); and that the issue of child soldiers is already adequately addressed by the agreement between the LTTE and UNICEF and that the GSL has no role in the discussion, the Norwegians said. -------------- - CURRENT LTTE THINKING ON PERMANENT SETTLEMENT -------------- - ¶5. (C) Since the November 17 presidential election, the LTTE has been "very reluctant" to discuss its current thinking about the elements of a permanent settlement, Nurnberg said. Knappskog said he believes that while the Tigers may still cherish the goal of a separate state, they are also realistic and recognize that this goal would not be endorsed by either the GSL or the international community. (He added, however, that the LTTE did seem to nurse some very "unrealistic expectations" about support--especially financial--from the Tamil diaspora for a separate state.) Given those limitations, the LTTE likely realizes that it might ultimately have to settle for some form of federal arrangement, Knappskog said, but will probably push for as loosely structured an arrangement as possible. The LTTE's proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) probably offers the most recent and most fully articulated view on Tiger thinking in this area, he concluded. -------------- MUSLIM PARTICIPATION: AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE, BUT STILL NO SEAT AT THE TABLE -------------- ¶6. (C) While both the GSL and LTTE profess to acknowledge the importance of addressing Muslim concerns, "Norway is the only one raising Muslim issues" consistently, Knappskog noted. There is no move on either side to accommodate a separate Muslim delegation to talks at this time. (Comment: We suspect that even if such an invitation were tendered, it would be virtually impossible for the politically fragmented Muslim community to agree on the composition of a COLOMBO 00000467 003 OF 003 delegation.) Knappskog said he has tried repeatedly to arrange a visit by the head of the Muslim Peace Secretariat to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi, but while the LTTE always agrees in principle to receive such a visit, when the time comes there is always some reason it is not convenient. The Norwegian diplomat said that he plans to try again in the next few weeks. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The GSL strongly suspects that the main reason the LTTE agreed to come to the table in Geneva is because it needs help in cleaning up the Karuna faction. Thus in the GSL view, Karuna is not a problem; he is part of a solution--and the only real leverage the GSL still has. Given this perspective, it is highly unlikely that the GSL would ever go about disarming what it sees as its last bulwark against an LTTE sweep of Tamil communities in the north and east. The LTTE's (and, we suspect, the Norwegians' and SLMM's) interpretation of what the GSL committed to do in Geneva differs sharply from the Government's own view that it agreed to do nothing more than to restrain armed activities and operations in areas under its control. If this disparity in understanding is not addressed, the second round, if it takes place, may well degenerate into the "shouting match" SLMM fears (Ref B). ENTWISTLE