SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY CLAIMS NO GSL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000408 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/INS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV MOPS PHUM CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY CLAIMS NO GSL CONNECTION TO PARAMILITARIES REF: A. COLOMBO 377 ¶B. COLOMBO 351 Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD. REASON: 1.4 (B,D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 15 meeting with Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the Ambassador stressed the importance of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) upholding its commitment to restrain any armed group other than Government security forces from operating in GSL-controlled territory (Reftels). According to Rajapaksa, the security forces, which he asserted maintain no ties to the Karuna faction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),are assiduously carrying out this pledge. Rajapaksa suggested that members of the Karuna faction should engage in humanitarian and political work, rather than their more customary occupations of murder, abductions and extortions, to win the hearts and minds of eastern Tamils. At the Ambassador's urging, Rajapaksa agreed to meet with the ICRC Head of Delegation regarding several recent reported abductions. End summary. -------------- PRESIDENT "ADAMANT" ON KEEPING THE PEACE IN GSL TERRITORIES -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 15 the Ambassador called on Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to discuss Government of Sri SIPDIS Lanka (GSL) efforts to uphold its commitment, conveyed in the February 23 joint statement issued after talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Geneva, "to ensure that no armed group or person other than Government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations." The Ambassador commended the GSL team in Geneva for dealing sensibly with the sensitive paramilitary issue during the talks and underscored the importance that the GSL honor that commitment. While acknowledging that it may be impossible to exert 100 percent control over each and every armed person, the Ambassador noted that the sharp decline in violent incidents since talks were announced in late January proves that both sides can reduce the violence if there is political will to do so. The USG supports what President Mahinda Rajapaksa is trying to do, the Ambassador said, but our ability to help will be diminished if violent incidents recur. ¶3. (C) Rajapaksa, the younger brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, said that the initial draft text of the joint statement committed the GSL to disarm paramilitaries, which he immediately realized would be unacceptable. He said he suggested the alternative language in the final statement to his brother, who accepted it. The President "from the beginning . . . was adamant" that no other armed groups, "no matter who," operate in GSL-controlled territory, the Secretary of Defense continued. Exerting such control is SIPDIS easier in Colombo or even Ampara or Trincomalee than in Batticaloa, however, Rajapaksa cautioned, where the civilians themselves are divided into pro-LTTE and pro-Karuna factions, making intelligence gathering difficult for the GSL. He added that there are as many as eight different Karuna groups operating in the east, none of which seem to be controlled by any one person, probably because Karuna himself is not in the country. Citing a recent incident in which suspected LTTE cadres burned a bus in GSL-controlled territory in Batticaloa after suspected Karuna cadres reportedly abducted two local youths, Rajapaksa said that the police alone are unable to prevent such incidents without the assistance of the Sri Lanka Army (which has recently seen much of its strength in COLOMBO 00000408 002 OF 003 the east transferred to secure Jaffna in the north) or the Special Task Force, which is not stationed that far north in the east. ¶4. (C) Nonetheless, Rajapaksa said, he is confident that the security forces can uphold the commitment--provided that the LTTE upholds its reciprocal commitment not to attack the security forces. If the LTTE resumes these attacks, however, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU),the President's hardline political allies, "will come at the President" to make a show of force, he predicted. Rajapaksa added that he was able to dissuade the JVP and JHU from pressing for retaliation during the December-January attacks against the military by telling them that the GSL was not prepared militarily for a return to hostilities. "If we lose another hundred soldiers again, we can't hold (the JVP and JHU) off from pushing for a military response," he said. -------------- LACK OF LINKS WITH KARUNA COMPLICATES TASK FOR SECURITY FORCES -------------- ¶5. (C) The security forces' task to uphold the GSL's commitment is complicated by the absence of links to anyone in the Karuna group, Rajapaksa asserted. He told the Ambassador that he had passed a message to military officers in the field that "we have to have some links to these people to explain about the peace process." Rajapaksa blamed the firewall on written instructions reportedly issued by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga warning of dire consequences for any military officer in contact with members of the Karuna faction. Ever since, whatever links there had been were severed, and the defense establishment has scrupulously avoided any contact, regardless of how innocuous or at what level, with anyone in the Karuna group, he said. Instead, political parties like the opposition United National Party (UNP) and the right-wing religious Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) have stepped into the void, he claimed. Karuna's wife is related to a UNP MP, Rajapaksa continued, and since "the Karuna people love money," it can be deduced that the UNP's relatively strong showing in Batticaloa during the presidential election may be due to the UNP buying votes in the district, he speculated. -------------- A KINDER, GENTLER KARUNA? NO SIGNS YET -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that Indian diplomats returning from a recent trip to the east had reported seeing a number of signs in the area advertising the putative political wing of the Karuna faction. Rajapaksa said that he wants to convince the Karuna group to take up politics, just as the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP),a former anti-LTTE paramilitary turned parliamentary party, had. But "the Karuna people don't understand politics," he lamented. "It would be best if Karuna could come back (from overseas) and do political work like (EPDP leader) Douglas" Devananda, Rajapaksa commented, but may be unable to do so because "he's under RAW control." In addition to politics, the Karuna faction should take up humanitarian work as well, Rajapaksa suggested. The LTTE is winning eastern Tamils' hearts and minds through the charitable work carried out by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO); "Karuna should do more of that." He added that the Karuna faction is looking for NGOs interested in linking up to provide development and/or humanitarian assistance in the east. (Comment: So far the only purported connection between the Karuna faction and charitable organizations has been the unsubstantiated COLOMBO 00000408 003 OF 003 allegation that Karuna cadres abducted seven TRO workers in January.) -------------- REPORTED ABDUCTIONS? -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the ICRC was looking into reports of abductions which took place in Jaffna in the December-January period--some of which were alleged to have had military involvement. The LTTE always wants to blame every incident on the military, Rajapaksa responded. He categorically denied that the military was involved in any way in abductions, adding "it might have been the EPDP or the ENDLF." The Ambassador urged Rajapaksa to meet soon with ICRC Head of Delegation Thierry Meyrat to offer full cooperation in expediting these investigations. Rajapaksa said that he would do so. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) It is hard for us to believe that the Karuna group can have operated for so long and so freely in GSL-controlled territory without some measure of GSL knowledge or acquiescence, if not outright support. Moreover, that violent acts attributed to Karuna in GSL-controlled territory has slipped to near-zero since the talks were announced suggests to us that the government exerts greater influence over the LTTE dissident faction than it is now willing to admit. We are also skeptical of Karuna's marketability as either a democratic politician or humanitarian. He has killed too many of his own people and extorted too much money from them--both during and after his career as an LTTE military commander--to start winning hearts and minds now. But the GSL appears serious about maintaining its commitment to restrain armed activity--which can only be a good thing for the long-suffering people of the east and for prospects for the second round of talks in April. LUNSTEAD